the conviction must be repeated and felt again and again, before the ideas will entirely, universally, and readily coalefce; so that, by reason of the neceffary avocation of mind, and the unfteady and imperfect views of things we can gain in this state, little can be done towards it here, and it must be referred to the attainments of a better world.

The above-mentioned facts, however, fhew, in the strongest light, what is the natural progrefs and effect of affociation of ideas in the human mind. We fee the course that things are evidently in, and it doth not appear, that any bounds can be fet to it. We muft, therefore, in favourable circumftances (fuch as we shall, no doubt, find ourselves in, in a future world) approximate to this perfection of comprehenfion with the experience of every day; in this way, time only is requifite, to make a mere man arrive at a pitch of excellence and happiness, of which we are able, at prefent, to form but very imperfect conceptions. With thefe lights, though, as yet, we are able to apply them but very imperfectly, how may we ftand amazed in the contemplation of our future selves!

By the help of thefe confiderations, we may form fome idea wherein confifts the fuperiority of beings of higher orders, whofe intellectual powers exceed ours. The affociation of their ideas may be more extenfive, and affociated ideas may unite and

coalefce

coalefce more readily, and perfectly in their minds, than they do in ours; the confequence of which will be, that ideas collected from a greater fpace, both before and after the prefent moment, will be co-exiftent in their minds; which will make the influence of ideas ftill greater, and that of fenfation (or what may be in them analogous to fenfation in us) still less than it is with us; fo that their natures will be more purely intellectual than ours.

Hence, alfo, if we may prefume to indulge a conjecture on fuch a subject, may we form a faint idea of the incomprehenfible greatnefs and perfection of the divine being. For fince there is a real connection of all things, in the whole fyftem of nature, how distant foever the parts of it may be, in point of time or place; this connection may at once be fo completely feen by him who planned, and who directs the whole, that it may be faid, there is nothing paft or future in his ideas; but that to him, the whole compafs of duration is, to every real purpose, without diftinction, present. To him, therefore, one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day; the two extremes, being fo perfectly united, and fo equally prefent, that the intervals, how different foever, vanish alike in both cafes.

We fee, then, the course which the divine being has pointed out for the improvement of intelligent beings, whereby we may make approaches

to

ture.

to the excellence and happiness of the divine na→ We are to be influenced lefs by fenfation, and more by associated ideas perpetually. The affociation of all connected ideas is to grow more perfect, and more extenfive continually, till things paft, prefent, and to come fhall, to greater and greater diftances, become the fubject of our contemplation, and the fource of our happiness. Provifion is made for the continuance of this progress, in the structure of our minds, and in all the influences to which we are expofed. All the objects about which we are converfant, and all the events to which we are liable, are contrived to favour it.

Let us now confider whether any thing fimilar to this may be observed in the fcheme of revelation; and fince both the ordinary and extraordinary courfe of divine providence have the same object with refpect to us, both being defigned and calculated to raife, improve, and blefs the human race; let us confider whether they be conducted in a manner analogous to one another; fo that we may trace the fame hand in both, and hence derive a prefumptive argument in favour of revelation.

To me, I own, there feems to be, in this refpect, a very great analogy between both these difpenfations of God to mankind, and the argument that may thence be deduced in favour of revela tion ftrikes me very much. For in thofe, extraordinary difpenfations of God to mankind, of which

we

we are informed in the books of fcripture, we see a moft glorious apparatus for accomplishing this great end, for enlarging the comprehenfion of the human mind, and railing us to the highest pitch of perfection and excellence.

To have the mind impreffed with the idea of its being in a state of moral government, and that our actions have great and distant confequences, is of admirable use in this refpect; and this, we find, was the fituation of Adam presently after he came from the hands of his maker. He was permitted the free use of all the trees in the garden of Eden except one, which he was forbidden to meddle with under fevere penalties. In thefe circumstances he was under a neceffity of looking before him, and attending to the distant confequences of what he was doing. He faw (as is generally understood) an immortal exiftence before him in cafe of obedience, and of prudence and regularity in the gratification of his appetites; and death (of the meaning of which he was, no doubt, informed) in cafe of difobedience and irregular indulgence.

If we confider the importance of having enlarged views, and of the attention being engaged upon objects, beyond the prefent moment, we must fee how vaftly fuperior this situation was, with respect to the improvement of his faculties, to a ftate in which he should have been left to the random indulgence of his appetites, without any intimation

of

of the confequence, except what he could learn by flow experience. The more we think upon this fubject, the greater will this advantage appear to be. Mankind might, for ages, have been little more than brutes, without fome provision and affiftance of this kind.

If the object of this trial, viz. the abstaining from the fruit of a tree, appear trifling, we should confider the infantile ftate of the first man, and the only dangerous exceffes that, in his fituation, he could be guilty of; and we may fee the greatest propriety in this very circumftance. Would it not have been much more abfurd to have forbidden him to fteal, to commit adultery, or, indeed, to have enjoined him the obfervance of any of the ten commandments of the moral law. What is more natural, or common with ourselves, than to forbid children to eat of certain kinds of food, or to meddle with things that are most in their way, by which they are liable to do harm to themselves or others. They are not capable of offending in any other refpects, or of understanding any higher precepts. We are not made acquainted with all the reftrictions under which our first parents were laid; but it cannot be doubted, but that they must have been of a falutary nature, whether they themselves might be aware of it or not. We do not always give our children the reafon of the reftrictions we lay them under, because they are not always capa

ble