grat repugnance towards those that excited their hostility, and readily became bitter personal enemies. And yet it does not seem that, violent as they were, they should have been so blinded by hatred and malice, as to regard the ification of such feelings as affording an adequate reason to justify them in deliberately seeking to destroy their party, and promote the election of such an adversary as then stood before them. FLOYD'S DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS IN THE SOUTH. During the summer of 1860, I happened to be in Washington, subsequently to the adjournment of Congress, and at that time some arms were sent South, and it was stated in some of the Northern papers that my visit had some connection with that transaction. In fact, I at that time had no such object in view, but as much has since been said of Secretary Floyd's sending arms to the South, a statement as to how he come to take that step may possess interest. In the latter part of November, 1859, being in Raleigh, Governor Ellis and I had a conversation in reference to the John Brown raid into Virginia, and the extraordinary manifestations of favor then extended to his enterprise. The Governor expressed his regret that there were no arms in the State for defensive purposes, and asked me to see the Secretary of War and ascertain what was the amount that might be due to North Carolina, and get her quota whatever it might be. I also think that during our conversation he said that if there were any arms in the State he would not hesitate, if an emergency occurred, to take them. I may be mistaken as to his making this last remark. I told him I would do what I could. Accordingly, soon after reaching Washington, I called on Governor Floyd, the Secretary of War, and, after stating the case, asked him what arms he could send to our State? He said he would enquire, and immediately sent for Colonel Craig, the ordnance officer. On his coming into the room the matter was explained to him, and he was directed to ascertain what arms, under the existing laws, the State of North Carolina was entitled to have. The Secretary told me that if I would call in a few days he would have a report ready for me. On my seeing him again, soon after, it was ascertained that not more than a few hundred stand of small arms could be sent to North Carolina under the existing law. We had a good deal of conversation on the subject of the defenceless condition of the State as well as of the South generally. At length he said: "I can do this, and have been thinking of it. There are a great many arms in the various Northern arsenals, and I can distribute them over the different States, wherever there are arsenals suitable for their preservation.” I urged him to do this, and think I stated to him that this would fully answer our purpose, as we would not hesitate to take possession of them if it became necessary for defensive purposes. Subsequently he stated to me that he had ordered that twenty-eight thousand rifles, and a number of muskets, should be sent to the arsenal at Fayetteville, North Carolina, as well as a large supply to other States. In fact, it subsequently was ascertained, that nothing like this number of rifles had been sent to Fayetteville, or, as Mr. Davis, during the war, told me that Floyd had been "cheated by Colonel Craig.” The larger number sent were old muskets. The fact known to Colonel Craig that I had previously induced Mr. Davis, when in Pierce's cabinet, to send munitions of war to San Francisco, and subsequently that I had held an interview with Secretary Floyd on the subject of the latter distribution of arms in the South, doubtless led him to suppose that my journey to Washington had a connection with the forwarding arms at that time, and hence the report referred to. But this transaction tends to show that important results follow things that are in themselves seemingly trivial. Had not Governor Ellis spoken to me on the subject of procuring arms for North Carolina, it is not probable that I should ever have spoken to the Secretary of War on the subject. And had I not seen Governor Floyd, and brought the matter urgently to his attention, it is not likely that he would have made the distribution of the arms. It was only after it was ascertained that but a small amount could be donated to the States, and in our second interview, that he announced his purpose to send the arms South. To estimate the importance of the consequences that followed this action, let these facts be considered: It was not until some time in the month of July, 1861, in which the battle of Manassas was fought, that the first contract was made by the Confederate authorities for the purchase of small arms, and that contract was only for six or seven thousand rifles; I say six or seven thousand because the Hon. Charles M. Conrad informed me that he had been a member of the Congressional committee to investigate the matter, and that that committee had ascertained that the first contract made had been in that month for the purchase of six thousand rifles. But, subsequently to this conversation, General Joseph E. Johnston, to whom I mentioned it, said that the number contracted for was seven thousand. Whether the one amount or the other was the exact one is not a material question, nor is it important to ascertain when these arms were delivered, if they ever were, subsequently obtained by the Confederate authorities. This circumstance is important as showing that no arms were imported by the Confederate government during the early part of the war. In confirmation of this fact it may be stated that when I was in Montgomery, about the middle of May, 1861, as commissioner from North Carolina, General Toombs, then Secretary of State, complained of the remisness of President Davis and his Secretary of War, in not having taken early steps to procure arms, but said that they had just previously moved in the matter, &c. In the early part of June following, at Richmond, the conversations I had with President Davis led me to believe that he had made engagements to obtain arms, and General Toombs again said that there must then be a large amount of arms afloat, which were intended for the Confederacy. He made this statement to me more than once. And yet, when in the early part of July, 1861, I returned to Richmond, General Toombs, with great indignation of manner, told me that he intended to resign his position as Secretary of State, because he said the President and Secretary of War had deceived him in pretending that they had made purchases of arms. He declared with the greatest emphasis, that "they had not purchased a gun," and that he would not stay in the Cabinet. On more than one occasion, previous to this, he had complained of their refusing an offer from a responsible party, who agreed to deliver, for a small price, fifty thousand Enfield rifles, to be inspected on board the ship by a British ordnance officer. The Governor of Missouri, about the first of August of that year, told me at Richmond, that he would have taken steps to obtain arms, but that he had been assured that it was unnecessary; that the Confederate government had made ample arragements to obtain an abundant supply of arms. It is a well known fact, that volun teers by the hundred thousand, were, in the early part of the war, kept out of it, because there were no arms for them. As These circumstances enable us to realize the importance to the Confederacy of the movement of Secretary Floyd in sending the arms to the South. soon as Fort Sumter was taken, fearing there might be too much delay, I telegraphed Governor Ellis to seize the Fayetteville arsenal. He did so in time to secure the arms there. A portion of them were given to the first North Carolina regiment, which fought the battle of Big Bethel, where a vietory was obtained that produced a great impression on the minds of men both North and South. At the first battle of Manassas, if the troops, which on that day carried arms from the North Carolina arsenal, had been absent, the result would most probably have been different. As I had as good an opportunity as any one else to see what occured on that day, riding as I did over the field on a horse General Beauregard was kind enough to lend me, I have heretofore published this opinion. Had the Virginians been prompt enough to secure the arms at Harper's Ferry, (about eighteen thousand stand) their State would have had that many additional soldiers. And had the Missourians been smart enough, instead of seizing the public buildings in St. Louis, of no value to them, to take the fifty thousand stand of arms that Floyd sent to them, the result of the war in the Mississippi Valley would probably have been very different from what it actually was. At the final surrender which took place near Greensboro, North Carlina, this conversation occurred. There were about a dozen general officers sitting together, and a remark was made somewhat disparaging to President Lincoln, whose recent death had become known. Thereupon an officer of the highest rank, and of the most undoubted abilities, said: "If we had had Lincoln and they had had Davis, we should have subjugated the North." There was silence for a few moments, and at length I remarked that in that event I had no doubt but that we should have secured our independence. He replied, instantly, "We could, during the first year of the war, have imported two millions of arms and placed a million of men in the field, and we would have subjugated the North." These statements are referred to as evidence of the importance to the Confederacy of arms, and as tending to show what great consequences often follow acts that in themselves seem of little moment. [After the rupture at Baltimore, as the election of Lincoln seemed to be a foregone conclusion, I did not think it worth while to take any part in the contest. But Mr. Douglas, at Norfolk, in reply to some questions by Mr. Lamb, one of the Breckinridge electors, declared himself in favor of what was popularly known as the doctrine of "coercion." Being surprised that he should have taken such a position, I went to Raleigh to be present at the delivery of his expected speech. Soon after his arrival I called to see him with a view of endeavoring to induce him if possible to explain away the objectionable statement. On my enquiring as to his prospects in the canvass, he said that he could carry great strength in the North, if he had Southern support. I expressed my surprise that he should have made such a reply as he did to Mr. Lamb at Norfolk. He said that the question had been put suddenly to him while he was speaking, and that he had answered without time for reflection. He added that Breckinridge would have to answer the question also. I told him that Breckinridge would, I felt cenfident, make no committal on the subject, but that if he were to do so, as he had done, I should denounce him publicly. I stated further to Mr. Douglas that while I had till then intended to take no part in the contest, yet if he (Mr. Douglas) should, standing on the ground he had taken at Norfolk, obtain any considerable vote in the South, that fact would encourage Lincoln to resort to force, and hence I should feel it to be my duty to canvass against him, and reduce his vote as much as possible. He expressed his regret in strong terms, saying that as I had been regarded as a friend of his, my opposition would be very injurious to him. I told him that unless he could modify his position, I would have no alternative but to take ground against him. He said he would think over the matter before he spoke next day. I then proposed to him that if he and his friends would agree that there should be but one Democratic electoral ticket in the State, with the understanding that the electors should cast the vote of the State either for himself or Breckinridge, as it might be found most advisable to defeat Lincoln, then I would induce the Breckinridge men to assent to the arrangement. I stated that they would be averse to the movement at first, but that I would notify them that I would, in case they refused, canvass the State against Breckinridge, and thus throw its vote into the hands of the Bell and Everett party, and that I had no doubt but that I could compel the Breckinridge men to agree to the arrangement. Mr. Douglas said in response, that if he were to enter into this arrangement it would lose him his strength in the North, and that, therefore, he must decline it. It subsequently turned out that the only votes he did receive in the North were two obtained in New Jersey through such an arrangement. On the next day, during his speech he was interrupted by Colonel McRae, and asked to repeat to the audience what he had said at Norfolk. It was at once manifest that this was a concerted affair between him and Colonel McRae, and he stated, in strong terms, that if Lincoln were elected he should be inaugurated, and that all persons who might resist should be hanged as "high as Haman." He declared that this government could not be regarded as perfect in its action until it had hanged a traitor, &c. It was clear from this and certain other circumstances, that Mr. Douglas was not making the canvass with any hope of being elected himself, but to carry out the views of our adversaries in the North and divide and weaken the South as much as possible. During the canvass in North Carolina, while I in my speeches took ground for resistance to Lincoln, my colleague, Gov. Bragg, and most of the other Breckinridge speakers declared strongly for the Union. On looking to the returns after the election, it appeared that at those points where I spoke there had been gains to the Democratic ticket on the preceding August vote, while generally at other places we lost ground as compared with the vote in the State election. There were two reasons for this, the first of which is obvious enough. In a contest made as to the comparative unionism of the two parties the Breckinridge men ought naturally to have lost ground, because all the pronounced disunionists in the South supported that ticket, and hence its friends had to struggle against the current on such an issue. A second and more potent reason existed in the fact that the people generally felt that we had the right side of the issue against the Abolitionists, and when an appeal was made directly to their manhood, they were ready to respond properly. It was in fact owing to such feelings that the subsequent action took place. In North Carolina, however, and in most of the Southern States, this spectacle was presented. The supporters both of the Douglas and Bell tickets charged boldly that the object of running Breckinridge was to prepare the way for a dissolution of the Union. To meet this line of argument the Breckinridge men in most localities strongly denied the charge and endeavored to surpass their opponents in declarations of devotion to the Union. It thus seemed that if "eulogies on the Union could save it," surely it was not in danger. Such a factitious sentiment in its favor was thus gotten up, and so feeble seemed the resistance feeling, that it appeared as if the South was so divided into factions, and so utterly helpless in the presence of its enemies, that nothing was left for it but unconditional submission. This condition appeared so clearly and palpably that the bankers, merchants and other prominent men in New York, without regard to mere party feeling, united in a public address to the country, in which it was urged, that as the South was divided, distracted and helpless, then was the time for the North to unite by common consent, and compel them to submit to the gov ernment of an anti-slavery administration. In substance they declared, "Samson is now on his back, tightly bound with new withes and strong cords; now let the Philistines be upon him." But that he did burst these mighty bands, and arise in strength to meet his adversaries, is the noblest exhibition of manhood hitherto presented by the great Caucasian race, that has been placed by Providence at the head of humanity. That they subsequently failed of success was due to an executive imbecility, which was a fitting sequel to the manner in which they were precipitated into the contest, divided and without preparation. In view of the developments that immediately followed Lincoln's election on the evening of my nomination for re-election to the Senate, on being called upon for my views, I stated to the caucus that, in my opinion, civil war was imminent, as it was ascertained that some of the States would secede, and that if the movement were confined only to the Cotton States, it was most probable that Lincoln would make war upon them, and that we should be involved. Hence I urged that North Carolina should call a convention at once, and through it take the position that, if Lincoln, instead of giving proper assurances that the rights of our section were not to be invaded, should resort to coercion against the seceding States, that in such a case we would take ground against him. I expressed the opinion that by thus laying down propositions in the nature of an ultimatum the peace of the country could be maintained. Immediately after the meeting of Congress, as it may be seen in the Congressional Globe, the following debate occurred, December 4, 1860.] A. J. Glossbrenner, Esq., the Private Secretary of the President of the United States, appeared below the bar, and said: Mr. President, I am directed by the President of the United States to deliver to the Senate a message in writing. The Vice President, (the message having been delivered into his hands.) Is it the pleasure of the Senate that the message be now read? There being a general acquiescence, the message was read. Mr. Clingman. Mr. President, I make the usual motion for printing the message, and I will take this occasion to offer a suggestion or two upon some of the points embraced in it. As to the general tone of the message, Mr. President, everybody will say that it is eminently patriotic, and I agree with a great deal that is |