South reduced to the condition of Jamaica or St. Domingo; or, in other words, to a condition of free negro equality.

The abolitionists are the aggressors in this war, while the Southern States are merely claiming their Constitutional rights, as North Carolina has again and again declared. I repeat, that the great practical question for us to determine is, whether we shall, as a people, aid Lincoln in this war on the South, or aid the South in defending its rights in common with our own.

All except those who are at heart for unconditional submission to the Black Republicans, will soon see that this is now the practical issue to be decided. A vote for submission is in effect a vote for civil war and free negro equality over the South.

But, should North Carolina take a stand for resistance, her influence, and that of Virginia, may be sufficient to arrest the purpose of Lincoln and his followers, for they are disinclined to fight a united South, and peace may, in that way, be secured.

The above, hurriedly written as it is, will give you a just idea, I think, of the prospect before us, and you are at liberty to use it as your best judgment may dictate.

I am very truly yours, &c.,

Hon. Jas. W. OSBORNE, Charlotte, N. C.

T. L. CLINGMAN.

Telegram to the Editor of the Charlotte Bulletin.

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1861.

There is no chance whatever for Crittenden's proposition. North Carolina must secede or aid Lincoln in making war on the South.

T. L. CLINGMAN.

[As the session proceeded it became more and more evident that the Republicans were anxious to avoid, as much as possible, alarming the people of the South, and thereby preventing preparations for resistance. While many of them were waiting to see whether the movement would extend beyond the cotton States, they were all resolved apparently to keep the people of the South in the dark as to any hostile purposes they might entertain. Mr. Douglas co-operated strongly with them in insisting that there was no reason to apprehend war. He and other Union men really, without intending to do so probably, materially aided in bringing about the collision. As evidence of the nature of the efforts then made, and of the general current of feeling prevailing at the time, the following extracts from the debates as reported in the Globe are presented:]

REMARKS

ON PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S INAUGURAL, DELIVERED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, MARCH 6, 1861.

Mr. CLINGMAN said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I agree with the honorable Senator from Illinois that there are some points upon which this inaugural is obscure; but they are upon the limitations and conditions. Upon the main points there is no obscurity at all. Allow me to call the attention of that Senator to a few direct sentences:

"I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Can anything be more explicit than that? How does the President execute the laws of the Union in Virginia and Pennsylvania? By occupying the forts that are there, the arsenals and public property, and collecting the duties. That is precisely what he says he intends to do in all the States. But the honorable Senator says that he may not have the power to do that; and if the people do not give him the power he cannot do it, and therefore he draws his hope. Let us see how that stands? The President of the United States now has the control of an army, perhaps of fifteen thousand men. They are scattered far and wide about the country; but in a few weeks half of them, perhaps more, can be concentrated." Will he feel bound to use that army, and the ships of war at his hand to take possession of Fort Moultrie? Clearly the language implies it. Fort Moultrie has been taken possession of by those men whom he pronounces insurgents and revolutionists. This is his language.

"It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to the circumstances."

Mr. Lincoln, upon his own showing, is pledged to regard the taking possession of those forts by the State authority as "insurrectionary or revolutionary." To make the matter more specific, however, if there

could be any doubt about words of such plain import, we have the following:

"The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties on imports."

Is it true that he says, as the Senator supposes, that there will be no bloodshed or violence? He says:

"But beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." What does that mean? It means that Mr. Lincoln will not use force upon obedient men. He does not do it in the District of Columbia. I presume he does not propose to do it anywhere throughout the Union. Those men who obey the laws he will not make war against; but he intends to compel everybody to obedience. The honorable Senator from Illinois knows very well that the States which have seceded claim that they are free from all obligation to pay taxes to this Government, and that they have a right to occupy those forts. Mr. Lincoln says he will compel them to pay taxes to this Government, and that he has a right to occupy those forts, and will do it to the extent of his ability; and if they submit, there will be no bloodshed. Suppose that I say that I intend to occupy the house of the honorable Senator from Illinois, contrary to all right, as he thinks, and I declare to him, "there will be no force or violence if you submit and give up possession to me;" everybody knows that my declaration, that I did not desire violence, would not amount to anything if I declared a purpose to do an unlawful act, or an act that he regarded as unlawful. The States that have seceded regard their right to the forts within their limits as just as good as any man regards the right to his own house. They do not mean to be turned out of them except by force; and hence, when the President says he intends to execute the laws and take possession of the public property, of course, if that be attempted, a collision is inevitable.

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But, Mr. President, I say the practical question is now upon us: shall we have these forts taken; shall we have a collision; shall there be an attempt to collect the revenue in the seceding States or not? It will not do to ask the country to wait two or three or more years, as the Senator from New York suggested, to obtain constitutional amendments. If Mr. Lincoln intends to use the power in his hands, as he states in his inaugural, we must have war. If he does not, I think he is unfortunate in his declarations. If I were a friend of the President, I should advise him to withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens. They are of no earthly use there. The only effect of their presence is to irritate those States. Will those States stand still while Mr. Lincoln calls Congress together to get the force bill enacted which is suggested? I doubt if they will do so. It seems to me the true policy for his friends. and him to take is, to withdraw those troops, and leave the other questions, if there be other questions, for negotiation. I would suspend all attempts to execute, not merely the Post Office laws, but the revenue laws especially. It is no concession to the Government to decline to carry the mails, because it is not so much for the advantage of the Government as the people. I shall not, however, Mr. President, further take up the time of the Senate.

REMARKS

ON THE WAR POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION, DELIVERED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, MARCH 19, 1861.

Mr. CLINGMAN said:

Mr. PRESIDENT. When I took the floor yesterday, I was about to call the attention of the Senator from New Hampshire, [Mr. Hale,] whose course of remark I thought rendered it legitimate for me to do so, to one point in connection with a subject that he alluded to; and I avail myself of this occasion to call his attention, and that of other Senators, to the subject.

It will be recollected, Mr. President, that when the Senator from Connecticut, (Mr. Dixon) offered a resolution to print the inaugural, I expressed the opinion that it meant war; that the policy of the President as there indicated, must necessarily lead to war; and I so characterized it. The honorable Senator from Illinois, not at this moment in his seat, (Mr. Douglas,) expressed a different opinion; and bringing to the view of the Senate several statements made in it, argued that its policy was that of peace. Since then the honorable Senator from Illinois has argued at considerable length, and with great force, and I admit that some of the facts to which he alluded did fend very much to bring my mind to the conclusion that the President, after all, might not attempt to carry out what he declared to be his duty.

I had some hope, from the array of facts presented by the honorable Senator from Illinois, that the policy of the Administration might not be one calculated or intended to involve us inevitably in civil war; but there is one pregnant difficulty in the way; and if the honorable Senator from New Hampshire, or any other Senator, can relieve my mind on that point, I should be very much gratified. If the policy be (as has been contended by the Senator from Illinois and others) one of peace, why should it not be announced? Everybody knows that the country is suffering, that commerce is paralyzed, that manufacturers are depressed, that stocks are down, that there is a general stagnation and distress throughout the land; and, as has been well said by the Senator from Illinois, if the Administration would announce a peaceful policy, we should at once be relieved from these difficulties. Why should it not be done, if that, in fact, be the policy? Everybody will see that it is eminently important that it should be so; but if, on the other hand, a different policy be intended, I can well understand why it should, for the time, be concealed; and I apprehend, and I am forced very reluctantly to the conclusion, that it is the settled policy of those in power to involve us very soon in civil war. Their silence is pregnant, to my mind. Suppose that were the policy; what would the Government do? Would it indicate it at once? By no means. The Government troops are scattered far and wide over the country. Two or three thousand of them, perhaps, are in Texas; and if war were declared at once, there can be no doubt that the people of Texas could make prisoners of that portion of the army. The troops that the Government has, are not

only scattered far and wide, but its ships are on every sea. I understand, and I presume there is no doubt about the fact, that orders have gone to the Mediterranean and to the distant stations, to bring our ships home. Why? If there is a peaceful policy intended, why should our ships be brought out of the Mediterranean? Are they not as necessary now at that point as they ever were? Why is such an immense armament being collected at New York? For if we are to believe the newspapers and private correspondence, there is a larger number of ships of war there now than has ever been collected on our coast at any one time in the last twenty years.

Mr. Grimes. I think they have not been ordered home from the Mediterranean.

Mr. Clingman. It is so stated. I do not know what the fact may be. Mr. Clark. It was so stated during Buchanan's administration.

Mr. Clingman. I will ask the honorable Senator from Iowa-and shall be obliged to him for the information-does he believe that distant ships at the Mediterranean and elsewhere have not been ordered home?

Mr. Grimes. I made enquiries a day or two since on that subject, and learned that they had not been ordered home from the Mediterranean. I made the inquiry of those who I supposed were informed.

Mr. Clingman. Then, I take that to be true. Have they been ordered home from distant stations anywhere? Perhaps the Senator can inform me.

Mr. Grimes. I have no knowledge on that subject.

Mr. Clingman. The Senator has no knowledge on that subject, but only in reference to the Mediterranean. I am very much pleased to hear what he has stated as to that, but it is rumored that ships stationed at distant places have been ordered home; and it is strange that the Senator should inquire as to the Mediterranean and not inquire as to the others.

Mr. Grimes. Not at all. I was interested as to parties on board some of the vessels there.

Mr. Clingman. Then I will take that explanation, that the inquiry as to the Mediterranean, was accidental, or, at least, not connected with this particular subject. My very purpose was to get information of that kind.

Now, sir, I come to the point which I wish to put to honorable Senators. There can be no doubt that troops are being drawn in from distant places and collected together, and that a number of ships are taking in supplies. If the policy of the Administration were war, of course it would conceal it until it was ready to strike; it would require several weeks until a movement was made. I will state in this connection, that I have information within the last two or three days which leads me to believe that troops and heavy guns are to be sent South to take possession of the forts in North Carolina, Virginia, and elsewhere. This has been brought to my ears within a few days from sources that I rely on. How the fact will turn out, I am not prepared to say; but I do say, that if that result follows, I shall regard it as evidence of a purpose to make war. I need only call Senators' minds to what occurred two months ago. About two months ago there was a report that troops were sent South, and that war measures were to be inaugurated; and