into Vicksburg. Grant's plans were now fast approaching their consumPemberton is forced mation. He had made sure of Pemberton, whose routed troops that night fell back into the fortifications of Vicksburg; with them also entered many planters and their families, who had been living near the city. A scene of uproar and confusion ensued, in which the blasphemous oaths of soldiers, the cries of young chil dren, the lamentations of women, commingled. The remorseless pursuer, detained by the burned bridges of the Big Black, was busy constructing floating ones. One was of cotton-bales, one of timber and planks. He had them finished in the night, and by nine the next morning was crossing. The only pontoon train in the army was with Sherman, who, without delay, laid it and crossed his troops, marching toward Vicksburg by the Bridgeport Road. "That night, soon after dark, Grant rode up and had an interview with Sherman. The two commanders crossed the bridge, and seated themselves on a fallen tree, in the light of a pile of burning fence-rails, while the eager and swift-marching men of the 15th Corps filed by them and disappeared in the darkness. Grant had marched 200 miles, had fought four battles, taken 90 guns, captured 6000 prisoners-more than all, he had cut off Pemberton's escape. He detailed his plans for the next day, after which he returned through the forest to his own head-quarters." When Sherman's troops, the next morning, were within 3 miles of Vicksburg, that general turned to the right, to get possession of the Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. He accomplished it before night. Communications were opened with Admiral Porter, who was on the Yazoo, and the new base of supplies was secured. McPherson followed Sherman, halting at the point where Sherman had turned off. McClernand came Investment of Vicks- up by the Jackson Road, turning at Mount Alban's to his left. By these dispositions the three army corps completed the investment of Vicksburg on the morning of the 19th. burg by Grant. Johnston had feared the worst, but he had not expected this terrible energy. He saw that he had on his hands no repetition of the Virginia peninsular campaign, but that the national army had at last learned how to make war. As soon as he heard of Pemberton's repulse at Cham pion Hills, he sent a dispatch to him. "If Haines's Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value; it can not be held. If you are invested in it you must ultimately surrender. Instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if pos sible, save the troops. If not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies forthwith, and march northeast." But it was too late. The Confederates Bluff. The Confederates abandoned their works at Haines's Bluff on the 17th. Admiral Porter, speaking evacuate Haines's of them, says, "Such a network of forts I never saw." Not without reason did Sherman, in a letter to General M. L. Smith, say, "As soon as we had fixed things in Jackson, I made good time in reaching the very point above Vicksburg that we had worked so hard and thanklessly for last January. It has fulfilled all my expectations, and we now have high and commanding ground, and haul our stores from our old landing at Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads made by the enemy, which enabled him to mass his troops so promptly before us, are now ours, and answer an admirable purpose. I ride often to the very signal hill from which all our movements were telegraphed, and enjoy an internal satisfaction that, after five months' patient labor and fighting, I can now reciprocate the compliment. We are close upon the enemy; our artillery reaches every part of the city, which, I am told, has become like a prairie-dog village, all burrowed in the earth." There was nothing now to prevent the gun-boats passing Destruction of ship- up the Yazoo. Accordingly, five went up to ping at Yazoo City. Yazoo City. They reached it on May 20. It was here, in an extensive yard for the construction of war vessels, that the Arkansas was built. The Mobile was ready for her plating; the Republic was fitting for a ram with armor of railroad iron; on the stocks there was a new steamer 310 feet long and 70 feet beam. She was to be plated with 4-inch iron. These, with the machine-shops and other establishments, were destroyed. Posting of the armies at Vicksburg. At this time Grant's army was about 30,000 strong. Sherman was on his right, McPherson in the centre, McClernand on the left. The force increased to nearly 70,000, in 16 divisions, during the siege. On the Confederate side Stevenson occupied 5 miles from the Warrenton Road to the railroad, Forney 2 miles from the railroad to the Grave-yard Road, Smith 14 from the Grave-yard to the river front on the north. Bowen was in reserve. On the entire line there were 102 guns. From the extreme right of Stevenson's position to the left of Smith was about eight miles, the shortest possible distance which the topography of the country permitted. Thus arranged, the garrison of Vicksburg was about 25,000 strong. It had provisions for nearly two months. The fortifications were bastioned earth-works on the right, centre, and left, with an exterior line of intrenchments. first assault. On the first day of the investment, Grant, relying on the Grant fails in his demoralization of the enemy in consequence of their repeated defeats, ordered a general assault at 2 P.M. It proved unsuccessful. Two days were then spent by him in obtaining and distributing supplies; on the third he renewed the attempt. He was induced to do this by the expectation that Johnston might attack him in the rear in hopes of raising the siege; by the consideration that the possession of Vicksburg would enable him to turn upon that general and drive him from the state, thereby effectually securing all territory west of the Tombigbee, and saving the government the necessity of sending re-enforcements, which were needed elsewhere; and finally by the persuasion that the troops themselves, being impatient to possess the place, would not work in the trenches with zeal, believing it to be unnecessary. The assault was ordered to commence at 10 A.M. on the ond assault. And again in a sec- 22d. Grant caused the corps. commanders to set their watches by his, so that there should be no difference between them in the movement. Promptly, at the designated moment, all three army corps advanced, Grant taking a position near the centre of the front, from which he could see all McPherson's, a part of Sherman's and McClernand's advancing columns. Sherman was resisted by Baldwin's and Shoup's brigades of Smith's division; Hurlburt's brigade, of Forney's division, met the attack on both sides of the Jackson Road. On the Confederate right the brigades of Moore and Lee resist ed McClernand. The assailants succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the bastions, but the position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken by assault. No one entered any of the works except Sergeant Griffith, a youth not 18 years of age, and eleven pri vates of the 21st Iowa Volunteers. But about 12 o'clock Grant received a dispatch from McClernand stating that he had taken two of the forts, and requesting that Sherman and McPherson should make a diversion in his favor. That was accordingly done. It eventually proved that McCler nand was mistaken, and that the two forts had not been carried. In this assault Grant lost about 3000 men, one third of them through the renewal of the attack at McClernand's request. The Confederate loss was more than 1000. Little resistance was made by their artillery. Porter aided the attack by keeping up a bombardment with his mortar-boats, and by sending four gun-boats to silence both the water and hill batteries. They engaged the water batteries at a distance of 440 yards, but so great was the noise and smoke that Porter neither heard nor saw any thing of the battle that was going on in the rear. Grant, now perceiving the hopelessness of a direct assault, determined to He prepares for a regular siege. proceed against the strong-hold by a regular siege. He sent to West Tennessee for all the troops that could be spared. Halleck re-enforced him with others from West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri. Within a fortnight the besieging army was strong enough to invest Vicksburg on its front, and ward off Johnston in its rear. The besiegers had the great advantage of being sheltered from the hot sun by the woods; they also found many springs of fine water in the ravines. Besides the investing line on the land-side of the town, stretching from Haines's Bluff to Warrenton, they had a line of infantry on the other side of the Mississippi, across the peninsula which Vicksburg overlooks. There were gun-boats both above and below; one of these, the Cincinnati, was sunk on the 27th of May while attempting to silence a water battery. She was riddled through and through. There were, in addition, six 13-inch mortars, and two 200-pound Parrot guns mounted on rafts. Pemberton had very great difficulties to encounter, arising partly from the exhaustion of the military countered by Pem- resources and spirit of the Confederacy, and partly from his relations with his superior, The difficulties en berton. General Johnston. As respects the former, he complained bitterly of his want of cavalry for the purpose of checking raids, declaring that they were so incessant that it was absolutely impossi ble for him to protect his communications. Of Grierson he says, "So great was the consternation that it was impossible to obtain reliable information of his movements, rumors placing him in several points at the same time." He declared that if he had only had cavalry, Grant would never have reached Vicksburg, or even Jackson. In other par ticulars his resources were very inadequate: he had to take guns out of the Vicksburg batteries to supply those |