out of the party altogether. The collision and discussion between our friends and these persons will, I think, result in their being crushed. Such certainly I believe will be the effect, if the Democratic party should also take an unequivocal, national platform. The South, as the section most interested in the pending questions, ought to hold herself in position to co-operate with such party in the North as may stand upon truly national ground. But should neither of the prominent parties take such a position, the country is to see merely a struggle for the offices, a contest scarcely worthy of the consideration of statesmen. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the Democratic Convention should take proper ground, and that of the Whig party fail to do so. The result would be that the Whigs, being in position to court the Abolitionists, would win them over by adopting entirely their doctrines, and have their aid in breaking down their Democratic rivals, whom they would stigmatize as pro-slavery men, &c. In such a proceeding it becomes not me to take part. If they can get into power by such means instead of my assistance they shall have my determined opposition. If the friends of the Constitution are to be exterminated, I shall not join in the war against them. If Webster is to be crushed in Massachusetts, and Dickinson trampled down in New York, because they have been willing to do what, in their judgment, the Constitution required them to do in behalf of the rights of the South, I at least will not fight in the ranks. against them. If the blood of our allies is to be shed, it shall not stain my hands. Concurrence in such a proceeding would, on the part of Southern men, be not only criminal, but in the highest degree impolitic. There would be a terrible recoil on us. When hereafter the anti-slavery party, invigorated by this process, and flushed with victory, shall assail us, and we the minority call upon patriotic men of the North to aid us, what response can we expect? Will they not point us to the graves of our former northern allies, and remind us that we are in the habit of throwing off our friends the moment we cease to need their aid, and of permitting them to be sacrificed to gratify the vengeance of the Abolitionists? We shall be left to our own energies, and a collision between the two sections will most probably result in the overthrow of the Government. The whole anti-slavery movement in the North has been unconstitutional and sectional. They have sought to pervert from their legitimate purposes the powers with which the Federal Government was invested for the protection of all the States and their citizens, and to use them as a means of attack against the people of the Southern States. It is not less unjust than it would be if the guns on the ramparts of a fortress, stationed there to repel the external enemy, should be turned inward by those having them in charge, and fired at a part of the garrison. Instead of co-operating with such traitors to the Constitution, it is the duty of the South to oppose them. My advice to the men of my own section is to come together, so that they may in a body stand by the national men of the North. If we do that, we shall have friends enough there to assist us in giving the Government a national line of policy. As long as we are divided-as long as we give as much aid to our enemies as to our friends-we may expect to be sufferers.

I have confined my remarks for the present to the bearing merely of the slavery questions. Of course, there are other important points of

policy to be considered in connexion with the choice of candidates for the Presidency. I wish to be understood as being neither the advocate nor the opponent of any named candidate. What I have said has, as it purports to have, reference only to general principles of action. If I have made no reference to the action of the Northern Democracy, it is not because I do not find matter for condemnation. As I am not connected with them by party affinity, of course I am in no way responsible for their past or future conduct. My purpose at this time is merely to show upon what terms I am willing to co-operate with the northern section of the Whig party.

I have thus rapidly and hurriedly glanced at some of the points now under discussion in the prints of the day. My purpose has been to compress what I wished to say within such narrow limits, that those editors who regard my individual course as a matter of sufficient moment to the public to justify their making it a matter of discussion, may be able to place these views before their readers without a sacrifice of too much space in their columns. Very respectfully,

T. L. CLINGMAN.

Attempts were made from time to time, until the meeting of the convention, to harmonize the Northern and Southern wings of the party but with little success. Though apparently the contest seemed in a great measure to relate to the endorsement of the Fugitive Slave Law, yet it really reached much deeper. By this time many of the Southern Whigs saw that the real object ot the Seward wing was to continue the agitation of the slavery issue, and by killing off Fillmore and Webster, to deter others from manifesting moderate views. Finally, when the convention assembled, to conciliate the South, the Scott men adopted a platform that was satisfactory upon the whole, and took their own candidate. In order that they might while supporting the candidate, feel at liberty to "spit upon the platform," as Mr. Greeley in his Tribune put the case, General Scott, in his letter of acceptance, studiously avoided endorsing the platform.

This device, however, failed, though perhaps it promised as much as any other contrivance could have effected. It was obvious that a fatal breach existed between the Northern and Southern wings of the old Whig party. Scott's course not only drove off so many men from his party in the South, that he obtained only two States, but even in the North so many moderate men left him that in that section he was able to carry but two States. And when in the next Presidential election Mr. Fillmore was nominated to satisfy the compromise men, he did not obtain a single Northern electoral vote. In a word, the adoption of extreme anti-slavery views by its Northern members, rendered it impossible that it should exist as a national organization.

To indicate the tone of argument upon which General Scott was opposed and broken down in the South, my letter to Dr. Mills is presented :

Letter to Dr. Ladson A. Mills.

RALEIGH, October 8, 1852.

Dear Sir: In compliance with your request, I proceed briefly to state, in writing, the substance of my conversation with you in relation to

the approaching Presidential election. I do this the more readily, not only because I have no political opinions that I wish to conceal, but because as one of my immediate constituents you are entitled to have them in a form capable of preservation for future reference.

From the time of General Scott's nomination I have universally stated, in conversation with my colleagues, other members of Congress, and in fact all who felt an interest in knowing my views, that I did not intend to support General Scott. In reply also to such letters as I received, asking for my opinion, I repeatedly wrote to the same effect, to gentlemen of both political parties who were residents of my district, and also to some from other portions of the State. Several of these letters were written soon after General Scott's nomination, to gentlemen of both parties canvassing for seats in the Legislature. I mention this lest it should be charged that I hesitated to commit myself in writing, since it was easy for any one of those gentlemen-there being no injunction of secrecy on them-to have furnished evidence of my position. I did not think it expedient to make a publication on the subject, partly because it was said by the papers friendly to General Scott, that members of Congress ought not to attempt to dictate to the people, and in part, also, because I preferred giving my views to my constituents face to face, in a full and free manner, on my return to my district.

In 1848, seeing that the contest was likely to be between General Taylor and General Scott, and that the former had refused to take any position with reference to the great pending questions of the day, and not being disposed to adopt him on trust, and blindly support him, I, after long waiting for a develepment of General Taylor's views determined to advocate the nomination of General Scott, rather than his. Since then I have had no reason to regret that course. As I apprehended and predicted, as soon as the policy of General Taylor's administration was developed, with reference to the great slavery questions then pending, I, in conjunction with a majority of the Southern Whig members of Congress, was thrown into opposition to it. Though such was the condition of things for several months before General Taylor's death, yet the public was not generally aware of it. His sudden demise prevented an open and violent collision. About the first of July, 1850, it was determined, at a meeting of a decided majority of the Southern Whig members of Congress, that it was our duty, before an open declaration of hostilities, to advise the then President of our purposes, &c. Three gentlemen were selected for that purpose, to wit: the Hon. C. M. Conrad, the present Secretary of War, the Hon. Humphrey Marshall, of Kentucky, and the Hon. Robert Toombs, of Georgia. They, in accordance with the views of the meeting, separately called on the President and gave him to understand that he must expect our determined opposition if he persisted in resisting such a compromise as we advocated, and insisted on his policy of admitting California and New Mexico as States, and supporting the claim of the latter to the territory on this side of the Rio Grande. According to their several reports to us, General Taylor was unyielding, and frankly declared to them that as soon as the Constitution of New Mexico

reached him, which he looked for in a few days, he should send in a message to Congress recommending its admission at once as a State, as he had done in the case of California; that he also declared that Texas had no right to the territory claimed by her, and that he was disposed to support the claim of New Mexico against her. To one of these gentlemen, he said that he was placed in such a position that he would probably be forced to sacrifice one wing of his party; and that we ought not to expect him to sacrifice eighty-four men from the North rather than twenty-nine men from the South, these being the number of members of the Northern and Southern sections of the Whig party in Congress. The great body of the Southern members of Congress, with Mr. Clay at their head, would thus have been thrown into opposition, and would have been compelled, with the aid of the conservative men of the North, to fight the whole force of the administration. The death of General Taylor alone prevented a struggle which would have shaken the country to its centre. The decree of Providence thus averted the contest, but the lesson is one which ought not to be lost on us. Without, however, going into detail on these points, I proceed at once to speak of General Scott.

In the summer of 1849, his Canada annexation letter was published. General Taylor having just been inaugurated, it seemed probable that he might be re-nominated for election, with the support, as it was then supposed, of the whole South. It would be necessary to secure the Northern vote in opposition, to supersede him. General Scott, therefore, while expressing his wish for the acquisition of Canada, voluntarily and without being questioned on the point, went on to declare his opposition to the acquisition of Mexican territory. In substance he said that while he was for taking territory that would strengthen the North, he was opposed to such acquisition as might in like manner keep the South even with the North. I then looked upon this as an open, undisguised declaration of his wish to be regarded as the Northern presidential candidate. It could be considered in no other light than as a bid for Northern support at the expense, too, of our essential interests. During my journey through the Northern States in the autumn of that year, I had other evidences to the same effect. I felt that General Scott had not, in the position he had voluntarily taken, any claims on me or any other Southern man. the contrary, I saw that the rights of my section under the Constitution, as equals in the Union, had been put up for sale in the political market for anti-slavery votes. It was obvious that General Scott believed he could be elected by Northern votes alone. In fact I have the best reason to believe that he, much more recently than the time I refer to, repeatedly expressed the opinion that he could be elected without a vote from a slave State. For the last three years he has been identified with the anti-slavery party of the North; but in 1818, Mr. Seward, who is the leader of that party, was opposed to him. During the session of the Whig Convention at Philadelphia, in that year, I had some conferences with Mr. Thurlow Weed, the editor of the Albany Evening Journal, and with Mr. Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Tribune, both of them being well known as intimate

friends and mouth pieces of William H. Seward. They were utterly hostile to General Scott, and said he could not possibly be supported by them, on account of his Nativeism and various other points enumerated by them. Why is it that Mr. Seward and these gentlemen have since taken up General Scott and given him the nomination? Because they found they could make use of him to destroy Messrs. Fillmore, Webster, and other friends of the compromise; and they therefore seized upon him as a fitting instrument for that purpose. But, it is said, that he had in his private conversations expressed himself in favor of those measures. If it be true, it makes the case stronger against him. After the passage of the bills, a fierce attack wasmade on those men at the North who had had the liberality to assist in getting them through. Seward and his followers took the field to crush Webster and Fillmore. But while the storm of war was raging for their destruction, where was General Scott? As they had only done what he thought it was their duty to do, why did he not stand by them like a man? A sentence from his pen declaring his approbation of their course would have materially aided them. Though appealed to again and again, he would not write it. On the contrary, he allowed his name to be inscribed on the banners of their enemies. It was under the cover of his military glory that Seward and his clan fought the battle against our allies. Was such a proceeding fair and honorable on the part of General Scott? Let me state a similar case for illustration. Suppose that, during the Mexican campaign, a portion of his army had, in accordance with his approbation, taken an advanced and dangerous position, which nevertheless it was necessary for the safety of the army should be taken; suppose, too, that when they had been fiercely assailed by Santa Anna and his armies, that General Scott, though able to protect them, had stood aloof and allowed them to be destroyed; suppose, too, that he had, without objection, permitted Santa Anna to carry his own banner, and fight them thus, in the name of General Scott, who ought rather to have protected them; and suppose, to crown all, that General Scott had then become the associate and triumphant leader of Santa Anna's party! To show that the cases are alike you have only to substitute Fillmore and Webster, who took the extreme position for the Compromise with General Scott's approbation; then put Seward, Johnston, and other Abolitionists as their assailants instead of Santa Anna and his followers. Under General Scott's banner and in his name they have fought and conquered our allies in the North; and General Scott takes the nomination from their hands. But it may be said that such a case as I have put could not have occurred; that General Scott as an honorable soldier, would not have so acted, and that he, in fact, did refuse the presidency from the Mexicans. All this I admit. General Scott, the soldier, would not have so behaved, but in the field of politics has he not so acted? I agree that he has done so because he was entrapped by the politicians, who were more cunning than he Many of his friends try to evade it by saying that though under the influence of ambition, he acted wrong to get the nomination, yet he will do right if elected. But if Seward and company have had influence enough