mentioned, with orders to move, as soon as their work was complete, down a country road, and form on the left of the 17th Corps, refusing the line to a point nearer the railroad. The corps was in the act of moving down the road when they were attacked, and forced from it to a position in a field on the right. Battery F, 2d United States, was lost here, and some of the cannoneers captured while endeavor ing to unlimber the guns. McPherson, unattended except by a single orderly, rode rapidly down the line toward the point of attack. He supposed that the 16th Corps had connected with the 17th, and followed the continuation of the line of the latter, and, by so doing, went through the space left between the left of the 17th and right of the 16th, directly into the Confederate line. He was instantly killed by the rebel skirmishers. Logan was directed to assume command of his army-the Army of the Tennessee.

length repulsed.

The whole line was now engaged in battle, the conflict The Confederates at continuing for nearly four hours. At 4 P.M. Hood again plunged into McPherson's army, broke through its lines, captured two or more guns, driv ing a division 400 yards, and, in face of a terrific fire, carried two batteries, one of them of Parrott guns. Two divisions of the 15th Corps that were on the right and left of the railroad were separated. Sherman, being upon the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, ordered some of Schofield's batteries to be placed in a commanding position, to give an inces sant fire of shells, and the 15th Corps to regain its lost ground at any cost. This was executed, the enemy at length giving way, the 15th Corps regaining its position, and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which had been removed by the enemy into his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, the national loss being 3722 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Confeder ates left on the field their dead, wounded, and about 1000 prisoners. Their dead alone were computed to be 3240, of

which number 2200 were from actual count. They prob ably lost not less than 8000 men.

Return of Rousseau's cavalry.

Garrard had been detached with his cavalry on the 21st Garrard's cavalry to Covington, 42 miles east of Atlanta. From expedition. that point he was to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee Rivers, tributaries of the Ocmulgee. He returned, that work thoroughly accomplished. The Augusta Road was rendered useless. Sherman now addressed himself to the task of reaching the Macon Road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition which alone maintained the Confederate army in Atlanta. Schofield and Thomas were holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. The Army of the Tennessee was ordered to prepare to vacate its line and shift by the right below Proctor's Creek, and Schofield to extend his lines up to the Augusta Road. About this time Rousseau arrived from his Opelika expedition, bringing 2000 cavalry. He had found every thing under military control. "The conscription law was rigorously enforced. Scarcely an able-bodied man was to be met with. Even the infirm and crippled, who were capable of doing light duty, were enrolled and detailed for such service as they were able to perform. Tanners, millers, and others, following occupations of necessity to the army, were also enrolled, and then detailed to pursue their business for the benefit of the government. Conscription officers were in every neighborhood, hunting down any one who might have escaped or in any way evaded service. An iron-heeled despotism prevailed, and individual rights and freedom were utterly trampled under foot. No 'subjugation' could be more thorough than that under which the people of the South were placed by the rebel govern

ment."

The whole cavalry was now prepared for a blow at the Macon Road. Stoneman, with 5000 men, was to move.

Stoneman's expedi

con Railroad.

by the left round Atlanta to McDonough; tion against the Ma- McCook, with 4000 men, by the right on Fayetteville; and on the night of July 28th they were to meet near Lovejoy's, on the Macon Road, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. Stoneman, when on the point of starting, asked permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to proceed to Macon and Andersonville, and release the prisoners there confined. With certain restrictions, Sherman consented. The expedition, It fails: Stoneman however, was not successful. Stoneman was is taken prisoner. taken prisoner. McCook, after some successes, with difficulty extricated himself. The damage done to the road was so limited that it was obvious it would soon be repaired.

Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur Road, during the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's Creek and south, to prolong the national line due south, facing east. On that day General Howard, by order of the President of the United States, assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made en echelon. Dodge was in line on the evening of the 27th. Blair came into line on his right on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra Church, near some large open fields by the poor-house, on a road known as Bell's Ferry or Lick-skillet Road. Here the 15th Corps, Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About 10 A.M. all the army was in position, and the men were busy throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which soon assumed the form of a parapet.

About midday the enemy came out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry Road, and formed his masses in the open fields, behind a swell of ground, and

Battle of Ezra
Church.

advanced in parallel lines against the 15th Corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. It was evident that Hood was attempting to repeat his movements of the 22d. The advance was magnificent, but founded on an error which cost him heavily; for so coolly and deliberately were his men cut down that, in spite of the efforts of their officers, the ranks broke and fled. They were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points. A few, both officers and men, reached the line of rail-piles only to be killed or dragged over as prisoners.

These assaults lasted from noon until about 4 P.M., Defeat of the Con- When the Confederates disappeared, leaving their dead and wounded. Their loss was not

federates.

less than 5000; Sherman's not reaching 600.

This battle terminated all efforts to check Sherman's extensions by the flank, which now proceeded with comparative ease; but extensions to the south were met by wellconstructed forts and rifle-pits, built between Sherman's lines and the railroad to and below East Point. General Hooker, considering himself disparaged by the assignment of Howard to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was relieved, at his own request, from the command of his corps, which was given to General Slocum. General Palmer was also relieved from the command of the 14th Corps by General Jeff. C. Davis. General Stanley succeeded General Howard in the 4th Corps.

Changes in the national army.

But if there were these changes in the national army, Dissensions in the there were changes of a far more serious kind Confederate army. in the Confederate. It has been already mentioned that Johnston had been removed by the authorities at Richmond; and here, perhaps, we may conveniently pause from the military movements to consider the statements made respectively by Hood and Johnston, and their dissensions, as they throw much light upon the conduct of the whole campaign.

men.

Hood states that Johnston's force on May 6th was 70,000 He says the South had been denuded of troops to fill that army. Mississippi and Alabama were without military support, and

Accusations brought by Hood against Johnston.

looked for protection to a decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia. He criticises Johnston's conduct of the campaign with severity. He He says:

"In such condition was that splendid army when the campaign fairly opened. The enemy, but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, commenced his advance; the Confederate forces, whose faces and hopes were to the North, almost simultaneously began to retreat. They soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of mountains running across the line of march, and deep rivers, are stands from which a well-directed army is not easily driven or turned. At each advance of the enemy, the Confederate army, without serious resistance, fell back to the next range or river in the rear. The habit to retreat soon became a routine of the army, and was substituted for the hope and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one column to menace in front, and one to threaten in rear. The usual order to retreat, not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. Those retreats were always at night; the day was consumed in hard labor. Daily temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to fight. The men became travelers by night and laborers by day. They were ceasing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for seventy-four days and nights that noble army, which, if ordered to resist, no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from a battle-field, continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, and their flag waving only in retreat or in partial engagements. At the end of that time, after descending from the mountains, where the last advantage of position was abandoned, and camping without fortifications in the open plains of Georgia, the army had lost 22,750 of its best soldiers. Nearly one third was gone, no general battle fought, much of one state abandoned, two others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command, by loss of officers, men, and tone, seriously diminished."