lation should be taken in hand. If we want to grow rapidly in wealth and importance we have to turn our natural advantages to account. If we desire to advance in the only path to distinction open to the colony-a maritime and commercial one-we will have to take up the question of a reciprocity treaty with the United States at as early a date as possible. The sooner it is taken in hand the quicker the treaty will be inaugurated. If the preparatory steps be taken this session, it will in all probability require a year or so before such a treaty can be ratified. Two years hence the reciprocity between the United States and the eastern provinces will expire. If success should not crown our efforts before that period, by proper management it may then, when that treaty is renewed, as it most certainly will be. It is even not unlikely that the Red River settlement (Assiniboia) will be included. The subject has already been agitated there, and in all probability the only delay in advancing it there lies in the neglect of the colonial office to emancipate Assiniboia from the Hudson Bay Company. Were that once done and the way events are tending it cannot be long before it will be-that isolated community will be knocking at the doors of the United States Congress to be included in the renewed reciprocity treaty. After Assiniboia, all that would be left of British North America to be included in a reciprocity treaty would be British Columbia, Vancouver island, and the Hudson Bay territories. With the interest that we have at stake in this matter there should be as little delay as possible.

"In fact, we are not the only parties interested. It cannot be said that the advantages would be one-sided. On the contrary, reciprocity would be an equal advantage to California or Oregon with ourselves. If the San Francisco consumers can get our coal a dollar cheaper a ton, or our sawn lumber 20 per cent. less a thousand feet, or other articles at an equally reduced rate, it will require no further argument to convince them that they are interested in promoting reciprocity, and interested in a way that every one will feel it in his pocket. These commodities we can supply San Francisco cheaper than they can be had elsewhere on the coast. Consequently the demand would steadily increase. As the demand increased, so would the consumption of California or Oregon produce increase here, and the development of our country stimulate the industry of theirs. The prospective importance of British Columbia would readily induce Oregon and California to seize the opportunity to send in their produce free. They would find that there was no commercial barrier to trade, but that they enjoyed international free trade. The farmers' interests of British Columbia would not suffer, as the remoteness of the farming districts from the seaboard is a more effectual protection than a tariff. Whilst the consumer at present would get the necessaries of life cheaper, the revenue of the colony would be raised by higher duties on luxuries that only the wealthy would buy. Any scheme of reciprocity ought to include the whole British territory of the Pacificeven British Siberia."

Respectfully submitted.

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

JAMES W. TAYLOR.

EXHIBIT G.

GEOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF NORTHWEST BRITISH AMERICA, AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE REVENUE AND COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

ST. PAUL, MINN., May 1, 1862.

The commercial relations of the United States with Northwest British America were of no practical importance prior to 1858. The controversy of 1844, as to

via Fort William, on Lake Superior. This was a step in the right direction. though the arrangement was very unsatisfactorily carried out. But irregular as were the mails, we had a right to expect that they would continue, and gradually, through experience of the route, would work better. The Canadian government has, however, discontinued this small boon, and we are at this momen: entirely dependent on the favor of the American government for our means of communicating with the outer world. They have, at great expense, established a fortnightly mail to our frontier, sixty miles from this settlement, almost entirely for our own benefit. Does this fact not present the British government to our view at a disadvantage?

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(2.) If we except the round-about, slow, and very uncertain route through the arctic straits of Hudson bay, it is only through or from the United States that we can import goods-by an American route alone can we export furs, skins, cattle, or anything else! Is this favorable to loyalty? An importer from Britain can at present get but one supply of goods in the year, and counts himself very lucky indeed if, considering the many possible mishaps, he does get it; whereas the dealer in American goods can get twenty supplies during the sam time if he chooses. Almost any week from May to October, inclusive, a splendid steamboat may be seen at Fort Garry discharging her cargo of goods, and tak ing off packages of furs for the St. Paul, Boston, or New York market: whe boat is this? American citizens, whose enterprise, in the eyes of Red Riverites, throws into shade the slow-going, do-nothing Britons, whom, nevertheless, we are expected to admire, imitate, and hold as our indispensable fellow-subjects. (3.) The only decent route into this country for emigrants is through the States. The consequence is that the foreigners who are settling amongst us are for the most part American citizens, or persons thoroughly Americanized. Is ther influence favorable to loyalty?

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"(4.) By frequent intercourse with the Americans, and occasional visits to Chicago, Boston, New York, &c., the impression is fast gaining ground that there is no people like our republican neighbors. We see their fine cities, their railroads, and their steamboats; we read of the rapid settlement of new territ ries, and of the liberal system of legislation by which the sudden development of the resources of new districts is a matter of every day experience. Meanwhile, we see nothing of England's prosperity and greatness, and get none of her vast wealth, and the inference from all is, that our best plan is at once to become part of Minnesota.

"These are a few of the reasons why the people of Red River now say to England, Do something for us at once, or forever give us up and let us shap

our own destinies.'

I reserve for a subsequent communication some details of the measures by which the new governor general of the Hudson Bay Company is instructed by the London directory to check or divert the general dissatisfaction at Selkirk.

3. ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF BRITISH AMERICA.

The following article from the British Colonist, of April 15, published at Vie toria, Vancouver island, indicates quite distinctly that no adjustment of relations with the British provinces is now desirable, unless its proportions are continental:

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Reciprocity. We hope some of our legislators will not allow the prese session to pass over without devoting some attention to a reciprocity treaty wit the United States. A little more attention to the commercial and industrial in terests of the country would assist materially in the development of the island Beyond the ordinary routine of voting money to pay officials, passing a ter private bills, and spending a few pounds on the roads, nothing substantial and expansive has been done. It is high time that something beyond nursery legis

lation should be taken in hand. If we want to grow rapidly in wealth and importance we have to turn our natural advantages to account. If we desire to advance in the only path to distinction open to the colony-a maritime and commercial one-we will have to take up the question of a reciprocity treaty with the United States at as early a date as possible. The sooner it is taken in hand the quicker the treaty will be inaugurated. If the preparatory steps be taken this session, it will in all probability require a year or so before such a treaty can be ratified. Two years hence the reciprocity between the United States and the eastern provinces will expire. If success should not crown our efforts before that period, by proper management it may then, when that treaty is renewed, as it most certainly will be. It is even not unlikely that the Red River settlement (Assiniboia) will be included. The subject has already been agitated there, and in all probability the only delay in advancing it there lies in the neglect of the colonial office to emancipate Assiniboia from the Hudson Bay Company. Were that once done-and the way events are tending it cannot be long before it will be-that isolated community will be knocking at the doors of the United States Congress to be included in the renewed reciprocity treaty. After Assiniboia, all that would be left of British North America to be included in a reciprocity treaty would be British Columbia, Vancouver island, and the Hudson Bay territories. With the interest that we have at stake in this matter there should be as little delay as possible.

"In fact, we are not the only parties interested. It cannot be said that the advantages would be one-sided. On the contrary, reciprocity would be an equal advantage to California or Oregon with ourselves. If the San Francisco consumers can get our coal a dollar cheaper a ton, or our sawn lumber 20 per cent. less a thousand feet, or other articles at an equally reduced rate, it will require no further argument to convince them that they are interested in promoting reciprocity, and interested in a way that every one will feel it in his pocket. These commodities we can supply San Francisco cheaper than they can be had elsewhere on the coast. Consequently the demand would steadily increase. As the demand increased, so would the consumption of California or Oregon produce increase here, and the development of our country stimulate the industry of theirs. The prospective importance of British Columbia would readily induce Oregon and California to seize the opportunity to send in their produce free. They would find that there was no commercial barrier to trade, but that they enjoyed international free trade. The farmers' interests of British Columbia would not suffer, as the remoteness of the farming districts from the seaboard is a more effectual protection than a tariff. Whilst the consumer at present would get the necessaries of life cheaper, the revenue of the colony would be raised by higher duties on luxuries that only the wealthy would buy. Any scheme of reciprocity ought to include the whole British territory of the Pacific_ even British Siberia."

Respectfully submitted.

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

JAMES W. TAYLOR.

EXHIBIT G.

GEOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF NORTHWEST BRITISH AMERICA, AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE REVENUE AND COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

ST. PAUL, MINN., May 1, 1862.

The commercial relations of the United States with Northwest British America were of no practical importance prior to 1858. The controversy of 1844, as to

the northern boundary of Oregon, turned more upon considerations of national pride than of material advantage, neither government holding the country which was the subject of negotiation to be desirable for colonization.

Vancouver island, commanding the Straits of Juan de Fuca and the harborage of Puget Sound, was considered valuable in a strategic sense; but the district of the main land west of the Rocky mountains, and then called "New Caledonia," was held in no higher estimation than all geographical authorities now regard Labrador, its equivalent of latitude on the Atlantic coast. During the discussion in the British House of Commons, in 1846, the opinion was expressed by a member that the whole country north of the Columbia river was not worth £20,000.

Twenty years before, or in 1825, Great Britain manifested still greater indifference to territorial occupation of the North Pacific coast of the American continent. At that time Russia was foremost, the United States next, and England last, to assert rights of possession. In 1822 Russia issued an ukase, declaring the North Pacific a closed sea from 51°, or the north end of Vancouver island, to latitude 49° on the Asiatic coast. This was resisted by the United States, who claimed as high as 54° 40', and was interested that American whalers should not be excluded from the North Pacific.

Negotiations followed, resulting in a treaty, of 1824, between the United States and Russia, making 54° 40′ the boundary between the two nations, or at least that the United States would not settle above nor Russia below that latitude, and declaring the Pacific an open sea.

In 1825 Great Britain made a boundary treaty with Russia. In the third article the boundary commenced at the southernmost part of Prince of Wales island, in latitude 54° 40', between 131° and 133° west longitude, thence up Portland canal to 56° of north latitude, and "from the last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast as far as the intersection of the 141° of west longitude," and then along that meridian line to the Frozen ocean.

Article nine states that whenever the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast exceeds ten marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom.

During the war of England and France with Russia an agreement between the Hudson Bay Company and the Russian Fur Company not to disturb each other was ratified by the English government, and no effort was made to take possession of the coast from Portland canal to Mount St. Elias. The fur trade, in the language of a British journal, was considered of more national importance than 9,000 square miles of territory, with an extensive archipelago, stretching over ten degrees of longitude along the coast."

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Central British America, including the basin of Lake Winnipeg and the Mackenzie river, was only known as the territory of the Hudson Bay Company, with no other destiny admitted to be possible than to remain a preserve of the fur trade. With great assiduity the climate of Labrador was assumed to prevail in corresponding latitudes of the Pacific coast, and by systematic suppres sion the physical analogies of the European coast were overlooked.

Prior to the gold discovery in California Russia had shown a disposition to occupy that country, exciting the jealousy of England. Except for the Mexi can war, an European intervention would have probably appropriated the bay of San Francisco and the Gulf of California.

The organization of colonial governments for Vancouver island and British Columbia was the result of the discovery of gold upon Frazer river and the sudden irruption of adventurers in 1858. The colonization of California under the same impulse ushered a new era upon the Pacific coast of North America,

and the events of 1858, concurring with imperial legislation, assures for the harborage of Pugets Sound a political and commercial importance only equalled by San Francisco.

Central British America, or the district extending from Lakes Superior and Winnipeg to the Rocky Mountains, next invited the attention of the world.

Even before the commencement of the discovery of gold upon Frazer river and its tributaries, the people of Canada West had induced the Parliament of England to institute the inquiry whether the region in question is not adapted, by fertility of soil, a favorable climate, and natural advantages of internal communication, for the support of a prosperous colony of England.

The parliamentary investigation had a wider scope. The select committee of the House of Commons was appointed "to consider the state of those British possessions in North America which are under the administration of the Hudson Bay Company, or over which they possess a license to trade;" and therefore witnesses were called to the organization and management of the company itself, as well as the natural features of the country under its administration.

On the 31st of July, 1857, the committee reported a large body of testimony, but without any decisive recommendations. They "apprehend that the districts on the Red River and the Saskatchewan are among those most likely to be desired for early occupation," and "trust that there will be no difficulty in effecting arrangements between her Majesty's government and the Hudson Bay Company by which those districts may be ceded to Canada on equitable principles, and within the districts thus annexed to her the authority of the Hudson Bay Company would of course entirely cease." They deemed it "proper to terminate the connexion of the Hudson Bay Company with Vancouver island as soon as it could conveniently be done, as the best means of favoring the development of the great natural advantages of that important colony; and that means should also be provided for the ultimate extension of the colony over any portion of the adjacent continent, to the west of the Rocky mountains, on which permanent settlements may be found practicable."

These suggestions indicate a conviction that the zone of the North American continent, between latitudes 49° and 55°, embracing the Red River and the Saskatchewan districts east of the Rocky mountains, and the area on their western slope, since organized as British Columbia, was, in the judgment of the committee, suitable for permanent settlement. As to the territory north of the parallel of 55°, an opinion was intimated that the organization of the Hudson Bay Company was best adapted to the condition of the country and its inhabitants.

Within a year after the publication of the report a great change passed over the North Pacific coast. The gold discovery on the Frazer river occurred; the Pacific populations flamed with excitement; British Columbia was promptly organized as a colony of England; and, amid the acclamations of Parliament and people, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton proclaimed, in the name of the government, the policy of continuous colonies from Lake Superior to the Pacific, and a highway across British America as the most direct route from London to Pekin or Jeddo.

The eastern boundary of British Columbia was fixed upon the Rocky mountains.

The question recurred with great force, What shall be the destiny of the fertile plains of the Saskatchewan and the Red River of the North? Canada pushed forward an exploration of the route from Fort William, on Lake Superior, to Fort Garry, on the Red river, and, under the direction of S. J. Dawson, esq., civil engineer, and Professor J. T. Hinde, gave to the world an impartial and impressive summary of the great natural resources of the basin of Lake Winnipeg. The merchants of New York were prompt to perceive the advantages of connecting the Erie canal and the great lakes with the navigable channels of Northwest America, now become prominent and familiar designations of com