of Grand Gulf; and, at the very outset of Grant's southward movement, he had to notify the officers across the Mississippi that it was impossible for him to do any thing to prevent it. He had constantly to struggle against the cupidity of private parties, and the interests they exerted at Richmond for the promotion of their schemes of gain. A most serious embarrassment arose from the wretched condition of the railroads, which were fast wearing out. The planters refused to hire their slaves to repair them; he had to solicit that slaves might be impressed for the purpose. He had received assurances from Davis that assistance should be sent him, but it never came. He was perpetually instructed not only to hold Vicksburg, but that it was also necessary to hold Port Hudson and keep up the trans-Mississippi communications; but he saw distinctly, the moment the gun-boats had proved they could run the batteries of Vicksburg and Port Hudson with impunity, that, so far as the Confederacy was concerned, the free navigation of the Mississippi and Red Rivers was lost. Notwithstanding all the care he had taken to fortify Grand Gulf, the works at that point became useless as soon as Grant had sufficient transportation below Vicksburg. What was worse, with so much rapidity did that general move, that the heavy guns which had been carried down to Grand Gulf could not be withdrawn.

To add to all this, his troops had lost confidence in him. The morale of his They had become persuaded that he owed his army destroyed. command over them to favoritism and sinister influences at Richmond. He himself says that they were very much demoralized, and could not be made to stand. It was painfully apparent that the morale of his army was such as not to justify an attempt to hold the line of the Big Black. During the siege it became necessary to secure the magazines against the designs of disloyal persons. Yet his refusal to comply with Johnston's order to evacuate Vicksburg was not without political excuse, if, indeed, any

thing can ever excuse a soldier in disobeying the orders of his superior. He saw clearly what the evacuation meant. "The evacuation of Vicksburg means the loss of the valua ble stores and munitions of war collected for its defense; the fall of Port Hudson; the surrender of the evacuate Vicksburg. Mississippi River; the severance of the Confederacy. These are mighty interests!"

His reluctance to

With respect to his relations with his superior, General Johnston condemns Johnston, that officer, in his report of these Pemberton's acts. transactions, visits him with the severest condemnation. He says, "General Pemberton made not a single movement in obedience to my orders; he regarded none my instructions; .and, finally, did not embrace the only opportunity to save his army-that given by my order to abandon Vicksburg."

of

The people of the Confederacy placed very great confidence in Johnston's abilities, but Davis regarded him with unfriendly eyes. The blunt soldier had told the President that things had come to such a pass in the West that it was no longer possible to hold both Mississippi and Tennessee, and that the government must make its choice between them; he had added that he considered the saving of Vicksburg hopeless, and that the only time at which that could have been done was when Grant was landing at Bruinsburg. Pemberton had disobeyed his injunctions to attack Grant, and again to attack Sherman. "Convinced of the impossibility of collecting a sufficient force to break the investment of Vicksburg, should it be completed; appreciating the difficulty of extricating the garrison, and assured that both that fortress and Port Hudson had lost most of their value by the repeated passage of armed vessels and transports, I ordered the evacuation of both places. Vicksburg was greatly in peril when my instructions from Tullahoma to concentrate there were neglected; it was lost when my orders of the 13th and 15th of May were diso beyed. To this loss were added the labors, privations, and

certain destruction of a gallant army when my orders for its evacuation were set aside."

the siege.

Grant's position now was like that of Cæsar when at Grant's progress in tacking Vercingetorix in his fortified camp; but no ray of hope gleamed on the ramparts of Vicksburg, as on those of Alesia when the Gaulish relieving army came up in the rear. Grant remorselessly pressed on the siege. On June 25th a mine was exploded under the parapet of Forney's works; through the breach a charge was made, but it was repulsed. Some men of the Fortythird Mississippi, who were in the shaft countermining at the time of the explosion, were buried and lost. On the morning of July 1st another mine was sprung on the right of the Jackson Road; the result was the demolition of a redan, leaving an immense chasm where it stood. The Confederate interior line was much injured. Not one of the garrison could show his head without being instantly shot by the riflemen. Pemberton at last began to feel the Exhaustion of the Want of provisions. He drove out many of his mules and horses, partly in hope that some of them might reach Johnston, and partly to save forage. By the end of May his meat-ration was reduced to one half; when his stock of bacon was exhausted, mule-flesh was is sued. The sick and wounded in his hospitals were daily increasing; eventually they reached 6000. Though he had a sufficiency of ammunition, his stock of percussion-caps was reduced so low that at one time he had only ten for each man; additional quantities were, however, occasionally brought by persons who managed to get in through Grant's lines. His heart sank within him as he felt himself abandoned by the authorities at Richmond, and, notwithstanding all the promises that had been held out, deserted in his dire extremity by Davis. Wistfully, hour after hour, he gazed to the east, and still there were no signs of Johnston's appearance in Grant's rear. For

garrison.

forty-seven days and nights his men had been in the trenches unrelieved; their limbs had become cramped and swollen for want of exercise; they were constantly exposed to a murderous fire of shot and shell, and, if they showed themselves but for a moment, to the deadly rifles of the sharp-shooters.

Interview between

ton.

On the 3d of July Pemberton saw that Grant was ready to make a final and fatal assault. That aftGrant and Pember- ernoon he wrote to his besieger asking an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. To this Grant promptly replied, declining the appointment of such commissioners, and requiring an unconditional surrender. At 3 P.M. an interview between them took place beneath an old oak-tree. Pemberton was irritable and indiscreet. Great and merciful, the conqueror bore, without an unkind remark, the petulance of his vanquished adversary, and returned him no railing reply, but closed the interview by saying that he would send his ultimatum in writing.

Vicksburg is surrendered to Grant.

At 10 A.M., July 4, 1863, Vicksburg was surrendered to Grant. The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by proper authority. The officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. They were to take rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond the national lines. They were also to have the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food, and thirty wagons for the transport of such articles as could not well be carried.

Much dissatisfaction was expressed throughout the Confederacy that Pemberton should have thus surrendered on the national anniversary the Fourth of July. He al leged that, knowing the vanity of his enemies, he thought

they would give him better terms for the sake of obtain ing a triumph on that day. His true reason was that he did not dare to abide the impending assault.

On the morning of the surrender Grant rode into Vicksburg. The day was very sultry, and the roads in many places a fine dusty powder to the depth of ten inches. He repaired to the house which had been Pemberton's headquarters, and, on entering the piazza in which that general and his staff were sitting, asked for water. Of the sullen and sulky assemblage, no one returned his courteous salutations they pointed to him where he might supply his want himself.

There was great anxiety among the Confederate officers to carry off their negroes under the title of personal property, but it was positively forbidden by Grant.

Nearly every house in the city had been shot through. Condition of Vicks- Some had a corner blown off; of many the burg after the siege. walls were bulged. In the streets there were huge craters where the 13-inch shells had burst; the pillars of the piazzas were split to pieces. It was affirmed that there was not a whole pane of glass within five miles. Not less than three hundred houses were occupied as hospitals. The inhabitants had amused themselves by piling at their doors fragments of iron and exploded shells. In the bluff caves had been dug, into which the citizens retreated whenever the fire was heavy. Sometimes as many as twenty-five had crowded into one of these holes.

his operations.

The result of the campaign, as summed up by Grant, Grant's summary of Was “the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi; and the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison, and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were 15 general officers; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green; and hundreds, perhaps thousands of stragglers who can