LXIII. BATTLE AT BULL RUN, VA., BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.-1861. First Important Engagement in the Great Civil War.-Severe Fighting for Many Hours.-Most Disastrous Defeat of the Federal Troops.-Their Uncontrollable Panic and Headlong Flight.-The South Jubilant.-Gloom and Humiliation of the Loyal States.-Three Months Since Sumter Fell.-Armies Massed at Washington and Richmond.-Threats Against the Federal Capital.-Irritation and Impatience of the North.-" On to Richmond!" the Union War-Cry.-March of McDowell's Army.Plan of the Movement.-Rousing the Southern Forces.-Their Unexpected Strength.-Uncertain Fate of the Day.-Re-enforcement for Confederates.-Davis's Arrival on the Ground.-He Exclaims, "Onward, My Brave Comrades!"-Their Wild Enthusiasm.-A Lost Battle for the Union.-Complete Demoralization.-Three Miles of Scattered Troops.-Arms, Stores, etc., Flung Away -Distressing Sights and Sounds.-Thanksgiving Appointed by Davis.-Te Deums Sung in the Southern Churches.-Lessons Taught by this Battle. "The sainted patriots cry, "IT CANNOT BE!" From heaven they speak, and from their graves revered; The God who gave them victory will not see The temple shattered which their toil has reared!" MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD. ORE than three months had passed since the cap ture of Fort Sumter, and, during this exciting period, throughout the country, the great contending parties had massed, respectively, immense bodies of troops at Washington and Richmond, and their vicinities. So deep was the indignation felt by the upholders of the national cause, at the fall of Sumter, and at the various hostile movements and expeditions by the confederates which followed that event, such as the fearless assault made upon the federal soldiers while passing through Baltimore, the destruction of railroads and telegraphs, the seizure of Northerners' property at the South, the loss of the Norfolk navy yard, the rout at and the defiant threats of an advance on Washington,-that the cry of "On to Richmond," into which city the confederate forces had poured from every part of the South, both for defensive and aggressive operations, was heard on every side. Indeed, the patience of the North had become strained to its utmost tension toward those whose alleged official inactivity or tardiness was the assumed cause of the insurgent army not having been, long since, scattered and destroyed. There were of course those who did not share this impetuosity,-knowing well the capacities of defense peculiar to Richmond and its approaches, and keenly comprehending the disastrous effect upon the loyal states of a lost battle in the open field, immediately after the siege and reduction of Sumter. To the pressure, however, of this almost universal demand for an "onward movement," General Scott at last yielded, and, on the 21st of July, 1861, the first really important engagement between the union and confederate forces took place on the banks of a stream called Bull Run, a few miles to the north-west of Manassas Junction, Va., and about thirty miles south of the Potomac at Washington. It was on the 16th of July, that the union army, commanded by General McDowell, and officered by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Richardson, Heintzelman, Patterson, and Miles, commenced its march, the whole number of men being some forty-five thousand. The confederate force which they were soon to encounter, was much larger, and consisted of the division of General Beauregard, intrenched at Manassas Junction, re-enforced by the division under General Johnston, previously stationed at Winchester, in the valley of the Shenandoah, and a large body of reserves advanced from Richmond and Aquia Creek. On the 17th, the union army, in three columns, continued their line of march, the advance column occupying Fairfax Court House about one hour before noon, the confederates withdrawing as the unionists advanced. The cavalry pushed on to Centreville; and, on the 18th, the army took up its march for the same place. The advance, to this date, had been steadily made on all sides, and the reported positions of the troops considered good at headquarters. In the afternoon, an engagement took place at Blackburn's Ford. But the character of this conflict, as well as the general plan of the whole movement, will be best understood by presenting here the important portion of General McDowell's official report, or an abstract of the same. On the evening of July 20th, McDowell's command was mostly at or near Centreville, and the confederate forces at or near Manassas, about seven miles to the south-west. Centreville is a place of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction is along this ridge, crossing Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge, through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossing from northwest to south-east. The first division, Tyler's, was stationed on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge, two brigades on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas, where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford. The second division, Hunter's, was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville. The third division, Heintzelman's, was on a road known as the Old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the south-east, about a mile and a half from the village. The fifth division, Miles's, was on the same road with the third division, and between it and Centreville. The fight at Blackburn's Ford, on the 18th, showed that the confederates were too strong at that point for the unionists to force a passage there without great loss, and, from all the information that could be obtained, McDowell found that his only alternative was to turn the extreme left of the confederate position. Reliable information was also obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the confederate forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major-General Pat, terson. Brigadier-General Tyler had been directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move around to the upper ford, and there turn south and get behind the enemy. Heintzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as the turning off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by tween two and three hours behind the time appointed-a great misfortune, as events turned out. General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half-past six A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held, (says this officer,) one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles's division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford, at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division, Burnside's, had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aid-de-camp was sent to Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road, for about the same distance, the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road, the country on both sides of the road is open, and, for nearly a mile further, large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through Irvin Uusmall Hunter's division; the fifth division, Miles's, to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge. The fourth division, Runyon's, had not been brought to the front farther than to guard the federal communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria railroad. The divisions, says General McDowell, were ordered to march at half-past two o'clock, A. M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat. There was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were in consequence be over. the valley of a small water course, a tributary of Bull Run. Concerning the general action, the official report says: Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached the open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following up with infantry. The leading brigade, Burnside's, had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy fro: the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream, and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farmhouse on it. Behind this hill, the enemy had, early in the day, some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, and the hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the center and up the road, whilst Keyes's brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. Rickett's battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the enemy's special attention, who succeeded our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it-in disabling the battery, and then attempted. to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abattis across the road, to allow our re-enforcements-Schenck's brigade and Ayers's battery-to join us. After describing the condition of the confederate army at this time as disheartened and broken, General McDowell explains some of the causes that led to the disastrous fate which befell the federal army. They had been fighting since halfpast ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than nine and a half miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to get possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks. It was at this time, says McDowell, that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train. They threw themselves in the woods on our right and towards the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and J. E. Joniphon they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated into a panic. Finding this state of affairs. was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of their wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what could no longer be prevented, General McDowell gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and after the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost. The onset of that tumultuous retreat is described by those who witnessed it as terrific. For three miles, hosts of federal troops-all detached from their regiments, all mingled in one disorderly rout-were fleeing along the road, but mostly through the lots on either side. Army wagons, sutlers' teams, and private carriages, choked the passage, tumbling against each other, amid clouds of dust, and sickening sights and sounds. Hacks, containing unlucky spectators of the battle, were smashed like glass, and the occupants were lost sight of in the debris. Horses, flying wildly from the battle-field, many of them in death agony, galloped at random forward, joining in the stampede. Those on foot who could catch them rode them bare-back, as much to save themselves from being run over, as to make quicker time. Wounded men, lying along the banks-the few neither left on the field nor taken to the captured hospitals appealed with raised hands to those who rode horses, begging to be lifted behind, but few regarded such petitions. Then the artillery, such as was saved, came thundering along, smashing and overpowering everything. The cavalry added to all these terrors, for they rode down footmen without mercy. An artilleryman was seen running between. the ponderous fore and after wheels of his gun-carriage, hanging on with both hands, and vainly striving to jump upon the ordnance; but the drivers were spurring the horses; he could not cling much longer, and a more agonized expression never fixed the features of a drowning man; the carriage bounded from the roughness of a steep hill leading to a creek, he lost his hold, fell, and in an instant the great wheels had crushed the life out of him. And still the flight continued. It did not slack in the least until Centreville was reached. There the sight of the reserve -Miles's brigade-formed in order on the hill, seemed somewhat to reassure the van. But still the teams and foot soldiers pushed |