There is a great number of young men, however, who may never have had the opportunity of "saying to this man, Go, and he goeth," but who now find it necessary to give orders every day. If they have the mental and social knack of leadership, it will develop itself into a power through the use and expansion of a few small hints. For nothing is more true than that the officer is tested by the way in which he says "Go" (or in the most vital cases "Come on"), and the way in which his men respond to his orders. They will respond with speed and confidence, or with hesitation and misgiving, according as they believe in him or mistrust him. Those who are teachable can be taught the little artifices of managing men, and it should be laid on somebody to say all that can be said usefully and practically on the subject to every youth before he is promoted to the rank of an officer.

We have before us an excellent pamphlet called Moral: the Most Important Factor in War (London: Sifton, Praed, and Co.; 6d. net), by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Shirley, who has been an Instructor at Sandhurst, Director of Military Studies at Cambridge, and Commandant of the 2d Artists' Rifles O. T. C. It is not only a well-written lecture, but is full of the right feeling. "I exhort you," he says to the budding officers, "to go forth as the Champions of Right, not as the Avengers of Wrong. It is right to destroy wickedness, but to stoop to retaliation is to sink to the level of the malefactors we execrate. Vow to excoriate these abominations from the face of civilization even at the risk of your life, for you know 'the thing that matters is not how long life lasts but what you do with it.'" Moral forces, he goes on, are intangible, occult. They are "courage, intelligence, initiative, resourcefulness, training, discipline, pride, cheerfulness, temper,

respect, tenacity, religion, patriotism, love, will-power." He resolutely refuses to believe that a good officer, as a general principle, is born and not made. The fairest field will grow weeds instead of wheat if it is not cultivated, and a sterile field will grow wheat if it is cultivated. He complains that there is a general disinclination to discuss fear, although that is the moral factor which is more potent for evil than any other. Practically every man is susceptible to fear. We suppose that about one man in ten thousand is really "fearless" in the sense that dangers, rightly called terrible, produce in him a sense of exhilaration which is the equivalent of positive enjoyment. He is made that way; it is for him a most fortunate accident. Again, there may be four or five men in every hundred who are so little shaken by fear that it is no burden upon them. They are conscious of the presence of the terrible thing, but are not in the least harassed by it. Then come the vast majority of men-those who are sensitively susceptible to fear, but whose self-respect (whose moral) is proof against any possibility of their being betrayed by it. They do not want to die, but they would much rather die than be seen to flinch. At the very bottom of the scale we imagine that there are a few, a very few, miserables whose moral strength is incapable of overcoming fear; they are men who would sustain any disgrace-plead any fantastic excuse before a recruiting tribunal-rather than submit themselves to great bodily danger. Colonel Shirley says:—

"Practically every man is susceptible to fear; it is the skeleton in every soldier's cupboard. The first and commonest form of fear is a vague dread of the enemy, but comfort yourselveshe is even more afraid of you than you can be of him. Consider your points of superiority: better physique,

better shooting, better training, greater self-reliance and resourcefulness, and a better cause. "Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just.' There are physical methods of overcoming this type of fear, such as movement, or firing, or both. In fact, keep your men's minds and bodies occupied and you will succeed to a great extent in eliminating this kind of fear. Smartness of carriage and dress is very important as indicative of self-respect, method, pains, precision, punctiliousness, punctuality. The man who is particular about his person is probably particular about his duties. I maintain that, caeteris paribus, the better dressed line will always win. Emulation and esprit de corps are also valuable factors, but must not be confused with those vulgar vices, jealousy and cheap swagger, which are so destructive of respect, confidence, contentedness, and comradeship. Respect is a valuable moral factor, but it must begin at home -if you do not respect yourself you must not expect others to respect you."

Comradeship, as no one needs to be told, is characteristic of the British Army. The men and there are not many exceptions to the rule-like their officers, believe in them, and habitually praise them. How can the officer be the best friend of his men, and mix freely with them, and yet maintain his position? This is the problem which is at the very root of the officer's moral. It might seem to involve that elusive and unteachable thing, a feat of tact. But Colonel Shirley certainly gives the right answer when he says that the officer must see to it that he is as superior to his men in all moral qualities as he is in rank. For "rank is but the guinea's stamp," which may be set as easily on dross as on gold. Another excellent maxim is that the officer (this has been an invariable practice in the British Army for many years) should attend to his men's wants before he sees to his own. If an officer does that, he may safely be weighted by some

incompetence, for his men will never desert him. They will stand by him through thick and thin.

The border-line which divides a constant and proper strictness from nagging might also seem to be capable of being traced only by a man of tact. But Colonel Shirley is ready with a solvent for ordinary use. "Make certain whether mistakes are made through ignorance or carelessness." One sort may be the officer's own fault; he may have failed in clearness. The other sort deserves the sharpest reproof. And it should never be forgotten that no honest soldier has a grievance, or pretends to have one, when he is blamed for what he knows to be his own fault. He has no grudge against an officer who is strict if he be also just. As a Rugby boy once said of a famous HeadMaster, "He is a beast-but a just beast." What men in the ranks cannot stand is injustice and variability of temper, so that they never "know where they are."

One of the wisest of the maxims is that a young officer should make himself "infallible in drill." Everyone can do this. However else he may fail, it is within his compass, by means of unyielding application, to know the Manual of Infantry Training backwards. He can then bear himself on the drill-ground with an assurance which cannot fail to impress his men. Half the battle of moral is then won.

There is much else we should like to quote, but we must end with the supremely important advice about "the spirit of the offensive." The officer must have not merely the "tenacity" which is proverbially said to be the virtue of the British Army, but an "aggressive tenacity." He must be the creator, not the creature of situations. Men can so saturate themselves with the "will to conquer" that, even if they fail of conquest, they can at least render themselves in a real sense in

vincible. Illustrating his meaning, Colonel Shirley says:—

"I should like to give you one more instance. One of my pupils at Cambridge was a giant in size and strength and a first-class rowing man. I asked the coach what sort of an oar he was. 'The best on the River,' he replied. 'Then,' said I, 'I suppose he will get his blue.' 'Not he,' said the coach, 'he has got no devil.' That's it, gentlemen, Devil's the thing that does the The Spectator.

trick. You get Devil, drive, push, and hell-fire into your men, and neither the Devil nor the Angel Gabriel with all his Principalities and Powers will ever stop them."

It was Napoleon, we think, who said that he would rather have an army of stags led by a lion than an army of lions led by a stag; and in quality of leadership that is the whole truth of the matter.

The United Kingdom has 121,000 square miles and 45,000,000 inhabitants, according to the last Census, and the German Empire 209,000 square miles and 65,000,000 inhabitants. Per square mile there are 372.6 people in the United Kingdom, 311.0 in Germany, and 191.2 in France. The density of population is almost as great in Germany as in the United Kingdom, and is considerably more than 50 per cent greater in Germany than it is in France. Owing to the great density of the German population the country is not self-supporting. The German people are almost as dependent on their foreign trade as are the British.

Before the war the foreign trade of Germany came to about 150,000,000 tons per annum, or to 500,000 tons for every working day of the year. By converting this daily load of 500,000 tons into wagon-loads of 10 tons, or into train-loads of 200 tons, we can best visualize the gigantic extent and vast importance of Germany's foreign trade. It should be noted that more than two-thirds of Germany's foreign trade was oversea trade. How gigantic Germany's requirements of foreign goods are may be seen by the fact that she imported on an average per year 500,000 tons of cotton, 250,000 tons of wool, 200,000 tons of coffee, etc. LIVING AGE, VOL. II, No. 68.

Of coffee alone Germany requires per year a thousand large train-loads.

The German General Staff and all the world anticipated a short war. If, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, Germany had been closely blockaded, the war might perhaps have ended before now. It is of course easy to reproach the British Government after the event with lack of energy and foresight. At the same time it must be remembered that sweeping measures which may easily be stated in theory

not always practicable. During many months Germany received vast quantities of supplies not only by way of her neutral neighbors in the North, but also via Italy, which then was neutral. The immediate institution of an absolutely effective and complete blockade might have led to very serious and most unwelcome political consequences.

The present war is a war of Might against Right. Not only for political, but also for ethical reasons, caution was needed in using the dangerous and twoedged weapon of the blockade. An insufficient consideration of the feelings of neutrals has before now led to grave consequences. During the struggle between England and the North American Colonies, France and Spain, a few intriguers succeeded in inducing the

Empress Catherine the Great to adopt against her will an anti-British policy. Thus she opposed, misled by one of her advisers, the British blockade policy. Russia was joined by Sweden, Austria, Prussia, and other neutrals. The celebrated Armed Neutrality League was formed, and it wrought the greatest mischief. Germany no doubt hoped to create another Armed Neutrality League, but she failed owing to the clumsy attitude of her agents, to the character of her warfare, and to the cautious blockade policy adopted in the beginning by this country.

The British blockade policy is certain to be opposed in neutral countries to the end of the war, whether England follows a strict or a generous policy. Even if the English Fleet should prevent only the most insignificant trifle of Germany's trade from being carried on as in peace time, the German agents abroad would do their best to incite the neutral nations against this country simply because Germany requires allies, and would welcome a diversion. Besides, neutral merchants whose goods are seized or turned back would loudly protest, and their protests would be supported by other merchants who are merely suffering through the war, but not through the British blockade. A blockade, however generous, cannot be carried on with the general consent of neutrals. That is perfectly evident.

From the news which reaches this country it is clear that the economic position of Germany is becoming increasingly serious, owing partly to the greater stringency of the blockade, partly to other reasons which have hitherto been overlooked by most people who have considered the subject. Germany produces, as I have frequently shown, about three times as much vegetable and animal food per acre as does this country. Germany has an extremely intensive agriculture, and intensive agricultural production

The

requires a very great application of human labor, animal labor, and manure to the land. Human labor has been enormously diminished by the requirements of the army, and the prisoners who are forced to work on the land work half-heartedly and produce comparatively little. Enormous numbers of horses have been destroyed in the war, and as millions of cattle had to be slaughtered for lack of imported feed, ploughing must have been largely neglected. In peace time Germany imported 120,000 horses per year. stoppage of that trade alone affects Germany very seriously. Last, but not least, the absence of imported mineral manures and the reduction of animal manures consequent upon the reduction in the number of horses and cattle must diminish production per acre. The reduced productivity of German agriculture owing to lack of men, animals, and manure may be seen by the fact that the German beet-sugar industry, which produces normally about 2,000,000 tons of sugar and about 15,000,000 tons of cattle feed, has been reduced to about one-half.

Owing to the decrease in the productivity of Germany's agriculture and the shrinkage in the accumulated stocks of raw materials the British blockade is becoming increasingly effective from day to day, and the question has been discussed whether a further tightening of the blockade is advisable, whether it will tend to an earlier conclusion of the war, or whether it is likely to create dangerous dissatisfaction among the neutral States. The principal neutral countries which have to be considered are the United States, which could supply Germany with much of the cotton, wool, copper, grain, etc., which she requires, and Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose citizens could pass through these commodities with vast profit to themselves. Let us consider the probable attitude of these countries

in case the British blockade should still further be tightened, and let us at the same time discriminate between these neutral States and their merchants.

After all Germany has done, it is absolutely inconceivable that an American Government should virtually conclude an alliance with Germany directed against England, however close the blockade may become and however much individual American traders may be inconvenienced or may pretend to be inconvenienced. Germany's policy of frightfulness has defeated itself. The United States have begun to see in Germany a danger not only to Europe, but to themselves. An effective opposition to the British blockade policy might ultimately recoil upon the American people. Hence America is not likely to oppose Britain's blockade policy, however stringent.

Holland, Denmark, and Sweden are economically in almost an identical position. All three are dependent for their very existence on foreign imports. The principal imports of Holland and Sweden are food and fuel, and the principal imports of Denmark are feed for the huge Danish herds and fuel. If one of the three countries should seriously oppose the British blockade policy it would virtually become an ally of Germany. It would presumably be blockaded. Germany, which at present receives a good many commodities from her neutral neighbors in the North, would be deprived of a source of supply and would be obliged to share her scanty store with her new allies, who would be starving unless rescued by Germany. Not only Holland, Denmark, and Sweden must view with dread the possibility of seeing themselves blockaded by this country, but Germany itself must fear such an event. Hence she is likely to urge her northern neighbors to pursue a policy of moderation. It can scarcely be Germany's

aim to see her northern neighbors involved in the blockade. Their active support of Germany would merely result in facilitating the task of the British Fleet and depriving Germany of part of her foodstuffs and raw materials which she would have to send to her new allies in the North.

Although the three neutral States in the North occupy economically a strangely similar position, their attitude differs in accordance with their history and tradition. Holland obviously desires to observe an attitude of the strictest neutrality. She is satisfied with her territorial position. She cannot greatly profit by the war. Denmark on the other hand remembers her spoliation of 1864, and numerous Danes desire that their Danish brothers in Schleswig-Holstein should be reunited to them. While Holland is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, most Danes not unnaturally desire that the Entente Powers should be victorious, for only their victory can lead to a reunion of the Danes.

The position of Sweden is a peculiar one. In the seventeenth century Sweden and France were the two leading Continental Great Powers. They controlled jointly the German Empire in accordance with the stipulation of the Peace of Münster. Sweden declined because Charles XII, like another William II, rashly embarked upon a war which was beyond the strength of the nation, and Sweden lost vast territories to Russia and Germany. In search of ice-free ports Russia endeavored to obtain an outlet on the Baltic. She wrested from the Swedes the territory occupied at present by Petrograd, and as the Russian capital lies on the borders of Finland it was perhaps not unnatural that Russia endeavored to secure it by acquiring Finland as well. Russia's growth at Sweden's cost and the neighborhood of