taxation. That is all. But in another place the Constitution declares, (article 4, section 2:)

"No person held to service or labor in one state by the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.'

h;

"From these extracts, it would seem to be perfectly clear, that the Constitution does not create or establish it only recognizes a class of persons held to service in the states by "the laws thereof," not by virtue of the Constitution. That clause, when fairly construed, is only an inhibition upon the free states, that they shall not pass laws to prevent the owners of slaves from reclaiming them. The argument that slavery is recognized by the Constitution is used as equivalent to establishing. The laws of the state support and maintain it, not the Constitution. It is a state institution, resting on the local law of the state, without the aid, without the support, without the maintenance of the Constitution, in any way whatever. Yet in the face of all this, it is contended, and attempted to be proved by metaphysical reasoning, that the Constitution extends beyond the states in which slavery is established; that it carries it into free territories, and guarantees it there. Can this be so? and if so, where will the power end? If the institution is one which has its foundation in the Constitution, and not one resting upon laws of the states, where is the limit to its extension? What is the next step in the application of the argument? After you have overrun your territories, what power can prevent the slaveholder from coming into the free states with his slaves? If his right is a Constitutional one; if he rests his claim

If the

there, and is correct, a state law could not affect him, because it would be in conflict with the Constitution. I can not see how this conclusion can be avoided. premises are correct, that result must follow. But I neither admit the premises nor the conclusion. The Constitution gives no right, it creates no right; it merely recognizes a right which is created by the laws of the state. That it is a local institution, there can be no doubt. The courts of nearly all the states have so decided. Authorities to any extent could be cited; they are familiar to all. The moment a slave goes beyond the limits of the state where slavery exists, he becomes free. It must, therefore, look alone to local laws for its support.

"I hold that the Constitution, in and of itself, by its express language, authorizes Congress to inhibit this institution in our territories. I hold that the article in the Constitution which gives to Congress the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting its territories, includes full and absolute authority over this whole matter. What is the language of this clause of the Constitution?

"Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.'

"What is this grant of power?

"1st. Congress may dispose of its public domain.

"2d. It may make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.'

"To dispose of, is to give, grant, or convey the public lands; but to make all needful rules and regulations, implies and carries with it full and ample power of legis

lation, in all cases where the Constitution does not otherwise prohibit. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of the terms rules and regulations.' The Constitution itself interprets them. A law is defined to be 'a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in the state.' The Constitution gives Congress power to 'regulate commerce '—to make 'rules concerning captures '—' to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.' It also provides that persons escaping from one state into another, shall not be discharged from service in consequence of any law or regulation therein.' In this case both terms are used-'all needful rules and regulations—to give the widest scope to the power. But it is said that the concluding words in the clause quoted- or other property '-limit and confine our legislation over the territory to the same as property. Grant that our territories are denominated as property, whether inhabited or not, does not the same power exist to pass all needful rules and regulations for its settlement and its final admission into the Union as a state? The power is clearly within the scope and meaning of that clause.

"The history of the manner in which that clause became a part of the Constitution, would settle the question, if there could be a reasonable doubt. In the Articles of Confederation, by which the states were united, before the Constitution was formed, no such power was found. This grant of power was therefore made in the forming of the Constitution, for the purpose of giving Congress the power. The doings of the Convention, and the declarations of Mr. Madison, are clear upon this point. But, aside from this view of the case, we have the uninterrupted use of the power by the General Government for about sixty years. Hardly a Congress has existed which

has not acted upon this power, from 1787 to this time. This power has been exercised by Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, and Van Buren. The Supreme Court of the United States have settled this question. Congress has already exercised the power, and that power has been declared valid by the Supreme Court. 1 Peters' Rep., 543, Chief Justice Marshall says:

"Whatever may be the source whence this power is derived, the possession of it is unquestionable.'

"In 5th Peters' Rep., 44, again the Court says:

"Rules and regulations respecting the territories of the United States, necessarily include complete jurisdiction.'

"Again, the power is contained in the bill upon which we are acting. It continues the laws of Oregon in force for three months after the meeting of the Legislature. It provides, in the Territories of California and New Mexico, that the legislative power shall not pass any laws on the subject of religion or slavery. Here we use the power in its broadest sense. We inhibit the use or exercise of any power on either of said subjects, and some others.

"Could there be any doubt still remaining, and if we had no grant of power in the Constitution at all, there would yet be another source from which we must gather it. If the Constitution was silent, as it is not, yet under that power which we can acquire, we could most certainly govern. It matters little where you find the power to acquire; if you do acquire, you must have the power to govern. The first is the major, the second is the minor proposition. It would not be good sense to contend that we have a power to acquire public domain, and yet could not pass needful rules and regulations for its government. The case, when stated, is its own best argu

ment. The sovereignty to acquire must contain the lesser power to govern. These are briefly the reasons which force conviction upon my mind. Casuists have been known to deny their own existence, and satisfactorily to prove it to their own minds. That may be a plausible and a practical doctrine, when contrasted with the one that we have no power to govern our territories. It is too late,' at the noon of the nineteenth century, to deny that right, or for us to avoid the duty of acting.

'Having the power to act, what is the responsible duty which I feel imposed upon me? (for I speak for none other.) It is, that I should exert all the power which the Constitution gives to exclude the institution of slavery from our territories now free, because it is a social, moral, and political evil. That such is its character, needs no argument to prove. They are conceded facts -supported by the declarations and admonitions of the best and wisest men of the South

"In thoughts that breathe, and words that burn.

I would resist the introduction of that institution in justice to a superior race of men-men who are capable of a higher state of social and political refinement. I would institute such governments as are best calculated to advance the true interests of our own Caucasian race, and not degrade the dignity of labor by fastening upon it the incubus of slavery. I would resist it, because I would not invoke or use the name of Democracy to strike down, as with the iron mace of a despot, the principles. of social equality and freedom. I would not profane the sacred name of Freedom, while using it, to impose a tyranny upon the minds or persons of men. Jefferson has said, that God has no attribute which can take sides with us in such a cause.' The eloquent Pinckney has de

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