may be cheaper there than at home. Yes, sir, they wish the farmers to bear the burden of the tariff, while they have the benefit of free trade. Coming from them, this proposition is the most amazingly impudent one that the mind of man has ever conceived. It would be a very different thing if they proposed to put all persons on the same footing by a general repeal of duties, and permitting all to purchase where they could buy most advantageously.

With respect to our fishermen, I am as anxious as any one to advance their interest. They certainly, however, have no reason to complain of us. They are now, and have, from time immemorial, been sustained by bounties from our Treasury. In addition to getting the salt they use in curing fish free of duty, the bounty paid to them out of the Treasury is, according to the speech of the gentleman from Massachusetts himself, (Mr. Scudder) delivered a few days since, equal to $22.32 for each person engaged in the business, including both ship-owners and fishermen. As they are employed but four months, it is therefore equal to $5.58 per month added to their other profits. Would not the farming laborers of the country like to have given to them by the government $5.50 per month, in addition to their wages? Instead of this, however, they have to pay in taxes the very money which the government gives over to the fishermen. The fish caught by them are certainly a good commodity, but not worth so much to the nation as the pork and beef of Ohio, Kentucky and other States, which gets no such bounty. It is said that the sailors thus employed serve in times of war to man our navy, and defend the country. This is, to some extent true; but it will hardly be affirmed that they render more important service than the riflemen of the western and southern country did at New Orleans, Buena Vista, and on many other well-fought fields, and yet, instead of giving these men bounties out of the Treasury, we impose taxes on them. I do not wish to be understood as insisting on a repeal of the laws giving these bounties to the fishermen, but only to show that they are, in fact, much favored already, while I am disposed to obtain for them further advantages, upon what I consider fair terms. What are these terms? Simply that, in addition to the fishing privilege, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, and free trade with Canada, we also so far modify our navigation laws as to extend the reciprocity system with Great Britain adopted a few years since, to the entire coasting trade of the two countries.

By the arrangement entered into some three years ago, our ships have the right to carry freight, &c., from any port of the British dominions to any other country, also from Great Britain to any one of her colonies, and from one colony to another. Her ships, too, have the right to carry from the United States of any other country; but our vessels cannot thus go from one port of Great Britain to another port of that island, nor from a port of one of her colonies to another port of the same colony, nor can her vessels take cargoes from one port of the United States to another in our country. I propose, then so to modify the existing system as to allow the vessels of both countries to participate in the coasting trade of each. Against this proposition a clamor is raised, and one gentleman said in my hearing that we had as well

abolish our navy. Everybody may remember, however, that there was a similar apprehension of mischief from the adoption of the reciprocity system in the foreign trade before it went into effect. But what has been the result? Instead of our commerce suffering there has been an immense increase, by reason of the free competition thus afforded. Yet Great Britain has not been prejudiced, but on the other hand, has been positively benefited. In 1848, the year previous to the repeal of the navigation act, the entire tonnage of the United Kingdom was 10,630,000; in 1851, it was 13,471,000-being an increase of some thirty per cent., an amount greater than the advance for an equal period at any former time. The increase of British tonnage engaged in the foreign trade, which entered the ports of Great Britain in the year 1851, as compared with that of 1849, is, however, only five per cent. But that of the United States in the same ports was as follows: For the year 1849, 586,987 tons, and in the year 1851, 779,664 tons--an increase of twenty-five per cent, in two years. It thus appears that, in her own ports, our tonnage has increased five times as much as hers since the adoption of the reciprocity system. How is the comparison on this side of the water? I have a statement for the port of New York, which I take to be accurate:

From this it appears that within two years, viz: 1849 and 1851, whilst the increase at that port of British tonnage is fifteen per cent., that on our side amounts to seventy-eight per cent., or more than five times as much. We are, under the system of free competition, beating the British everywhere. For the accuracy of this statement with ref ence to the port of New York, I appeal to the gentleman representing it, (Mr. Brooks) who made an able speech on this subject in the last Congress.

Mr. Brooks. That increase of tonnage arises from two reasons: first, the annexation of California, which has caused an extensive commerce around Cape Horn, which we had not before. And, secondly, the British navigation act, which has opened all the British ports.

Mr. Clingman. By the British navigation act, the reciprocity system between both countries has been extended to the foreign trade. I am obliged to the gentleman for the candor of his admission. My object is to show that free trade upon the ocean has greatly increased our commerce, and thereby benefitted us. We now send more abroad because of this greater freedom of trade. It is a little singular, some gentlemen may think, that both countries should be benefited by this

change. The reason is this: in the first place by reducing the cost, you increase the amount of freights. We all know that when people can get their productions to market cheaper they sell a great deal more. In the next place, when one branch of business is glutted, the whole field being open, owners of vessels can shift from one employment to another.

What I propose, Mr. Chairman, is this: I am willing to agree with Great Britain, that if she will allow our fishermen the privileges they desire, and give us the navigation of the St. Lawrence to boot, I will go for Canadian free trade, provided we also extend the reciprocity system to the coasting trade of both countries. We shall thus greatly benefit our agriculturalists. Why should not the farmer, when his produce gets to the sea-side, have the right to send it anywhere in the ship that will carry it cheapest? Two years since I had occasion to state that it cost more to take freight from New Orleans to New York than from New York to Canton, on the opposite side of the globe. This is a heavy tax on the cotton, pork and flour that goes down the Mississippi.

Why should people be longer compelled to submit to it? By letting in the competition of British ships, and stopping the monopoly, we should lower freights, and benefit all the producers of the country. Great Britain is able to give us a sufficient equivalent in the way of exchange. Unless, however, this is to be done, I am opposed to Canadian reciprocity. That would be simply giving Canada all the benefits of being in our Union, without her contributing anything to support our government. Of course it is good policy for her, and I do not wonder that Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister, was anxious for it. Its adoption would tempt a portion of our population to go over into Canada. They might thus escape the high tariff of this country, and buy British goods cheap for their own use, and yet have the privilege of selling all they made in this country. I repeat, I am willing to adopt a general system of free trade, but not a partial one for the advantage of a particular class or section.

I have, Mr. Chairman, discussed these topics with little expectation that in the ten days which remain of the present session, we shall see any legislation on them, but rather in the hope that at some early day of the next session, Congress may be induced to act on them. During my time on this floor I have witnessed important results, and great changes of public opinion, effected by discusion in these halls; and, if, at this time, I could, by directing the attention of gentlemen to the consideration of these points, be instrumental in any manner, or to any extent, in convincing the minds of a majority of the propriety of these views, I should feel quite confident that, sooner or later, they would, through the medium of the press and otherwise, bring public opinion to that condition that would affect the proper legislation to carry them into practical operation. I thank the committee for its attention, and will no longer occupy its time.

[In the early part of 1852, it became manifest that in the selection of a Whig candidate for the Presidency, a great effort would be made by those controlling the Northern wing of the party, to choose a standard bearer regarded as hostile, or at least not committed, to the compromise measures of 1850. There seemed to be a settled purpose on the part of such leaders as Mr. Seward, to reject Messrs. Webster and Fillmore especially, on account of their friendship for those measures. General Scott had been induced to place himself in a position that seemed to render him available for their purposes. As the spring advanced, I became satisfied that the anti-slavery elements in the party would control it. The success of the party under such circumstances, would be more disastrous to the country than its defeat. Believing that desperate disorders would justify remedies of a decisive character, I went to work to produce one of two results. Either to induce the Southern Whigs to refuse to join in calling a national convention, except on such conditions as would certainly frustrate the purposes of the anti-slavery agitators; or, to break up the party as a national organization.

A circumstance seemed to favor such a movement. President Fillmore hesitated to allow his name to go before the convention, as a candidate for the nomination, and was considering the propriety of peremptorily withdrawing from the contest. He was pressed to take this step, by certain influences in his cabinet. Mr. Webster and his friends were extremely desirous that Mr. Fillmore should withdraw, in order that the conservative elements of the party might be concentrated on Mr. Webster. Mr Crittenden, the Attorney General, was a most zealous friend of General Scott, and likewise anxious that Mr. Fillmore should retire, in the belief that thus, Scott's most formidable rival might be gotten rid of. The pressure on Mr. Fillmore from these two sources, caused him to decide to give way, and I was apprised that at an early day he would announce his determination not to be a candidate for the nomination.

I saw in succession, privately, many of those Southern Whigs, who were most hostile to the Seward-Scott movement, and induced them to agree that if Mr. Fillmore did decline, in respect to which there was some intimation in the papers, they would join in a public declaration against the convention and advise the Southern Whigs to decline to go into it. Mr. Fillmore's purpose to withdraw was resisted by a few of his friends, and delayed somewhat, but I had the most reliable information, that on a day not more than one week in advance, his decision would be made public.

The Hon. Humphrey Marshall called one morning to see me, and he was strongly conservative in his views, and exceedingly averse to the Scott movement then. I explained the matter to him, and asked his cooperation in my plan, so that we might by such action either compel the Northern wing to abandon the purpose to select Scott, and consent that Mr Webster or some one occupying a similar position should be our nominee, or if we failed in this to break up the Whig party, and form a new organization that should not be controlled by the anti-slavery elements.

Contrary to my expectations, however, Mr. Marshall suddenly became excited and said: "No, I cannot agree to break up the Whig party." It became known thus that if Mr. Fillmore should withdraw, the result would be that the party would be disrupted. Immediately thereafter, the policy of the friends of Messrs. Webster and Scott were changed, and Mr. Fillmore was pressed to stand, in order that he might,

as the event proved, be made useful in holding the party together for the benefit of of General Scott.

When a caucus of the Whig members was called to take into consideration the subject of calling a convention, there were manifested great differences of opinion, and finally a number of the Southern representatives seceded from it, and published an address to the country explaining their reason for so doing. The points involved in the controversy are sufficiently set forth in the following letter to the Editor of the Republic:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, May 10th, 1852.

To the Editor of the Republic:

of

SIR: A friend has called my attention to an article in your paper Saturday last, which makes such reference to me as justifies my asking some space in your columns. The article I refer to has been copied, at the request of the Hon. Ben. Edward Grey, from the Louisville Journal. In justice to my friend from Kentucky, Col. Grey, I think it right to say that I know that in asking its republication he was not at all influenced by any desire to give currency to that comparatively small portion of it which referred especially to myself. Though none who knew the character of the Louisville Journal would regard me as under any obligation to notice any attack which it might contain, or to have any controversy with its editor, yet your having republished it, and at the request, too, of a highly respectable member of Congress, places the matter in a different light. I avail myself, therefore, of the occasion thus offered, because I desire to present some points connected with the action of the late Whig Congressional Caucus, which are not only necessary to my own defence, but may also be of interest to the public.

Waiving, therefore, the consideration of the general topics which have been so fully discussed in the address of the seceding members already published, I will confine my remarks to a brief statement of some of the essential points. In the first place, I did not leave the caucus simply because it refused to adopt the precise resolution offered by Mr. Marshall or by Mr. Gentry. As I stated, these propositions did not, in my opinion, go as far as they should have done; and, therefore, I proposed an additional one by way of amendment. I also reminded the presiding officer that in the caucus held for a similar object four years ago, at which the same gentleman, my colleague, Mr. Mangum, presided, the question as to whether there should be any National Convention at all was entertained as the preliminary proposition, and that there had been much discussion, and various suggestions relating to that single question; and that in fact on the first evening of our meeting no other subject was taken up for consideration; and that it was not until some weeks after we, by a vote of the caucus, had settled this as a preliminary question, that the time and place of holding the convention were fixed. I also argued that if, in accordance with this former precedent, such a question was now entertained, we might either determine to recommend that there should be no convention at all, or recommend it with qualifications or conditions. Though the chairman stated that he well remembered that such had been the course of proceeding at the time referred to, yet he declined to follow that precedent. It was because he decided that he