organized, and more than a hundred thousand black troops armed in the national service.

Measures for the or

ed troops.

Previously to the issue of the proclamation, the employ ment of colored troops was restricted to a ganization of color- few localities. General Hunter had organized some at Hilton Head, in South Carolina, but, as there was no express authority for so doing, there was no warrant for paying them. That difficulty was, however, remedied by a special order from Stanton, who from the beginning of the conflict had perceived that the decisive method of action in a war with slaveholders is to resort to the military use of slaves. General Phelps, commanding under Butler in Louisiana, had also proposed to raise three regi ments of Africans, to be used, not as laborers, but as soldiers. Butler resisted this at first, and Phelps resigned his commission. Butler, however, soon found himself constrained to pursue the same course, and organized several colored regiments.

But Jefferson Davis saw as distinctly as Stanton the ef fect of this use of the slaves. He therefore, with characteristic impetuosity, issued an order that any captured commissioned officer who had been employed in organizing, drilling, or instructing them, should not be treated as a prisoner of war.

In the Confiscation Act, and in another act passed in July, 1862, Congress had authorized the employment of colored troops. These laws had, however, in contemplation colored men who by the course of the war had been released from slavery.

After the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued, measures were introduced in the Senate and in the House for the enlistment of blacks. It was, however, decided that the Conscription Act gave the necessary authority without any farther legislation. On the 20th of January, 1863, Stanton authorized the Governor of Massachusetts to raise such troops, and organize them in a separate corps. Other

free states soon followed that example. In March the gov ernment dispatched the adjutant general to the Southwest to take charge of the matter in the Mississippi Valley. At the close of that year about 50,000 colored men were in actual service, and this number was tripled before the end of the next year. In those states or regions exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation by its own provisions, loyal slave-owners offering slaves for enlistment were to receive $300 for each recruit accepted, upon filing a deed of manumission for him, and giving satisfactory proof of title. In certain specified cases enlistments might be made without the consent of owners, and compensation awarded on the same terms as if the slave had been offered for enlistment.

The military effects of the Emancipation Proclamation were therefore gradual; for, though colored troops appear at the siege of Port Hudson and elsewhere during the latter portion of 1863, their effect was comparatively unimportant. We have to examine the movements of the great armies at that time in the field to acquire a clear concep tion of the character of the campaigns of that year.

For the sake of perspicuity, I shall continue to speak of the armies on the east of the Alleghany Mountains as the Army of the East; of those between the mountains and the Mississippi as the Army of the West; of those beyond the Mississippi as the trans-Mississippi Army. This is not in accordance with the official designations, but it renders the description of the movements less confused.

Advance of the na

The events of the past year had shown that the only portion of the line of investment encircling tional forces on the the Confederacy which had been distinctly central northwest. and definitely advanced was that which lay on the northwest of the central region. This part, originally, for the most part, parallel to the Ohio River, had, through the fall of Donelson and the Battle of Shiloh, assumed the form of a vast crescent, one cusp of which rested

on Nashville, the other in the vicinity of Vicksburg, the convexity presenting to the Mississippi River, the concavity to the Alleghany Mountains. Elsewhere all partial front attacks on the Confederacy had either proved abortive or had merely given a foothold. The most energetic of them had been made by the Army of the Potomac, and had been repelled. That army and its antagonist, the Army of Northern Virginia, balanced each other. After repeated attempts, each had failed to obtain a positive superiority.

Subdivision of the

The central portion of the north line of investment was held by three armies: (1), that of the Ohio, Western armies. under Burnside, in Kentucky, looking to Knoxville and East Tennessee; (2), that of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, in Tennessee, looking to Chattanooga; (3), that of the Tennessee, under Grant, occupying West Tennessee, and threatening Vicksburg.

Advantages pos

The topographical advantages of this region were very great. Events soon showed that it was the sessed by the Army movements here executed which would give of the Tennessee. rise to decisive results. These advantages were mainly due to the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers, of which use was skillfully made. As the Army of the Tennessee opened the Mississippi, it continually found itself sustained by a powerful co-operating fleet in the river.

This also was the weakest portion of the whole Confederate line of defense-a weakness which was not compensated by increased army-strength. On the contrary, erroneous political considerations led the Richmond authori ties to concentrate their military force in Northern Virginia, to the disadvantage of this more vital part.

No one can study the history of this civil war without being struck with the incompetency with which the af fairs of the Confederacy were managed. In all its military transactions may be seen the ideas of the politician dominating over those of the soldier. In truth it may be said, that while on the national side there was a definite plan,

consistently, resolutely, and at length successfully carried out, on the Confederate side there was no plan whatever.

To the topographical advantages possessed by the Army of the Tennessee were added others too important for us to overlook. It had in its command two of the ablest officers in the service-Grant and Sherman. Its duty, the opening of the Mississippi River, was sharply defined, thor oughly understood, enthusiastically approved of, and— which added not a little to its morale-more than half accomplished.

Synopsis of the

Vicksburg was taken by the right wing of the Army of the West, under Grant, about midsummer, movement of the 1863. The fall of that fortress drew with it the capture of a great Confederate army, its garrison; the immediate surrender of Port Hudson, and the complete opening of the river down to New Orleans.

Western Army.

At this time the other wing of the army, the Army of the Cumberland, under Rosecrans, at Nashville, had not moved. It was Halleck's intention that Rosecrans and Grant should have pressed forward simultaneously, the former marching upon Chattanooga, while the latter besieged Vicksburg. He spared no exertions to carry his intention into effect-a correspondence, not without acerbity, passing between him and Rosecrans. Nevertheless, Rosecrans could not or did not move until the fall of Vicksburg. He then proceeded to the execution of his orders, and in a short campaign, without much difficulty, obtain ed possession of Chattanooga.

At this moment it seemed as if the Western Army had accomplished the duty to which it had been assigned. On its right Vicksburg had been captured and the river opened; on its left Chattanooga had been taken. In truth, there was, however, a great difference in what had been done by its two wings. Grant had made prisoners of war of the army of Pemberton, his antagonist; but Bragg, who was Rosecrans's antagonist, had simply receded, and was hold

ing in force a position of great strength in the mountains of Georgia.

Rosecrans therefore advanced upon Bragg to attempt his destruction; the battle of Chickamauga was fought, and Rosecrans, instead of obtaining the victory, was beaten. He was now shut up in Chattanooga, his lines of supply severed; he was reduced to the direst peril, and not without reason was it expected that his army would have to surrender.

In this extremity the national government took the course that reason suggested. It promptly brought over from the Mississippi to Chattanooga the general who had conducted the campaign on that river so admirably. Within a few days after he had arrived, Grant had reopened the lines of supply, relieved the famishing army, and rendered Chattanooga secure.

Then he renewed the attempt in which Rosecrans had failed the disposal of Bragg's army in his front. With the utmost speed he brought up Sherman and his army, and on the moment of the arrival of that officer fought the battle of Chattanooga, one of the best planned and best fought battles of the war. Bragg was overthrown. Henceforth Chattanooga was permanently secured to the nation, the siege of Knoxville was raised, and the Atlantic States of the Confederacy placed in the most imminent danger.

acts.

In the contemplation of these movements, the details of Summary of its which I shall now give, the reader will find very much to admire. There is something grand in the conception and execution of this Western campaign. Its combinations are exceeding picturesque, and its incidents alternately offer enough of disaster and glory. The brilliant movement of the Army of the Tennessee on Vicksburg, the siege and capture of that fortress, the march of the Army of the Cumberland to Chattanooga, the seizure of that portal into the South Atlantic States, the overthrow of Rosecrans at Chickamauga, the famine, the trans