his speech by boldly walking down the aisle to the seat of the chairman and charging him with suppressing important evidence in behalf of the defendant. The chairman had no defense, quailed visibly, and the audience broke into an uproar of applause. The enthusiasm of congress was transmitted to the press by the reporters, who were carried off their feet by the speech of Blaine, and Political the republicans throughout the country were satisfied. But time brought reflection, and in the cold type of the Congressional Record the letters seemed to have something which was not explained. They probably prevented Blaine's nomination in 1876 and in 1880. The campaign of 1884 was hardly opened before these letters were brought out, and September 15 the papers contained other letters from Blaine to the same correspondent, not hitherto made public. Curtis, editor of Harper's Weekly, declared that they corroborated the first installment. As a whole, the Mulligan letters placed a blot on the name of a great man, which the defense uttered has not removed. Cleveland The campaign was noted for personalities. The republicans, writhing under the charges against their candidate, attacked the private reputation of Cleveland, charging him with grave sexual irregularities. The charge had some apparent foundation Attacked. in his early life, but it was widely exaggerated and the offense was long since atoned for. An investigation showed how unfairly it was presented, and before this and before the frank attitude of Cleveland himself the matter was overlooked. The The reformers in the republican party were bitterly opposed to Blaine. At Chicago they supported Edmunds, giving him 93 votes on the first ballot and 41 on the last. Among them were Senator Hoar, W. W. Phelps, Andrew D. White, and two young men, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. As politicians they would not jeopardize their careers by repudiating the nomination, but there were other reformers unembarrassed with political expectations. Soon after the convention adjourned an address was issued by a committee of which George William Curtis was chairman, calling on independents to vote for Cleveland. It received vigorous response in many parts of the union. The public was impressed when it saw such men as Henry Ward Beecher, Carl Schurz, James Freeman Clarke, George William Curtis, and William Everett turning to the democratic party. The editor of the New York Sun, who had a keen dislike for reformers, dubbed them "Mugwumps," a word hitherto of doubtful meaning, probably of Indian origin. They had the support of several important newspapers and literary men. As the canvass proceeded it was evident that New York would decide the battle. The state was filled with speakers, processions of various kinds addressed the candidates, and feeling was exceedingly CLEVELAND PRESIDENT Dr. Bur chard. 719 warm. A small incident at the end of the campaign probably had much influence on the result. One of the addresses to Blaine was made by Rev. S. D. Burchard, a New York minister and a warm Blaine supporter. He assured the candidate that he and his friends would not vote for the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Blaine in reply did not notice the thrust at the Catholics, and the democratic press loudly charged him with insulting that important portion of the voters. He tried to explain, but it was too late. The vote proved so close that this might have been the turning point. When the count was made it was seen that Cleveland had 219 electoral votes. They came from the Solid South, Delaware, Indiana, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Blaine had Cleveland the rest, 182 electoral votes. In the popular vote the Elected. democratic plurality was only 23,000. In New York Cleveland had the lead by only 1149 votes. With such a narrow margin the issue in the state might have been determined by Dr. Burchard's remark, the opposition of the mugwumps, the hostility of the prohibitionists, or some slumbering Conkling defection. The Nation said: "The real force which defeated Blaine was Blaine himself. He had created during his twenty years of public life a public distrust too deep to be overcome by even the most formidable combination of political wiles, money, and treachery ever organized in this country." CLEVELAND AND HIS PARTY A Deadlock. Cleveland Outwardly the election of Cleveland was a break in party history; inwardly it was only an incident. A new party control was, indeed, established, but it did not have power in congress, and the deadlock of Hayes's administration continued. Cleveland had definite purposes in regard to tariff reform, but a republican senate blocked the way, and only routine affairs could be transacted in congress. In party history the first administration of Cleveland rescued the democracy from the condition of an opposition group and made it a definite and aggressive force. Mere and his opportunism ruled it in 1868, 1872, and 1880. In 1876 Party. Tilden gave it a positive character, but this was adopted for temporary expediency, to take advantage of a situation which the folly of its opponents created. The nomination of Cleveland was much for the same reason, but once in power he imposed on his supporters a positive program, the first since 1856. His principles became democratic principles, and the American people fought for or against them for several years. Cleveland used his own judgment in selecting his cabinet. T. F. Bayard, of Delaware, was secretary of state, Daniel Manning, of New York, known hitherto for shrewd political management, became secretary of the treasury, W. C. Endicott, of Massachusetts, secretary of war, W. .C. Whitney, of New York, secretary of the navy, A. H. Garland, of Arkansas, attorney-general, W. F. Vilas, His Cabinet. of Wisconsin, postmaster-general, and L. Q. C. Lamar, of Mississippi, secretary of the interior. Bayard, Garland, and Lamar were experienced in national affairs, but they were Southerners, and by that fact were slightly handicapped. Not one of the four others had seen experience in Washington. Endicott's highest office hitherto was a judgeship, in which he acquitted himself well, and Vilas had served in his state's legislature and presided over the recent national nominating convention. At this time the democratic party had met its opponents in congress on equal terms for ten years. It is indicative of the unformed state of its Northern branch that not an experienced man of that wing was called to a cabinet position. The president was pledged to support civil service reform. He was at once beset by a horde of office seekers, and his supporters men. in congress marshaled them. The recently established The Spoils- classified service was mostly kept intact, but removals for partisanship occurred freely in the unclassified service. Vilas created dismay among the reformers by announcing such a policy for fourth-class postmasters. The Baltimore post office was under civil service rules, but the postmaster there made removals and filled the places with democrats, saying in reply to his critics, "I am sure my course in this respect has met the approval not only of democrats, but also of fair-minded republicans, and I shall not concern myself as to the views of Mugwumps.' Henry Watterson defined offensive partisanship thus: "Officially every man is offensive who is not in sympathy with the party in power.' In view of this feeling Cleveland did well to remove no more than two-thirds of the officials not under the civil service rules. He wished to avoid a split with his party and announced a policy of equalization which he observed in general. Many of the reformers believed he did the best he could, but others were displeased and forsook him. As a reformer Cleveland, had no sympathy from two groups of democrats, a "machine" element somewhat like the "stalwarts" Anti- among the republicans, and the high tariff democrats of the East. Of the former, Senator Gorman was a prominent leader. He rose to power in Maryland by the ordinary methods of machine politics, and maintained himself through unusual ability. He was a silent, bland, clear-headed man an astute leader, and an unyielding opponent. He and the men whom he represented had no taste for reform. Tammany Hall, controlling the party in New York City, was equally opposed to reform. Governor Hill, of New York, was in sympathy with Tammany and openly declared his objections to the administration. His election to the United States senate, in 1891, gave an able leader to the malcontents CLEVELAND AS TARIFF REFORMER 721 and a worthy assistant to Senator Gorman. Cleveland was also viewed unfavorably by the high tariff democrats. They were led by Randall of Pennsylvania and were strong in that state, New York, and New Jersey. Randall showed his antipathy to reform in 1886 by introducing into the house a bill to repeal the Pendleton act. The democrats dared not pass it, but it strengthened the mover with a certain section of the party. TARIFF REFORM UNDER CLEVELAND Bill of 1886. The democratic platform of 1884 reflected the divided opinion in the party. It merely promised tariff revision in the spirit of fairness and without injury to American industry. Cleveland, however, went further, and in his first annual message, December, 1885, suggested the adoption of a tariff for revenue only. A bill to that effect was introduced into the house, but thirty-five Randall democrats united with the republicans to prevent its consideration. In the autumn after congress adjourned, 1886, the democratic majority in the house was reduced from 40 to 12, and Morrison, leader of tariff reform, was among the rejected ones. Symptoms of panic appeared in the party, but they did not reach the president. In the message of 1886 he renewed his arguments for reduction. Congress paid no heed, and the short session passed without a tariff bill. The situation within the party was now little less than war. Cleveland felt that he must win his fight by appealing to the country over the heads of the congressmen. His annual message of Tariff 1887 was entirely devoted to the tariff. He demanded a Message of tariff for revenue and pointed out most forcibly the dangers 1887. of surplus financiering. He disclaimed the advocacy of free trade, which his opponents imputed to him, and said, in a phrase that was often repeated, "It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory." The Mills The message was followed by the Mills bill, 1888, in which the duties were to be reduced from an average of 47 per cent to an average of 40 per cent. It rejected horizontal reduction, embodied in the Morrison bill, and gradual reduction through the enlarge- Bill, 1888. ment of the free list, embodied in the ill-fated bill of 1886, and took up the task of general revision, schedule by schedule. The president watched the bill closely as it went through the house by a majority of 13, and was believed to have secured its passage by threatening to veto bills for public buildings. It was not considered in the senate, where the republicans ruled and were preparing a bill expressive of their own ideas. Each bill was really a manifesto for use in the election then at hand. Cleveland Renominated. THE ELECTION OF 1888 In 1887 Cleveland's chances for nomination were considered doubtful, and Hill, the leading anti-Cleveland man and favorite of the New York democracy, was much talked of. But Cleveland's course in the following winter and spring removed all this doubt. He gave his party its issue and was so evidently the logical candidate that even Hill said he should be nominated. He was chosen without opposition by the party convention at St. Louis, June 5, and Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, was named for his running-mate. The platform was all Cleveland wished. Nominated. This situation pleased the republicans, who believed that so many tariff democrats would join them that they must surely win. Their most likely candidate was Blaine, who had lost little Harrison of his popularity through the defeat of 1884. He was traveling in Europe in the first half of the year and would not say whether or not he desired the nomination. Either his health, or the fear of defeat, or an aversion to another campaign of personal abuse finally decided him, and he definitely declined at the very time the party convention met in Chicago, June 19. Several other candidates were before the convention. Blaine, in withdrawing, suggested Benjamin Harrison, of Indiana, and after three days of balloting he was selected, with Levi P. Morton, of New York, candidate for the vice-presidency. The platform was long, but its most important plank gave open allegiance to "the American system of protection" and with a squint at the surplus-demanded liberal appropriations for the navy and pensions. The Campaign of 1888. The campaign was noted for a freer use of money by both sides than hitherto. The democrats, spite of the Pendleton act, are believed to have received large contributions from the officeholders, as well as from other sources. The republicans could not appeal to this class, but they had a greater resource in the manufacturers. The solicitation of funds from such persons was popularly called "fat-frying." It was believed that votes were freely purchased. Probably both sides were guilty, but the greatest blame was laid at the door of the republicans. Dudley, treasurer of the republican fund, is known to have written to a lieutenant in Indiana, "Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five, and make him responsible that none get away, and that all vote our ticket." New York was again the deciding state, and several causes united to make it favorable to Harrison. In the first place he had not the bitter enemies who opposed Blaine in 1884. Also, Tilden's friends in the state were discontented because they thought their leader had |