self-government for the bustling white immigrants who felt their responsibilities as builders of a new commonwealth. The tide of immigration was strong after the war of 1812; for stories of fertile lands in what from its position must certainly be a great state attracted many settlers from the East. They came chiefly from the South, passing through Kentucky and Tennessee in long wagon trains accompanied by their slaves and cattle. By 1820 the population was 66,586. It was the first, and for many years the farthest, advance of the white man's civilization into the great mid-continental plain beyond the Mississippi.

Division of

We have seen that by 1800 the states north of Maryland, i.e. north of the Mason and Dixon's line, had restricted slavery, and those to the southward continued slave states. By the ordinance of 1787 the Ohio was made the dividing line between freedom the West and slavery for the region beyond the mountains; and in Respect to Slavery. thus the country between the Atlantic and the Mississippi was amicably divided between the two great interests. Nothing was done about a similar division when Louisiana was acquired or when territories were first created within its bounds. In the absence of restrictions the slaveholders felt they had equal rights there with other Americans, and they were a large part of the population of Missouri when in March, 1818, congress was asked to make the

Missouri asks for Statehood.

territory a state. No action was taken at that time, although under the rule that a territory could expect statehood when it had 60,000 inhabitants, there should have been no objection to the request. The petition was renewed in the next session, and in February, 1819, the house was considering a state bill when Tallmadge, of New York, offered an amendment to exclude further introduction of slaves into Missouri and gradually to emancipate those already there. After a short and angry debate the amendment was carried in the house, but lost in the senate. This discussion lasted but two weeks. It was unexpected, and produced violent commotions. Whenever slavery had been discussed before that in congress, hot words had been used; for some Significance of its opponents would denounce it as a crime and some of its defenders would reply bitterly. The quieter men, North and South, had usually agreed to avoid occasions for excitement, and the number of free and slave states was equal. With the admission of Alabama, then imminent, there would be eleven free and eleven slave states. It was to the interest of the new republicans and of every man who had hope of being president in 1824 to keep in abeyance a question which would surely realign political groups and make impossible the enactment of such national measures as tariffs and bills for internal improvements. Jefferson said the debate was "like a fire-bell in the night." The leaders of the party, therefore, regarded with apprehension the hot discussion and the

of the Debate.

THE COMPROMISE CARRIED

373

voting of warm resolutions by public meetings and legislatures North and South through the summer of 1819.

Issue: the

The question was intimately related to that sectional jealousy which to this time had not been entirely absent from most of the deliberations of congress. The rule of Virginia was distasteful to New England, and even the New York republicans, though Sectionalpartners in that rule, were restless under it. Tallmadge, ism the who introduced the resolution, was a close friend of Clinton, Northern and Rufus King, leading defender of it, was an old federalist Side. of New York. To the men of the North it seemed that Southerners, by extending their peculiar institution into the great Northwest, would establish their power in the Missouri valley and eventually lay hands on all the region west of it. If such a thing was to be prevented, it must be prevented now. If this advance was allowed, there would be a union of the South and the great Northwest, slavery being the common bond which would dominate the future as relentlessly as the Virginia combination ruled the present. Besides this feeling, there was in the North a growing conviction that slavery was a blot on our civilization, and ought to be restricted in area. A small number of Northern people even declared that slavery was a crime and slaveholders criminals. Thus the Southern supremacy in the government was attacked by a powerful combination which threatened to take from it all its support in New York, Pennsylvania, and other Northern states.

The South

Several combined interests existed in the South. Its leaders desired to perpetuate Southern control, in order to ward off unfavorable. legislation; they also felt that the growing immigration into the free North would enable that section to people quickly the vast West and establish control in congress. Such a result achieved, it was not doubted that an attempt would be made to amend the constitution with regard to the three-fifths representation of slaves, and perhaps efforts would be made to abolish slavery itself. Besides these considerations, many Southerners were irritated when told that slaveholding was a crime. Their best people owned slaves, and everywhere were seen efforts to make the lot of the blacks as happy as the necessities of bondage permitted. Thus it was that sentiment North and South through the summer of 1819 hardened, and practical leaders became convinced that only a compromise could prevent a general disarrangement of existing party alignments.

ern Side.

January 3, 1820, four weeks after the new congress met, the house passed a bill to admit Maine. Massachusetts, which formerly had authority over Maine, had consented to this action provided congress approved before March 4, 1820. Earlier in the session Alabama was admitted, so that the admission of Maine would give the free states a majority. The situation suggested a compromise, and when the Maine bill reached

The Missouri Compromise.

the senate, it was combined with a bill then before that house to admit Missouri without restriction. This step was approved by the senate by a vote of 23 to 21. Then Thomas, of Illinois, moved to amend by admitting Missouri with slavery and by prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30', north latitude, in the rest of the Louisiana purchase. Here was the compromise that conservative men wished. It was much like that by which the Northwest was reserved to freedom in 1787 while the Southwest was left to slavery. It would remove the many dangers for persons and measures, and it passed the senate by a vote of 34 to 10. The house had a safe majority for restriction, and was disposed to throw away every thought of other ends to place slavery in a way of extinction, and voted to reject the senate compromise. It seemed that a complete deadlock was reached, when a conference committee was at last appointed. Then came further relenting, until enough members yielded to carry the compromise by a majority of three. Of the 87 who made the minority 33 were from New England, 46 were from the Middle states, and 8 were the solid Northwestern delegation. No Southern or Southwestern representative voted for restriction in Missouri, and 7 New Englanders and 8 Middle states men voted against it. The Missouri Compromise was the work of moderate men, chiefly those who lived in the Middle states and in the northern tier of Southern states. Many years later the South attacked the compromise, and pointed to the fact that it was not accepted by those Southerners who, as it was then put, were true to the rights of the South in 1820.

This debate aroused the Missourians, thoroughly under the control of the slaveholders; and the constitution they framed reflected their determination to hold the state. It guaranteed the existence of slavery in the new state and forbade the immigration of free negroes.

The Missouri Constitution.

When in the succeeding autumn it came before congress for approval, it was opposed by the Northern members of the house, who declared that it violated the federal constitution. There was a hot debate over the right of congress to shackle a sovereign state, and the result was deadlock. Clay took a prominent part in the first compromise, and he now came forward with another. He induced the legislature of Missouri, then in session, to agree that the objectionable clause should never be construed to lessen in Missouri the rights of citizens of other states, and with that the constitution was approved.

One other difficulty appeared. Missouri, assuming that statehood was complete, chose presidential electors in 1820 favorable to Monroe,

Clay the Pacificator."

and the returns were sent to the senate. The Southerners favored their reception on the ground that Missouri became a state by the first compromise act, March, 1820. If this was allowed, the restriction on her constitution was illegal, and the North accordingly insisted that the returns be rejected.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN STATES

375

Here was the possibility of an angry dispute, but Clay again smoothed the difficulty, proposing that the result be announced in words like these: If the vote of Missouri be counted, Monroe had 231 votes; if not, he had 228 votes, and in either case he was elected president. For his work in these compromises Clay was called the "Pacificator," a title which pleased his friends. It was considered a great thing to bring jarring factions together and to avert the threatened dangers of disunion.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

America

Monroe's unwillingness to recognize the independence of the South American states in 1817 was based on his conviction, shared by Secretary Adams, that the revolutionists had not established a settled government, and on the feeling that rash action in South this respect would imperil the plans of purchasing Florida. Recognized. By 1822 these two reasons were not operative. Florida was secured, and continued successes by the South Americans had made it certain that Spain, unassisted by other European powers, would not be able to reconquer what she had lost. Meanwhile, Clay continued to agitate for recognition, and aroused such enthusiasm that congress early in 1821 resolved that it would support the president whenever he thought fit to extend recognition. Monroe delayed a year and then yielded, notifying congress on March 18, 1822, that he would send ministers to the new states when money was provided for the expenses. Immediate action on the question was retarded by a far more complicated aspect of the matter in the field of general diplomacy.

England's

England had watched the South American revolutions with great interest. Having lost the North American colonies as an outlet of trade, she wished new markets in the new republics of the south. All the efforts of the revolutionists had been made Alarms. with her assistance, sometimes covert, but often open. Her fleet gave important aid on the Pacific, and her citizens sold supplies to the insurrectionary armies. When the European wars were over, the nations of the Old World united in the Holy Alliance to restore the conditions existing before the European upheaval, and began to think of helping Spain to regain her colonies. This would upset the commercial plans of England, and she gave notice that she would not coöperate in the matter. But the other powers were disposed to act of themselves, and England, not wishing to oppose them alone, thought of uniting with the United States to prevent such action. George Canning, the minister whose rude attitude did so much to bring on the war of 1812, was now head of the British foreign office. He turned to Monroe, who was keenly alive to what was going on, and suggested, August 16, 1823, that he unite with England in declaring that Europe should not extend her possessions in the western hemisphere. At that time France was subduing a liberal revolution in

Spain, and it was believed that the Spanish monarch, too weak to pay for the service in money, would allow France to indemnify herself by seizing the South American states.

The Views of Adams.

Adams only half approved Canning's suggestion. He did not like, as he said, the idea that his country should “ come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war." If we undertook to save the South American states, it was, he thought, more in keeping with our dignity that we act on broad principles announced on our own initiative. The knowledge that England at that time had designs on Cuba and that Russia was seeking to get recognition of a very shadowy claim to the Pacific coast south to the fifty-first degree of latitude convinced him that it was time to take a positive stand. Clay's continual appeals in behalf of a republican system in America with an eye to the recognition of the South American states had prepared the country to support such a policy as the secretary had in mind. It was out of such conditions that the Monroe Doctrine had its origin.

Canning's

Share.

Adams's determination was reached after many months of negotiations. Monroe must have been cognizant of what was done, and he gave it his approval. His cabinet were freely consulted, and the members also accepted the ideas of the strongwilled secretary of state, who was at his best in asserting the dignity of his country. And Canning himself could not object; for it was the United States, and not England, which was most concerned in the step about to be taken. His boast some years later that he "called a New World into existence to redress the balance of Old" was not entirely true. His suggestion was doubtless of great importance, and the coöperation of England was essential, but the Monroe Doctrine was an American doctrine and was designed to operate as much against English as continental aggression. He had little confidence in the ability of the United States to enforce their policy to the exclusion of England, and seems to have thought that in future emergencies England would manage to plant herself firmly in South America, a hope which the strong spirit of our government was to make ineffective.

The Doctrine Announced.

The policy of the United States being formed, it only remained to place it before the world, and the annual message of 1823 was selected as a fitting means. It reached congress December 2 and asserted in clear and simple language two interrelated purposes, one referring to the New World and the other to the Old. The language of the message is worthy of perusal by all Americans. "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves," it runs, "we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this