like the strong man of the Bible, carrying with her the main pillars of the edifice, the edifice itself, and the lords of the Philistines, into one common ruin.

APPENDIX.

[The following was added to the pamphlet edition issued two or three days after the delivery of the speech :]

Since the delivery and publication of the above speech, an arrival from Europe brings additional evidences of the current of British opinion on the new condition of things to be presented immediately. The views I have suggested are being confirmed, at an earlier period than was anticipated, though there was no reason to doubt but that such would be the case as soon as the dissolution of the Union should be regarded as a settled thing. I present extracts from several of the leading British journals. From the London Times, Jan. 22.

"There is not an hour to be lost in providing against this tremendous danger. To put the case in the mildest form, three-fourths of our cotton supply has become uncertain, one-third of our trade is in jeopardy, and the earnings of one-sixth of our population may be rendered precarious. Are not these facts enough to set us at work with a will?"

In the two last issues of the paper, which is regarded as the peculiar organ of the British Premier, Lord Palmerston, the following views are presented:

From the London Post, Jan. 21.

"England is now threatened with a great danger in two forms, one immediate, the other not very distant, and that danger concerns not only the national prosperity, but the very existence of something like five mil lions of the population. The first form is that, in the existing state of things in the southern States of North America, civil war or servile insurrection may prevent the cotton crop being sown in March or gathered in September. The second is, that as soon as the Southern Confederacy has consolidated itself it may revive the slave trade, and thereby throw difficulties in the way of our obtaining cotton from it as before."

From the London Post, Jan. 22.

"That there is imminent danger of civil war in America can no longer be doubted. We sincerely trust that the peril which now threatens may pass away, but we cannot shut our eyes to its existence, and we cannot but contemplate with apprehension the consequences which a contest between the northern and southern States is likely to entail upon ourselves. It is notorious that upon one article of American produce millions are dependent in this country for their daily bread. It is true that we now get cotton in considerable quantities both from India and from Africa, and in both those quarters the production of this great article of commerce is fast increasing, and is likely to increase. But India wants

railroads and Africa wants capital for the extension of cotton cultivation, and until these wants are supplied we must practically remain dependent upon our imports from the United States. What would be result

if these imports were suddenly cut off, or even largely diminished? Such contingencies are, we fear, but too probable in the event of a civil war in America."

The subject of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy is elaborately discussed and considered in the London Economist, a paper representing the views of Manchester, and the manufacturing interests especially.

From the London Economist.

"We last week promised our readers that we would take the earliest opportunity of considering the bearing of the dissolution of the American Republic on the interests of our country, both political and commercial. We will suppose that matters will go on as they have begun; that the other slave States will join South Carolina, and that a Southern Slaveholding Confederation will be formed as an independent nation, prepared to enter into relations with other States.

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"The first question that arises is, 'will England recognize the independence and sovereignty of the new State? The natural spontaneous answer is, of course, in the affirmative. Our principle is, and has long been, to recognize, and to enter into amicable relations with all de facto States and Governments. The moment the severance is complete and admitted, we have no concern either with antecedent causes or proceedings. But here a difficulty arises. What is our actual relation to the new Republic? Is the whole Union dissolved, or has there merely been a separation of a portion of it? Are our treaties and engagements with both sections of the Union dissolved, by the dissolution of the Union itself? or do they still hold with the North, as with the original body with which they were made? Do the Southern States, in seceding, still remain bound by the engagements entered into by the Confederation of which they formed a part at the date of those engagements? Or will they hold themselves liberated from all foreign contracts by the same act which has severed them from their domestic connection." "The real, immediate, practical problem that lies across our path is this: Will the Southern Confederated States consider themselves bound by those mutual engagements as to abstinence from and suppression of the slave trade, entered into and still subsisting between the United States and Great Britain? Probably not, since one of their chief motives for seceding is to be able to renew the slave trade. If they hold themselves freed, we do not know how we can bind them, or make them regard themselves as bound. But supposing our diplomacy were able to obtain this point, the only consequence would be that they would give us formal notice of their intention to abrogate those treaties and engagements after a certain date. We might remonstrate; we might negotiate; but we do not know that we could refuse to accept such notice. The practical shape, therefore, in which the question will come us is this: 'Shall we recognize their independent sovereignty, without requiring as a condition that they shall renew and observe the anti-slave trade treaties which subsist with their northern brethren-or even accept more strin

gent ones? Doubtless we shall endeavor, and in consistency, and as a matter of duty ought to endeavor, to make this condition; since we cannot shut our eyes to their notorious and avowed design of reviving the abominable traffic, and to pretend to do so would be to surrender the most passionately and pertinaciously pursued object of our national policy. We shall urge upon them that the trade is prohibited by international agreement and by municipal law in every civilized nation in the world, and that we recognize and treat with no nation as civilized which persists in upholding it. They will, of course, refuse to accept such a condition, as it would defeat one of their principal purposes; and will insist on unconditionat recognition. What are we to do then? It might seem that we are simply helpless in the matter. Three courses are open to us-none of them entirely satisfactory.

"We may recognize their independence at once, in accordance with our usual practice, and when we have done so, may proceed to make the best terms that we can as to the anti-slave trade treaties. But this course, though the simplest and easiest, would be very painful to our feelings of humanity-for we cannot disguise from ourselves that it would be nearly equivalent to unconditional surrender."

The only difficulties apprehended in this article we, here on this side of the Atlantic, know to be only imaginary. It is well settled that no purpose exists in the seceded States to reopen the African slave trade. The question of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy was never a matter of doubt and is no longer debatable.

How the dissolution of the Union is regarded in a political point of view, the following pregnant remarks fully indicate :

"Apart from this perplexing question, we see no reason for anticipating that a severance of the Union, once effected peaceably, and without catastrophe, will be in any way injurious to Great Britain. On the contrary, we are not sure that it may not indirectly be rather beneficial than otherwise. In the first place, we may expect that America will be somewhat less aggressive, less insolent, and less irritable than she has been. Instead of one vast State, acting on every foreign question cum toto corpore regni, we shall have two, with different objects and interests, and by no means always disposed to act in concert or in cordiality. Instead of one, showing an encroaching and somewhat bullying front to the rest of the world, we shall have two, showing something of the same front to each other. Each will be more occupied with its immediate neighbor, and therefore less inclined to pick quarrels with more distant nations. Then, too, for some time at least, the inordinate, though most natural sense of unrivaled prosperity and power, which swelled so flatulently and disturbingly in the breast of every citizen of the great transatlantic Republic, will receive a salutary check. Their demeanor is likely to become somewhat humbler and more rational, and it will, therefore, be easier to maintain amicable and tranquil relations with them than it has been. In place, too, of Europe being obliged to watch and thwart their annexing tendencies, the two federations will probably exercise this sort of moral police over each other."

Though remarks like these tend to wound our national pride, we have the consolation of knowing that such a result has been produced by the aggressive course of the North, and that the South has carried her submission to wrong as far as she could go, without degradation and ruin to her own people.

[As the session progressed the chances of an amicable settlement seemed to diminish. It was evident that while the Republicans were averse to having a war with a majority of the Southern States, yet they were not unwilling to see a resistance upon a small scale, which might be suppressed, and thus strengthen their authority, and aid their purposes to enlarge the powers of the government for further uses. If assured that they would have to fight only the cotton States, the collision would have been welcomed, and, in fact, courted. Their purpose evidently was to soothe and quiet the South as much as possible, and prevent resistance, or even preparation for it, outside of the cotton States, and thus cause the other States to be blinded to the impending danger. The peace conference served their purposes very well by assisting to amuse the Southern people, and cheat them by holding out delusive hopes. The Union men of the South aided them greatly by sending home letters and telegrams, from time to time, assuring their constituents that everything was being settled. The state of opinion in the middle Southern States was carefully studied by Republicans, that they might see whether there was danger of their coming into the contest.

With a view of apprising the people of North Carolina of the truth, and that I might be able to induce them to make such a demonstration as would tend to arrest the Northern war movement, I sent many letters and telegrams to editors and politicians in the State, some of which are presented as specimens.]

Letter to W. H. Thomas, Esq.

SENATE CHAMBER, Washington, Jan. 9, 1861. Dear Sir:-Your dispatch reached me last night, giving the information of the passage of the bill to arm the State. Had this bill and one to call a convention been passed a month ago, I think it probable that a sufficient impression might have been made on the Black Republicans to induce them to consent to some adjustment of the difficulties between the two sections. But the delay in our State, and similar evidences of hesitation or division in the South, encouraged our enemies. They came to the conclusion that they would have to meet no resistance outside of the cotton States, and they believed that they would be able to crush that resistance by military force. Under this impression, they as a party took a stand against any substantial concession. Having taken that position, there seems to be no indication whatever that any adjustment is to be made that will protect our honor or maintain our rights. While I am, as one of the representatives of the South, at all times ready to accept any proper settlement, I cannot hold out at present any inducement to delay action. The obvious policy and purpose of the Black Republicans is to keep the South unprepared and divided until they can get into power, and then their intention is unmistakable-to use all the power of the government to compel the South to submit to their domination, to the extent even of abolishing slavery, should civil war afford them a tolerable pretext. If, however, North Carolina, Virginia and the border States will act at once, they may, by preserving a a united South, avert the evils of civil war.

Such I think will be the result, unless there shall, before the inauguration be a military conflict. The Black Republicans are endeavoring

by all the means in their power to induce Mr. Buchanan to begin the war. Gen. Scott, who is here directing the military movements, is on their line of policy. I have for the last two weeks been satisfied that unless the President reviewed all his orders, we should certainly be involved in war at a very early day.

The message of the President, received to-day and now under discussion, can be construed in no other light than as a war message. Though he disclaims the right to coerce or make war in terms, yet he declares a purpose to enforce all the laws of the United States by military power in the seceding States. More than this he could not do, for no one would ask him to enforce laws that did not exist. Lincoln himself would not, probably, at this time, resort to mere despotic acts outside of the existing laws.

Whether, therefore, our purpose be to obtain Constitutional guarantees, to avert civil war, or to maintain our honor, and the property of our citizens, it is equally the duty of the State to arm itself, and in convention of our people take action such as the emergency may demand. The sooner that Convention is called, and the fewer restrictions attempted to be imposed on it, the better for the whole country. Though I have frequently expressed these views to you and to other members of our General Assembly, yet such is the importance of the subject, that I hope you will excuse my repeating them again. You are at liberty to make any use you may think proper of these views.

Very truly, yours, &c.,

W. H. THOMAS, Esq.

T. L. CLINGMAN.

Letter to Hon. Jas. W. Osborne.

SENATE CHAMBER, Washington, February 18, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:-The pressure of public business has prevented my writing to you at an earlier day. There is not at this time the slightest prospect that any just Constitutional guarantees will be obtained, as our Legislature has unanimously demanded as a condition of submission to Lincoln. In fact, since the news of the Tennessee election reached this place, there seems to be no prospect of any compromise being adopted by the Black Republicans.

Lincoln and the bulk of his party declare that they will make no con cessions to traitors and rebels, as they characterize the seceding States, and that until they have been reduced to obedience, or, in fact, subjugated, no terms of conciliation are to be listened to.

Our State, as well as the entire South, has declared against this policy of coercion. The great practical question, therefore, for North Carolina to decide is, whether she will aid Lincoln in this policy of coercion, or join the Southern States in resisting it. If she remains in the Union under Lincoln, she must not only furnish him money to wage war against the seceding States, but is liable to be called on to furnish men also. If she joins him in the war against the Southern seceding States, she must, in the end, expect to have slavery abolished by force of arms, and to see the