ments when he raised the siege of Atlanta and attacked the Confederate supplying railroads. However, it should not be forgotten that the morale of the army defending Richmond was very different from that of the army defending Atlanta.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the ene my's right flank, Grant and Meade personally accompanying it. It was Grant's expectation to reach and hold the Southside Railroad. The passage of Hatcher's Run was forced, part of the cavalry reaching the Boydton Plank Road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. But, finding that he had not passed the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault, Grant withdrew to his fortified line. In doing this, a gap happened to occur between Hancock and Warren. Grant, having received an erroneous report that Warren had connected with Hancock, returned to City Point. The Conbut his troops are federates, taking advantage of the gap, made forced to withdraw. a desperate attack on Hancock's right and rear. Hancock, however, drove them into their works, and withdrew to his old position during the night.

It was well that Hancock thus withdrew, for Hill had massed 18,000 infantry and cavalry to fall upon him in the morning. In this operation Grant's loss was 1900, of whom one third were missing.

In support of this movement, Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James.

Butler, moreover, for some time past had been digging The Dutch Gap the Dutch Gap Canal. It was excavated Canal excavated. where the James River makes a bend to the westward about Bermuda Hundred, the neck of land being only about half a mile across. It was begun in the summer and completed at the end of the year, a narrow bulkhead being left at the upper end. On blowing this up the earth fell back into the channel, admitting but an

insignificant stream of water. The Confederates established a battery opposite the mouth of the canal, so as to enfilade and neutralize it completely.

The Weldon Railroad was still used in bringing supplies from Wilmington within a few miles of Grant's tion of the Weldon lines; they were then wagoned to Richmond; but, on the 7th of December, Warren destroy

Farther destruc

Railroad.

ed the road for 20 miles farther down.

Active siege opera

winter.

From this time until the spring campaign of 1865 the operations in front of Petersburg and Richtions cease for the mond were confined by Grant to the defense and extension of his lines, and to movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and preventing his detaching any considerable force southward.

I did not think it advisable to break the narrative of The defenses of Early's sortie by any detailed statement reWashington. specting the fortifications of Washington. Although his advance to them and his subsequent retreat suggested a description of those works, I preferred postponing it to this opportunity.

The problem of surrounding Washington with fortifica tions came up at the outbreak of the war. Such officers of the Corps of Engineers as could be most readily with drawn from other duties were summoned to that city and placed under the orders of General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer on the staff of General Mansfield, and subsequently of Generals McDowell and McClellan.

Commencing with the few works thrown up when the national troops crossed the Potomac and seized Alexandria and the Heights of Arlington, the system of defenses now to be described was constructed mainly under the direction of the engineer officer named. Associated with him during a portion of the time, and taking an important part in the work, were Generals Woodbury and Alexander.

Their condition at

ing their strength.

Of the four works thrown up prior to the battle of Bull Run, Forts Corcoran, Albany, Runyon, and Ellsthe time of the bat- Worth, three were mere têtes-de-pont, the fourth tle of Bull Run. an isolated strong point by which to overawe the inimical population of Alexandria, and to offer some resistance to external attacks. That they should have served to deter General Johnston from advancing to seize the Heights of Arlington must be attributed rather to exag gerated notions of their extent, and to the confessed demoralization of his own forces by the severe treatment he had received, than to the real capabilities of the works themselves. The issue of that battle made it apparent that the war was not only to be of considerable duration, but one in which the strength and resources of the conNecessity of increas- tending parties must be tested to the utmost. The necessity of a thorough fortification of Washington was no longer doubtful; indeed, its urgency was such at that period as to admit of no elaborate plans, nor of such a thorough study of the ground as the judicious location of lines so extensive should require. The nearness of Alexandria to Washington, its situation on the Potomac, and its importance as the terminus of a great system of Southern railroads, imposed the necessity of its inclosure within the national lines, which, at first formed by the has ty erection of a series of detached works in front of Arlington Heights connecting Fort Corcoran with Fort Albany, Progress of their were finally extended across Four-mile Run, and thence, along the heights on which stands the Theological Seminary, to the margin of Hunting Creek, where Fort Worth overlooked a deep valley and imperfectly linked the chain with Fort Ellsworth. It was ultimately found necessary to occupy the heights south of Hunting Creek by the large bastioned work Fort Lyon and dependencies, and to establish at the Chain Bridge, as an auxiliary to the defense of Washington and a means of throwing the troops into Virginia, an extensive tête-de-pont,

development.