CHAPTER LXXXI.

CONFEDERATE SORTIE TO NASHVILLE. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. DESTRUCTION OF THE SALLYING CONFEDERATE ARMY.

After the departure of General Sherman on his march to the sea, General Hood, under orders from the Confederate government, continued his sortie toward Nashville. The national troops fell back, as he advanced, from the Tennessee River. He overtook General Schofield at the passage of the Harpeth River at Franklin. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN ensued. He was unable to prevent Schofield joining Thomas at Nashville.

General Hood then moved forward to Nashville. For some days the armies were paralyzed by severe weather. THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE was fought; General Thomas totally defeated the Confederate army, driving it from the field with great loss, and in the pursuit annihilating it.

General Hood escaped across the Tennessee River, and was relieved by the Confederate government from command.

"THOMAS has done magnificently," wrote Grant to Sherman, December 18th, 1864.

Hood marches north

marches to the sea.

He had been ordered

We have seen that Sherman halted at Gaylesville, unable to bring Hood to battle, unwilling to ward, while Sherman follow him any farther, and that, preparing every thing to accomplish his double object -the protection of Nashville and the march to the seahe had divided his army, sending one part under Thomas to Nashville, and putting the other in motion through Georgia. In its consternation, the cabinet at Richmond had become demented. Not satisfied with the removal to make a sortie. of Johnston, the ablest general of the South, Davis insisted that Hood should attempt a sortie, removing, for that purpose, the only army that stood between Sherman and the Atlantic Confederate States. Such were the circumstances under which Hood had assumed command that, even had he disapproved of these measures, he must have yielded his consent. To exchange the military advantage of interior lines for the gratification of a delusive invasion was the device of a politician, not of a sol dier-a bid for temporary public applause.

The distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 474 miles; from Atlanta to Nashville, 289. Every foot of his railroad to these bases Sherman had to protect. Davis had expect ed that the moment it was seriously threatened Sherman would abandon Georgia; he never supposed that that general would, without hesitation, break it himself, and boldly march to the sea.

Grant's opinion of

Forrest's successful

In his report of these movements Grant says: "Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his his movements. move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting." On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison of Decatur, Alabama, but, failing to carry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in face of the national cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and captured a gun-boat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnattack on Johnson- sonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gun-boats and eight transports. On the 4th he opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to by the gun-boats and the garrison. The gun-boats, becoming disabled, were set on fire, as were also the transports, to prevent their falling into his hands; about a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property was consumed. On the 5th Forrest disappeared, and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving toward Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d Corps, reached Johnsonville, but, the enemy being gone, he was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance, but not

ville.

to risk a general engagement until the arrival of A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until Wilson could remount his cavalry.

Hood's army did not arrive at Florence until nearly a month after its departure from Sherman's

Hood at Florence,

fronting him.

and Schofield con- front, a delay that gave Thomas time for the gathering and concentration of his forces. At Florence Hood was confronted by Schofield, who lay at Pulaski. The Mobile and Ohio Railroad was repaired; trains ran over it up to Corinth (see Map, vol. iii., p. 206), and thence east to Cherokee Station. Through this route Hood obtained supplies, and also large re-enforcements, from Mississippi and Alabama. At Corinth, Beauregard, who abstained from taking any active part in the campaign, established his head-quarters. Though, under the stress of public opinion, Davis had recalled him to service, notwithstanding his declaration that he would never consent to it though the whole world should demand it (vol. ii., page 307), the quarrel between them had not been appeased. Beauregard appears to have lost all faith in the success of the Confederacy under the leadership of Davis.

army.

Sherman's instructions were that Thomas should exerStrength of Hood's cise command over all the troops and garri sons not absolutely in presence of the gen eral-in-chief. He lingered at Kingston until he felt sure that Thomas was strong enough. On the 6th of November Hood's force was about 40,000; the infantry was 30,600, the cavalry about 10,000. He had lost about 10,000-one fourth of his army, probably by desertion, in his march from Jonesborough to Gadsden.

From the 1st to the 10th of November Hood was at Flor

ence.

He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge at that place, and had crossed over a corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry. The remainder of his force was still on the south side of the river, but on the 17th of November he brought it over.

as's army.

Thomas estimated his own force at 29,700. To this was Strength of Thom- to be added Washburn's command, 4500. He soon received 21 regiments of new recruits; most of these, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired. Two divisions, under A. J.Smith, were on their way from Missouri. He was also re-enforced by Wilson's cavalry 12,000, and by 7000 convalescents from Chattanooga, who were suitable for garrison duty, but not for marching.

Thomas's plan was simply to act on the defensive, imHood begins his peding Hood's movements as much as possinorthward march. ble, and gradually withdrawing Schofield and Stanley until the expected re-enforcements joined him. Forrest's cavalry joined Hood November 21st, and the northward movement then commenced (see Maps, vol. iii., p. 59 and 82). Had that advance been delayed a week or ten days longer, Thomas would have been ready to resist it at some point south of Duck River. Hood moved on parallel roads from Florence to Waynesborough, with Forrest on his right flank. His march was, however, slow. He shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the 22d. On the 23d Granger commenced withdrawing the garri sons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, ley withdraw before Alabama, and moved toward Stevenson. The movement was made rapidly and without opposition. That night Schofield evacuated Pulaski and marched toward Columbia. During the 24th and 25th the enemy skirmished with Schofield's troops at Columbia, pressing them still more strongly on the two following days. As Schofield perceived that Hood intended to cross above or below the town, he withdrew to the north bank of Duck River on the night of the 27th. Two divisions of the 23d Corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's Corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin Pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should

Schofield and Stan

him.

Hill.

make to force a crossing. The cavalry, under Wilson, held the crossings above those held by the infantry. But the Confederates succeeded in forcing Wilson back, and effected a passage. Hereupon, his line of retreat being threatened, Schofield prepared to withdraw to Franklin. Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains Action at Spring and hold the road open for the passage of the main force. He reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by infantry and cavalry combined, and they nearly succeeded in dislodging him from his position. Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia, resisting the enemy's attempt to cross Duck River, in which he succeeded, repulsing them with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as darkness came on, at a late hour in the afternoon he started with Ruger's division to the relief of Stanley at Spring Hill, and, when near that place, came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road. The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th. Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight; and, making a night march of 25 miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th. Cheatham's corps, supported by Stewart's, ought to have defeated Stanley at Spring Hill, and cut off Schofield's retreat. As it was, they nearly accomplished it. Hood, not without reason, affirms that this attack was feeble and partial, and that, had his instructions been carried out, the Confeder ates could have gained the road. He says:

"Stewart's corps and Johnston's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the en