Johnston here claimed that his father had originally ordered the attack just as the Comte de Paris fancied it should have been ordered, but "doubtless" had been persuaded out of it by Beauregard - thus, inops consilii, contradicting the very claim he had just put forth that his father had designed the tactics of the battle, which therefore was unachieved because of his death.

Should there be a shred of doubt left in regard to the true history of General Beauregard's controlling influence and part in bringing about the Shiloh campaign, that, it seems to me, must disappear before the following telegraphic dispatch, which was sent while General Johnston was marching toward Corinth for the concentration urged by Beauregard :

That is to say, as near to the date of the battle of Shiloh as three weeks, General Johnston had regarded it as most advantageous that the Confederate concen

tration should take place not so near to the enemy's base as Corinth, but fully fifty miles away to the northwestward, behind the Hatchee River, and covering Memphis, according to his Bowling Green memorandum of February 7th, 1862, ready in case of defeat to retire into that town and there await a siege and capture. These are not the views, I submit, of a general who within a week thereafter would repair to Corinth with the plan of an offensive campaign fully rounded in his mind ready for execution within a fortnight, but of one bent solely upon the defensive; views precisely consonant with his proffer of the command to Beauregard, and to withdraw his headquarters from the immediate vicinage of Confederate

forces.

Thomas Jordan.

Union Sentiment among Confederate Veterans.

THE ovation to Mr. Henry W. Grady on his return to Atlanta proved how truly he expressed the feelings of his people in his New England Society speech. This feeling is not confined to the new generation who were too young to take part in the war, but it is also the well-nigh universal sentiment of the veterans who fought for the "Lost Cause." For my part, it is now several years since I became convinced that it is an inestimable blessing, not only to the whole country, but especially to us of the South, that the war ended in the removal of the incubus of slavery and the consolidation of the entire nation under one flag and one

government. We can hardly doubt that if the Union had been broken up into three or four confederacies (as it would have been after its prestige was once destroyed), they would have felt toward each other as France, Germany, Austria, and Russia feel at this day. The result would have been vain attempts to maintain a durable balance of power, continual wars, conscription, standing armies, fortifications and custom-houses on every frontier, and burdens far more grievous than those under which all Europe is now groaning. The Southern Confederacy (or confederacies), being inferior in population and resources, would have felt these burdens far more than the others. None of these new nationalities would have been strong enough to command the respect of the great European powers, which would have made America the field of their intrigues and conquests, as was attempted in Mexico under Maximilian. Instead of that, we have the grandest country and the most magnificent destinies ever vouchsafed to any people. We could not realize this while the bitterness of defeat was still fresh in our hearts, but a quarter of a century has produced a vast change in the Southern mind. An old adage says: Wise men the great popular heart is almost always wise. change their opinions sometimes-fools never; and

One thing especially should make us proud - it aland it is this: After passing through the most giganways gave me pleasure to boast of it when in Europe tic struggle that any country ever underwent, not a drop of blood was shed after the heat of conflict had ceased. Not even banishment was inflicted upon any of the vanquished, the result being that instead of creating an Ireland in the South we are now one people, united as one man for the defense and the honor of our whole country.

These opinions, formed even before I left America to follow a military career abroad, were confirmed and intensified by seeing the condition of the European masses, taxed without mercy and made "food for powder" to maintain or modify the "balance of power." Yet if they were only my individual ideas, I would hardly feel justified in proclaiming them; but I will state that in the last few years I have expressed these views to hundreds of my former brother-soldiers, and that of all those, only one failed to give them the most hearty approval-and he had been a very prominent political leader, but not much of a soldier. I have therefore good grounds for asserting that the Southern veterans who fought the war are a unit in their desire for peace and harmony and the maintenance of the restored Union, now and forever.

R. E. Colston,

Formerly Brigadier-General, C. S. A. WASHINGTON, February 17th, 1887.

Lord Wolseley's Estimate of General Lee.

For convenience let us catalogue some of the points

of Robert E. Lee," Lord Wolseley has followed in the trail of the expert reviewers who allude to a new book as an excuse for enlarging the subject with the fruits of their own study and observation. His critique is printed in Macmillan's Magazine" for March, and is worthy of general perusal for two reasons: It affords a view (from the English standpoint) of the war of secession and the best-known Southern chieftain; and although it has little to say that is important or true with regard to General Lee, it sheds a flood of light on the military learning and mental strategy of the most conspicuous general in the British army.

No people are better acquainted with Lee's merits as a soldier than the Army of the Potomac. They admire also those traits of character which endeared him to his fellow-Confederates. So if Northerners cannot assist Lord Wolseley in placing him "on an equal pedestal with that of Washington," it is from no contempt of his abilities. The chief reason is the fact that Washington labored to create a Union of States and that Lee, with sorrow, but with greater love for a particular State, labored to divide the Union. But now that the Union he would yet have been glad to see preserved, is preserved, General Lee is for the whole country an American hero.*

In 1862 Lord Wolseley was a visitor at General Lee's headquarters, where he undoubtedly had opportunities of taking a studious interest in Confederate persons and affairs. He assures us frequently in the course of his paper that he has been a student of our war, and the following sentiment, alone, would point to such study as a duty for a man in his responsible position, since he says that "the influence which the result of this Confederate war is bound to exercise upon man's future history will seem very great."

Lord Wolseley's enthusiasm for Lee springs from personal knowledge, for he says that Lee" is stamped upon my memory as a being apart and superior to all others, in every way." But it is fortunate for Lee's fame that the admiration of his countrymen, North and South, rests upon solid facts, and not, as in Lord Wolseley's case, upon misconception of his character and ignorance of the leading events of his career. It is remarkable also that with all his admiration Lord Wolseley has not allowed his opinions to be influenced by those of his hero, even where Lee might be supposed to be an authority; nor consulted Lee's orders and reports for clews to his motives in strategy and battle. He would seem also to have imitated the traditional reviewer who found it bad method to read a book before criticising it, for certainly he has not leaned heavily on General Long for information.

*In his recent speech at Nashville, Senator John Sherman, referring to the losses and sacrifices of the war, said in part: "The courage, bravery, and fortitude of both sides are now the pride and heritage of us all. Think not that I come here to reproach any man for the part he took in that fight, or to revive in

other esteemed authorities :

1. At the outset he says that any "unprejudiced outsider will admit the sovereign right, both historical and legal, which each State possessed under the Constitution to leave the Union when its people thought fit to do so." But General Lee thought differently. In a letter to his son dated January 23d, 1861 (see General Long's "Memoirs," page 88), General Lee says:

Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom, and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the Confederacy at will. It is intended for perpetual union,' so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolubled. It is idle to talk of secession." tion or the consent of all the people in convention assem

2. "As I study the history of the secession war," says Lord Wolseley, presumably with a wink at the Muse of History, "these [Lee and Lincoln] seem to me the two men who influenced it most."

Whatever parallel might be drawn between the native integrity and manliness of Lincoln and of Lee, it has been accepted hitherto that Lincoln was the chief executive on one side, and that Lee, shrinking from the responsibilities of civil war, "save," as he writes, "in the defense of my native State," devoted his energies to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, while other Southerners of great abilities wielded the executive power, and other Southern generals, whose services Lee was great enough to admire, worked faithfully under the executive power, like Lee himself, for the common cause. The early victories that nerved the Southern heart for great sacrifices were won by other men. Lee's first service in the field, in West Virginia, though wisely conservative in view of the difficulties, was a public disappointment. Later he fell heir to Johnston's good beginnings at Seven Pines, in which action the latter was severely wounded. Though almost a fruitless battle, it checked McClellan's aggressive policy, so that Lee had to do at the outset with an enemy whose ardor had subsided; who, in fact, was more concerned about his own safety and "a change of base" than about the capture of Richmond. Lee's daring campaign in the Seven Days' fighting was no compliment to General McClellan, though Lord Wolseley remembers that Lee expressed greater admiration for McClellan than for any other Union general. From this time on Lee was, without question, the chief prop to the military confidence of the South; but he was responsible only for the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, until- and now comes a fact for which Lord Wolseley should have the credit of accuracy —

the heart of any one the triumph of victory or the pangs of defeat. No man in the North questions the honesty of purpose or the heroism with which the Confederates maintained their cause, and you will give credit for like courage and honorable motives to Union soldiers, North and South."

11. Yet Lord Wolseley exclaims: "Was ever an army so hopelessly at the mercy of another as that of McClellan when he began his retreat to Harrison's Landing after the Seven Days' fighting round Richmond?" For succinct ignorance, there is something unexampled in this statement. Malvern Hill was a staggering repulse to Lee's exhausted infantry, who were not able to confront McClellan at Harrison's Landing until the third day after that battle. And even then Lee withdrew, as he says, on account of “the condition of our troops." McClellan was well-nigh impregnable at Harrison's Landing. If Lee had been able to get at him there, the military situation would have improved, for the Confederates could not long stand such destructive fighting as "the Seven Days'." But Lee preferred to leave McClellan in his camp security resting at the outer gate of Richmond, while he started in the opposite direction to bowl over Pope and startle Washington. 12. Equally remarkable for visionary confidence is Lord Wolseley's next question, "What commander could wish to have his foe in a tighter place' than Burnside was in after his disastrous attack upon Lee at Fredericksburg?" Lee has explained in his reports, in effect, that he was so much pleased with the tight boot Burnside was wearing, so long as Burnside was the aggressor, that he had no thought of exchanging footgear with his enemy, as he surely would have done if he had attacked Burnside within range of the Union cannon on Stafford Heights, across the river. So secure was Burnside at the town that when it was proposed, on deciding to recross the river, to keep hands on Fredericksburg the council of officers believed that 10,000 men was a sufficient force for the purpose.

With less particularity but more discretion, Lord Wolseley concludes the subject with the remark, "Yet in both instances the Northern commander got safely away, and other similar instances could be mentioned." 13. "The critical military student of this war," says his lordship, with a fine compliment to himself, “will, I think, agree that from first to last the cooperation of even one army corps of regular troops would have given complete victory to whichever side it fought on." There is something in this suggestive of Gilbert and Sullivan's "modern major-general." Inasmuch as this was an American war, it had to be fought in the American way. As neither side had a standing army of any importance, each side must create an army out of nearly raw material. But there are those who remember that American" raw material " once battled with "regular" troops, during the scrimmage of 1776, and again at New Orleans in 1815, and that the " regulars" did not then complain of the inferiority of their foes. McClellan's army had a splendid division of regulars, well officered, that did good service, but their deeds do not shine brighter than those of the volunteers on either side. It was not the need of "regular "troops which prolonged the war, but the equality of grit, and daring, and skill, and devotion to ideas. Lord Wolseley cannot “blind himself to the hyperbole of writers who refer to these armies as the finest that have ever existed." It is true that they were not handled in the "regular" European fashion; for the rough, wooded country over which they fought would not permit; but will he deny that the two armies which

14. With Lord Wolseley's historical method, an anecdote or two is sufficient data for such a statement as this: "The usual proportion throughout the war between the contending sides in each action ranged from about twice to three times more Federals than there were Confederates engaged." His lordship would appear to be unaware that there were Western battles in which almost equal numbers fought terrible battles with surprisingly equal losses. But to confine our examination, with him, to the Eastern armies, the records tell us that, save at Antietam, Lee always had on the field of battle within a fourth or a third as many men as his opponent, and that when he was the aggressor he was clever enough as a soldier to strike his blow with forces superior to the wing or detachment smitten; as witness Gaines's Mill and the blow on the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville. When Grant began his Wilderness "campaign of attrition," the Army of the Potomac was for once twice as large as the Army of Northern Virginia, and, considering the relative advantages of assault and defense and the steel-like temper of the Confederates, Grant's army was none too large for the job. But his lordship condenses his opinion of those veteran armies in this complaisant simile: "A trial heat between two jockeys mounted on untrained horses may be interesting, but no one would ever quote the performance as an instance of great racing speed."

15. In repeating Lincoln's playful reply to the man who wanted the President's opinion of the number of Confederates in the field, which Lord Wolseley does "with reference to the relative numbers employed on both sides," the drift of Lincoln's humor would have been more apparent if his lordship had stated a fact which has interested students of the "Seven Days' fighting." The day before the battle of Gaines's Mill Lincoln telegraphed to McClellan acknowledgment of three dispatches received the day before, and added, "The later one of 6.15 P. M. suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much." But McClellan on July 11th, when safely encamped at Harrison's Landing, returned to the subject with this: "Prisoners all state that I had 200,000 men to fight. A good deal more than two to one, and they knowing the ground." Lincoln did not need the after-testimony of the Confederate records to convince him that this was nonsense; and he must have been aiming at that unique incident when he waggishly said, "Whenever one of our generals engages a rebel army he reports that he has encountered a force twice his strength. Now I know we have half a million of soldiers in the field, so I am bound to believe the rebels have twice that number.”

16. But the most surprising of Lord Wolseley's conclusions on the Confederate war pertains to Lee's "faults," such as his " softness of heart," his "devotion to duty and great respect for obedience, [which] seem at times to have made him too subservient to those charged with the civil government of his country"; also his appearing "to have forgotten that he was the great Revolutionary chief engaged in a great Revolutionary war" when" the South could only