cavalry. Meade himself did not cross the river until the 18th. On reaching Culpepper Court-house he halted his army, not deeming it prudent to cross the Rapidan and attack the enemy, who was now intrenched on the south side, and completely commanded the approaches on the north. During these movements several cavalry skirmishes took place, but without serious loss on either side. Lee, by moving rapidly, had accomplished his object and regained his old position. Dissatisfaction of Lee's escape. The government and the nation were deeply disappointed at this issue of the battle of Gettysburg. the government at They knew that the neglect to utilize a victory involves the fighting of another battle, in which every thing may be lost. On a subsequent occasion, when Lincoln was asked by a friend if he thought there had ever been periods at which better management might have terminated the war, "Yes," he said, "there have been three: at Malvern, when McClellan failed to command an immediate advance on Richmond; at Chancellorsville, when Hooker failed to re-enforce Sedgwick; and at Gettysburg, when Meade failed to attack Lee in his retreat at the bend of the Potomac." Halleck, on the 14th of July, in a telegram to Meade, said, "I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active, an energetic pursuit on your part, to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore." To this Meade replied, “Having performed my duty conscientiously, and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President is, in my judgment, so undeserved, that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army." He was informed, in reply, that the remark was not intend ed as a censure, but as a stimulus to active pursuit. His application to be relieved was declined. Lee's sortie had cost him 60,000 men: it had reduced Detachments are sent from both ar his army from 100,000 down to 40,000. mies to the South. Davis put forth an urgent appeal to the South, and with such effect that by it and the conscrip: tion Lee's force at the end of August had reached 56,000. The Confederate government, considering that operations had closed for a time in Virginia, and unable to resist any longer the importunate demands of Georgia, detached a part of Lee's army, under Longstreet, to re-enforce Bragg. In like manner, one fourth of Meade's army was taken away, the 11th and 12th Corps being sent, under Hooker, to Chattanooga. Hereupon Lee assumed a threatening attitude, manoeuvred to turn his antagonist's flank, and forced him back to the line of Bull Run. Having taken 2000 prisoners, and destroyed the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas to the Rapidan, he again fell back to his former position near Orange Court-house. minor movements. During these operations there were several severe enSubsequent military gagements between detached forces, but no general battle: on October 10th and 11th, at Robertson's River; 12th, at Brandy Station; 14th, at Bristoe Station; 19th, at Buckland Mills; 24th, at Bealton and the Rappahannock Bridge; and on the 7th of November on the south bank of the Rappahannock. On that day Sedgwick and French made an attack at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford, capturing several redoubts and about 2000 prisoners. A week subsequently Meade prepared a more formidable attack at Mine Run, but, the combinations for it failing, it was not made. On the 1st of December he recrossed the Rapidan, and the campaigns of the Army of the · Potomac closed for the year 1863. SECTION XVI. THE PRESSURE ON THE ATLANTIC, THE GULF, AND THE MISSISSIPPI FRONTS OF THE CONFEDERACY. CHAPTER LXXII. NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF CHARLESTON. DESTRUCTION OF FORT SUMTER. MIDNIGHT ASSAULT ON ITS RUINS. It being believed that turreted iron-clad ships could successfully attack land fortifications, Admiral Dupont attempted to force the harbor of Charleston with a fleet of such vessels, but totally failed. The national government determined to demolish the outer defenses of that harbor. General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren conducted the operations. They took Forts Wagner and Gregg. Fort Sumter was battered down by Gillmore. In view of the building of Anglo-Confederate iron-clads, the government would not permit the fleet to renew its attempt to force the harbor. The artillery power of Fort Sumter being destroyed, the Confederates converted that work into an infantry outpost. Dahlgren made a midnight attack upon it, but, not being supported by the land forces, failed. THE engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned had given to the government and Problem of the mil iron-clads. itary value of turret the public a high opinion of their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its surrender. No military advantages were anticipated from such a capture. The North, it is true, would have regarded the event with satisfaction, altogether, however, from sentimental considerations. Charleston was looked upon as to be solved in "the Culprit City." She had recklessly plunged the na tion into the calamities of civil war, and therefore, it was thought, deserved to be visited with signal punishment. Military men, however, uninfluenced by such considerations, and knowing that, so long as CharlesCharleston Harbor. ton remained in the Confederacy, it involved the neutralization of an army of 30,000 men remaining idle in garrison there, saw in the proposed attempt the solution of one of the most important problems of modern warfare-the determination of relative qualities of the floating iron-clad and the land fortification. Dupont tries moni fortifications. On the 7th of April Admiral Dupont made the experi ment. He had seven Ericsson monitors, the tors against land frigate Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. The battle in At noon on that day the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a monitor, took the Charleston Harbor. lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through its interference with her movements. On her way up she exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did no damage. At 2.10 P.M. she encountered obstructions extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P.M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and subsequently other monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., |