ments of our brethren throughout the colonies, with unspeakable affliction, we find ourselves obliged to oppose that system of dominion over us, arising from counsels pernicious both to our parent and her children to strive, if it be possible, to close the breaches made in our former concord-and stop the sources of future animosities.-And may God Almighty, who delights in the titles of just and merciful, incline the hearts of all parties to that equitable and benevolent temper, which is necessary solidly to establish peace and harmony, in the place of confusion and dissension.

The legislative authority claimed by Parliament over these colonies consists of two heads-first, a general power of internal legislation; and secondly, a power of regulating our trade: both she contends are unlimited. Under the first, may be included among other powers, those of forbidding us to worship our Creator in the manner we think most acceptable to him-imposing taxes on us-collecting them by their own officers-enforcing the collection by admiralty courts or courts martial-abolishing trials by jury-establishing a standing army among us in time of peace, without consent of our Assembliespaying them with our money-seizing our young men for recruitschanging constitutions of government-stopping the press-declaring any action, even a meeting of the smallest number, to consider of peaceable modes to obtain redress of grievances high treason-taking colonists to Great Britain to be tried-exempting "murderers" of colonists from punishment, by carrying them to England, to answer indictments found in the colonies-shutting up our ports-prohibiting us from slitting iron to build our houses-making hats to cover our heads, or clothing to cover the rest of our bodies, etc.

In our provincial legislatures, the best judges in all cases what suits us-founded on the immutable and unalienable rights of human nature, the principles of the constitution, and charters and grants made by the Crown at periods, when the power of making them was universally acknowledged by the parent state, a power since frequently recognized by her-subject to the control of the Crown as by law established, is vested the exclusive right of internal legislation.

Such a right vested in Parliament, would place us exactly in the same situation, the people of Great Britain would have been reduced to, had James the first and his family succeeded in their scheme of arbitrary power. Changing the word Stuarts for Parliament, and Britons for Americans, the arguments of the illustrious patriots of those times, to whose virtues their descendants owe every blessing they now enjoy, apply with inexpressible force and appositeness, in maintenance of our cause, and in refutation of the pretension set up by their too forgetful posterity, over their unhappy colonists. Con fiding in the undeniable truth of this single position, that, "to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery," they generously suffered. And the worthy bishop before mentioned, who, for strenu

ously asserting the principles of the revolution, received the unusual honor of being recommended by a House of Commons to the sovereign for perferment, has justly observed, that “misery is the same whether it comes from the hands of many or of one."

"It could not appear tolerable to him (meaning Mr. Hooker, author of the ecclesiastical policy) to lodge in the governors of any society an nlimited authority, tɔ annul and alter the constitution of the govern ment, as they should see fit, and to leave to the governed the privilege only of absolute subjection in all such alterations; or to use the Par liamentary phrase, "in all cases whatsoever."

From what source can Great Britain derive a single reason to sup. port her claim to such an enormous power? That it is consistent with the laws of nature, no reasonable man will pretend. That it contradicts the precepts of Christianity, is evident. For she strives to force upon us, terms, which she would judge to be intolerably severe and cruel, if imposed on herself. "Virtual representation," is too ridiculous to be regarded. The necessity of a supreme sovereign legislature internally superintending the whole empire, is a notion equally unjust and dangerous. "The pretence (says Mr. Justice Blackstone speaking of James the first's reign) for which arbitrary measures was no other than the tyrant's plea of the necessity of unlimited powers, in works of evident utility to the public, the supreme reason above all reasons, which is the salvation of the king's lands and people.' This was not the doctrine of James only. His son unhappily inherited it from him. On this flimsy foundation was built the claim of ship money, etc. Nor were there wanting men, who could argue, from the courtly text, that Parliaments were too stupid or too factious to grant money to the Crown, when it was their interest and their duty to do

So.

This argument however, was fully refuted, and slept above a century in proper contempt, till the posterity of those, who had overthrown it, thought fit to revive the exploded absurdity. Trifling as the pretence was, yet it might much more properly be urged in favor of a single person, than of a multitude. The counsels of a monarch may be more secret. His measures more quick. In passing an act of Parliament for all the colonies, as many men are consulted, if not more, than need be consulted, in obtaining the assent of every legisla ture on the continent. If it is a good argument for Parliament, it is a better against them. It therefore proves nothing but its own futility. The supposed advantages of such a power, could never be attained but by the destruction of real benefits, evidenced by facts to exist without it. The Swiss Cantons. and the United Provinces, are combinations of independent states. The voice of each must be given. The instance of these colonies may be added: For stating the case, that no act of internal legislation over them had ever been passed by Great Britain, her wisest statesmen would be perplexed to show, that she or the colonies would have been less flourishing than they now are. What

benefits such a power may produce hereafter, time will discover. But the colonies are not dependent on Great Britain, it is said, if she has not a supreme unhmited legislature over them. "I would ask these loyal subjects of the king (says the author of a celebrated invective against us) what king it is, they profess themselves to be loyal subjects of? It cannot be his present most gracious majesty, George_the third, king of Great Britain, for his title is founded on an act of Parliament, and they will not surely acknowledge that Parliament can give them a king, which is of all others, the highest act of sovereignty, when they deny it to have power to tax or bind them in any other case; and I do not recollect, that there is any act of Assembly, in any of the colonies for settling the crown upon king William or the illustrious House of Hanover." 'Curious reasoning this." It is to be wished the gentleman had "recollected" that without any such "act of Assembly" none of the colonists ever rebelled. What act of Parliament is here meant? Surely not the 11th of Henry the seventh, chapter Ist, in favor of a king de facto. Probably the 12th and 13th of William the 3d chapter, the 2d, "for the further limitation of the Crown, etc." is intended. And, is it imagined that the words "dominions and territories thereunto belonging" in that statute, form his Majesty's title to the sovereignty of these colonies? The omission of them might have looked odd; but what force is added by their insertion? The settlement of the crown of England includes the settlement of the sovereignty of the colonies. King William is mentionedand will the gentleman venture to say, that William was not king of England and sovereign of these colonies, before his title was "declared" or "recognized" by "an act of Parliament?" The gentleman slurs over this case. His zeal for the "illustrious House of Hanover" would be little gratified, by inferring, that because the two houses with the consent of the nation, made a king, therefore the two houses can make laws. Yet that conclusion would be as justifiable as this-that the assent of the colonies to an election of a king by the two houses, or to the limitation of the Crown by act of Parliament, proves a right in Parliament to bind the colonies by statutes "in all cases whatsoever." In such great points, the conduct of a people is influenced solely by a regard for their freedom and happiness. The colonies have no other head than the king of England. The person who by the laws of that realm, is king of that realm, is our king.

A dependence on the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain, is a novelty-a dreadful novelty. It may be compared to the engine invented by the Greeks for the destruction of Troy. It is full of armed enemies, and the walls of the constitution must be thrown down, before it can be introduced among us.

When it is considered that the king as king of England has a power in making laws-the power of executing them-of finally determining on appeals—of calling upon us for supplies in times of war or any

emergency-that every branch of the prerogative binds us, as the subjects are bound thereby in England-and that all our intercourse with foreigners is regulated by Parliament.-Colonists may "surely" be acknowledged to speak with truth, and precision, in answer to the "elegantly" expressed question-"What king it is" etc. by saying thathis most gracious majesty George the third" is the king of England, and therefore, "the king" they-profess themselves to be loyal subjects of?

We are aware of the objection, that, "if the king of England is therefore king of the colonies, they are subject to the general legislative authority of that kingdom." The premises by no means warrant this conclusion. It is built on a mere supposition, that, the colonies are thereby acknowledged to be within the realm, and on an incantation expected to be wrought by some magic force in those words. To be subordinately connected with England, the colonies have contracted. To be subject to the general legislative authority of that kingdom, they never contracted. Such a power as may be necessary to preserve this connection she has. The authority of the sovereign, and the authority of controlling our intercourse with foreign nations form that power. Such a power leaves the colonies free. But a general legislative power, is not a power to preserve that connection, but to distress and enslave them. If the first power cannot subsist, without the last, she has no right even to the first-the colonies were deceived in their contract—and the power must be unjust and illegal; for God has given to them a better right to preserve their liberty, than to her to destroy it. In other words, supposing, king, lords and commons acting in Parliament, constitute a sovereignty over the colonies, is that sovereignty constitutionally absolute or limited? That states without freedom, should by principle grow out of a free state, is as impossible, as that sparrows should be produced from the eggs of an eagle. The sovereignty over the colonies, must be limited. Hesiod long since said, "half is better than the whole;" and the saying never was more justly applicable, than on the present occasion. Had the unhappy Charles remembered and regarded it, his private virtues might long have adorned a throne, from which his public measures precipitated him in blood. To argue on this subject from other instances of parliamentary power, is shifting the ground. The connexion of the colonies with England, is a point of an unprecedented and delicate nature. It can be compared to no other case; and to receive a just determination, it must be considered with reference to its own peculiar circumstances. The common law extends to colonies; yet Mr. Justice Blackstone says, "such parts of the law as are neither necessary nor convenient for them, as the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts, etc. are therefore not in force. If even the common law, in force within the realm of England when the colonists quitted it, is thus abridged by the peculiar circumstances of colonies,

at least equally just, and constitutional is it, that the power of making new laws within the realm of England, should be abridged with respect to colonies, by those peculiar circumstances.

The laws of England with respect to prerogative, and in other instances, have accommodated themselves, without alteration by statutes to a change of circumstances, the welfare of the people so requiring. A regard for that grand object perpetually animates the constitution, and regulates all its movements-unless unnatural obstructions interfereSpiritus intus alit, totamque infusa perartus

Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet."

Another argument for the extravagant power of internal legislation over us remains. It has been urged with great warmth against us, that "precedents" show this power is rightfully vested in Parliament. Submission to unjust sentences proves not a right to pass them. Carelessness or regard for the peace and welfare of the community, may cause the submission. Submission may sometimes be a less evil than opposition, and therefore a duty. In such cases, it is a submission to the divine authority, which forbids us to injure our country; not to the assumed authority, on which the unjust sentences were founded. But when submission becomes inconsistent with and destructive of the public good, the same veneration for and duty to the divine authority, commands us to oppose. The all wise Creator of man impressed certain laws on his nature. A desire of happiness, and of society, are two of those laws. They were not intended to destroy, but to support each other. Man has therefore a right to promote the best union of both, in order to enjoy both in the highest degree. Thus, while this right is properly exercised, desires, that seem selfish, by a happy combination, produce the welfare of others. "This is removing submission from a foundation unable to support it, and injurious to the honor of God, and fixing it upon much firmer ground.

No sensible or good man ever suspected Mr. Hooker of being a weak or factious person, "yet he plainly enough teacheth, that a society upon experience of universal evil, have a right to try by another form to answer more effectually the ends of government”. And Mr. Hoadley asks-" Would the ends of government be destroyed should the miserable condition of the people of France, which hath proceeded from the king's being absolute, awaken the thoughts of the wisest heads amongst them; and move them all to exert themselves, so as that those ends should be better answered for the time to come?"

What mind can relish the hardy proposition, that because precedents have been introduced by the inattention or timidity of some, and the cunning or violence of others, therefore the latter have a right to