only when the engineers had pushed their sap to the work itself. But Sumter, seated in the midst of the water, was not accessible to such an operation. Its rubbish and frag ments were as good a protection against shot and shell as the sand of Wagner. Cannon could not be planted nearer than three quarters of a mile. It was clear enough, then, that nothing could be done except by assault. An assault was therefore resolved on. Viewed from the vessels, the ruins of the gorge wall exhibited a regular slope upward from the water, apparently practicable to the footsteps of active and determined men. But the men were not to be exposed without assistance. Dahlgren's plan of The monitors were first to place the work beoperations. tween their fires, the main body in the channel, and one of them off the gorge wall; afterward this monitor would serve as a base for the column, and open the way with shells and grape. It was requisite that it should be carefully posted in a vein of deep water that intersected the wide stretch of shoal water between Sumter and the north extreme of Morris's Island; this, having hitherto been under Confederate control, was practically unknown. Accordingly, a few hours after the capture of Wagner, a monitor was sent to buoy the channel; unfortunately, she got aground, and the attempt made at once to float her proved fruitless. Preliminary battle As the artillery operation was to be executed that night, the iron-clads were sent to the channel inside between the iron- of Sumter, and about dark opened on it with clads and forts. a heavy fire; but the batteries on Sullivan's Island returned the fire, and a portion of the guns had to be turned that way. This proceeding was continued until 9 P.M., when the fleet drew off, in order that attention might be given to floating the monitor at high tide, which occurred during the night. In spite of every effort, daylight found the monitor still on the shoal, the tide falling, and, as it fell, exposing the frail side beneath the armor of the overhang to the full play of the heavy Confederate batteries, which did not fail to take advantage of the circumstance. The other ironclads had to be ordered up to cover the endangered one, which did not get off until late in the afternoon. This not only crippled the arrangements for the assault, but reduced the iron-clad force in numbers and efficiency. One monitor was entirely disabled, a second had her engine damaged, the 11-inch gun of a third could not be used. About 1 P.M., while the action between the iron-clads and the Confederate batteries was still in progress, Dahlgren telegraphed to Gillmore: "I will assault Sumter tonight." The latter returned an answer that he intended to do the same thing, and sent an aid to know whether the naval party would join his. To avoid misapprehension and establish a sure co-operation, Dahlgren sent his chief of staff to make final arrangements with the general. and fails. It was after midnight when the officer returned, and reThe assault is made, ported that the arrangements had been satisfactorily made for the naval and military columns to assault in concert. A column of boats had been towed up by a steamer near to the scene of action, and was in readiness. The flag-ship steamed up the roads as near Sumter as the shoal would permit. The naval expedition was composed of three divisions. of seamen and one of marines. It found no difficulty in landing nor in ascending the slope of rubbish, but was stopped at the summit by the head of the wall. Dahlgren steered directly for the firing, and, in the darkness, encountered the monitor sent up to cover the column. Soon the firing from the fort ceased, though it was maintained from Sullivan's and James's Islands. The signal that the assaulting party had succeeded was not displayed. It was only too plain that the attempt had failed. The whole force engaged was about 400. Of 107 who landed, nearly every one was killed, wounded, or captured. not move. The land forces did not move. It was subsequently exThe land forces do plained that this was owing to the low tide, which detained them. "It is impossible," says Dahlgren, "to say now what the result would have been had the land column joined in the attack; but, had I known that it would not have been put forward, the naval column would not have gone on that night." And now it appeared how little the importance of this seeming ruin had been understood, how necessary was its possession to either side. Had the unsupported sailors succeeded in their gallant attempt, and effected a lodgment for the national troops, the Confederate batteries might have wasted their guns and ammunition on it as the national batteries had done. Obstructions and torpedoes would no longer have impeded the way, and the iron-clads, pivoting on this point, would have been free to strike whenever the opportunity presented. Unreasonable dis failure. I have described somewhat at length the circumstances connected with the assault of Fort Sumter, satisfaction at this because to the navy there was not accorded the approval which it deserved. The whole train of events was regarded as a succession of isolated incidents, without purpose or connection. The assault itself was considered a needless sacrifice, and the seamen who stepped on the ramparts of Sumter were denied the praise so well merited by the gallantry of the act. At the time of the occurrence, no explanation could be made without exposing the weakness of the naval force, and, notwithstanding this assault, there was wide-spread dissatisfaction that the fleet did not reduce the other coast defenses, or force its way into the inner harbor. As regards such a reduction, it should have been enough to recall what Fort Wagner had cost, and to reflect that the other works were far stronger. A council of naval officers decided unanimously that Forts Moultrie and Johnson could not be reduced by the iron-clads unsupported by the army; and as to a forced passage up to Charleston, it was the opinion of the ablest military officers, among others of General Sherman, that the attempt was altogether inadmissible. Great merit of the fense. Though we may justly admire the brilliant engineering of the national general, and the persevering courage of the national admiral, they serve only to bring into relief the signal ability and matchless tenacity of the Confederates. The page of history has not a more striking incident to offer than the defense of the pile of ruins in Charleston Harbor; not one more picturesque than the midnight victory gained by the soldiers who started forth from the recesses of rubbish to defend the wreck of Sumter. CHAPTER LXXIII. NAVAL PRESSURE ON THE WATER-FRONTS OF THE CONFEDERACY. NAVAL AFFAIRS ON THE OPEN SEA. THE ANGLO-CONFEDERATE CRUISERS. The national navy maintained the blockade so stringently as to destroy the financial system of the Confederacy. That portion of the Mississippi which intervenes between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and receives the Red River, became of great importance to the Confederacy as an avenue of supplies from the trans-Mississippi countries: attempts were made by the squadron below Port Hudson, and by that above Vicksburg, to obtain control of it; they were strenuously resisted by the Confederates. Confederate cruisers were built in Great Britain, among them the Alabama. these ships American commerce was nearly destroyed. The United States required of Great Britain redress for the national and the private injury thus sustained. The minor naval incidents of the war. By FOR the clear appreciation of any great social movement, such as the American Civil War, it is needful to contemplate attentively those events which control the progress or mark the culmination of profound political purposes and grand military operations. A vast mass of details must be grouped in the background, or, perhaps, kept altogether out of view. To bring things intrinsically insignificant out of their proper subordinate position is only to confuse. Yet sometimes it happens that such details, considered in the aggregate, present a result too important to be overlooked. The chasing of blockade-runners into an Atlantic port, or the duels of cotton-clad steamers on Western rivers, may be in themselves of little moment, but the ag gregate of such incidents, in one case constituting the coast blockade, in the other the patrolling of the Mississippi, were connected in no insignificant degree with the fortunes of the war. I propose, therefore, in this chapter to group together incidents of the kind here referred to occurring in the naval |