You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander in chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible, and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you (I give with freedom as I know you will not misunderstand it) is, that in view of any satisfactory results, you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and great enough to make some action very necessary. Where there is no heart in their leaders, and. every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the Please bring forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly, worse than I can tell you. men. JOHN POPE, Major-General. The army under General Lee, close along our front, numbered about sixty-five thousand men, without deducting their casualties at Manassas; but their losses in action had been more than made good by the arrival from the South of the powerful divsions of R. H. Anderson and D. H. Hill, the latter of which, however, although within supporting distance on the first, did not actually form a junction with Lee until the second of September at Chantilly. Notwithstanding the equality of numbers of the two armies, General Pope, greatly to his credit as a soldier, as was also his retreat from the Rapidan, in spite of his blatant bluster, had no thought of 1 See General Lee's Official Report, Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. ix., and Gordon's Army of Virginia, p. 489. Lee's official report gives the losses in his army in the battle at Manassas (exclusive of casualties suffered by his cavalry), as 1,090 killed, and 6,154 wounded, being about half the loss suffered by our army. The reports of Longstreet and Jackson (including Jackson's loss at Chantilly), give killed, 1,468; wounded, 7,563; missing, 81. See Jackson's and Longstreet's reports in Rebellion Record, vol. ix. Gordon's table of rebel casualties in the campaign ending with Chantilly shows a rebel loss of 9,849 men. - - ED. risking another general engagement between the united and fiercely enthusiastic army under General Lee and the sullen and angry troops, over a large part of which he evidently felt that his command was merely nominal. A bloody page of history, however, was still to be written before our retreat to the capital was secured. CHAPTER IX. SEPTEMBER 1, 2, 1862. THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY. -RETREAT TO THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON. As soon as General Lee ascertained, on the morning of the 31st of August, that our army had retreated to Centreville, he advanced a brigade of infantry across Bull Run to occupy some high land in his front, and ordered Jackson to turn our right flank and interpose his corps between us and the defenses of Washington. Jackson at once set about the work. Preceded by Stuart's cavalry, he crossed Bull. Run at Sudley Ford on our right, five miles from Centreville, and taking a circuitous route by country roads, struck the Little River turnpike, a road which joins the Centreville turnpike near Fairfax Court House about eight miles east of Centreville, halting his corps at night well on our right flank. During the afternoon of the 31st, the rest of Lee's army was moved to Sudley Ford, ready to follow Jackson next day. Of this grand movement on our rear, General Pope knew nothing until noon of September 1st, being without sufficient cavalry to cover the country on our flanks. On Monday morning, September 1st, the 21st, with the brigade, moved about a mile to what we supposed was to be a permanent camp, in a pleasant spot, and every one busied himself to make his quarters comfortable. How little did we think that before night the rebels would wreak a bloody vengeance on us for that evening's work at Manassas! About noon we were notified of our detail for grand guard or outpost duty, which order in a few minutes was followed by another to pack up and be ready to move at a moment's notice; and about two o'clock the brigade marched towards Fairfax Court House and Alexandria, following our 1st (General Stevens's) division. After marching a couple of miles we heard firing at some distance on the left of the road, but did not attach much importance to it as having anything to do with us, until we were soon turned off from the turnpike, and taking an old cart path to the left, approached closer and closer to the firing; then the men began to look over their guns and calculate the chances for another fight. About half-past four we were halted on rising open ground, near a large farm-house, and saw men skirmishing along the edge of some woods half a mile in our front, into which two twenty-pounder Parrotts in position near us were firing slowly. About five o'clock the 51st New York moved forward and entered the woods in line of battle, quarter of a mile to the right of where the skirmishers were at work. A few minutes after the 51st had disappeared from sight we were ordered up. Coming to the edge of the woods we entered them in line of battle at about the same point as the 51st. Just what orders the two regiments were under is uncertain. General Reno, though upon the ground, was sick and off duty, and in our brigade, at least, indecision and uncertainty seemed to rule the hour. The orders given to the 51st were claimed by their commanding officer to have been to march a short distance into the woods and wait for further orders. The orders given to the 21st were to the effect that the 51st had gone in to find the enemy, and that we were to follow them as a support. As we entered the woods heavy thunder-clouds obscured the sky and it became very dark; as the 51st were in front of us, we were particularly cautioned against firing if we came upon troops, and for the same reason we deployed no skirmishers in our front. We either entered the woods to the left of the line of the 51st, or obliqued so much to the left on our march as soon to be entirely uncovered by them and to pass by without noticing. them. As we moved forward through the dense dark wood, a tremendous thunder-storm burst upon us, and our line was badly broken up by fallen trees and other obstacles, but we still moved on. Passing a shelter of rails we saw a dozen men crouching under them to get out of the rain; they were rebels, but we took it for granted that it was all right, for the 51st were ahead, and passed them by. In a few minutes we came in sight of a body of troops in front of us, in dark uniform, and approached until portions of the regiment were within twenty yards of them, when we halted and began to dress our line, which was badly broken, some companies having been detached by long intervals from the rest by the obstacles met on the march. The heavy rain and darkness made it impossible for us to feel sure about these men in our front, and half a mile into the woods and entirely alone and unsupported we felt nervous and anxious. More than one man said, "Those are rebels," but from what we knew of the situation the chance seemed to be otherwise. A few scattered shots came in on our right, to which our answer was, "Cease firing; we're friends." Then, while most of our poor fellows were standing with their guns at the shoulder, one of the deadliest volleys ever fired rolled upon us from our right and front. In the sudden anguish and despair of the moment the whole regiment seemed to be lying bleeding on the ground, indeed, almost every man who had stood in the more open spaces of the wood did fall: yet there still was a 21st, and a 21st that could fight some standing still in line, some from behind the trees, we opened fire on our brutal enemy; but in the drenching rain it being almost impossible to load a gun without wetting the powder, the guns on both sides soon became unserviceable, and, except a shot now and then, the firing ceased. Colonel Clark now ordered the regiment to retire, and they moved slowly from the woods, the enemy not pursuing. Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, and First Lieutenant Bemis lay dead. upon the ground, and First Lieutenant Clark with them, his hip shattered by a bullet. Captain Frazer, mortally wounded, |