all; but shall rather fecretly exult in the future triumph of my innocence, and fhall fhow an unabashed and chearful countenance, till the.present load of infamy be removed. It must be owned, however, that the sense of infamy, in this cafe, will be felt more or lefs, according to the degree of comprehenfion of mind to which we are arrived, and alfo that we shall be able to bear unjust scandal for a longer or fhorter fpace of time in the fame proportion.

The fame obfervation may also be made with refpect to all the cases mentioned above. Thus it is that, by this power of comprehenfion, we are able to balance one idea or sensation with another, whether they be of the fame, or of different kinds. With this refource, a good man, conscious of his own integrity, grows every day lefs fenfible to the cenfures of men, confoling himfelf with the approbation of his own mind, and the perfuafion that he enjoys the favour of his maker; till, after fufficient experience, this juft fenfe of things will make him almost wholly indifferent, on his own account, to every thing that the world can think or fay of him.

A certain degree of this comprehenfion of mind, employed about proper objects, is fufficient to make a man virtuous through the whole courfe of his life. To arrive at this, nothing is wanting, but a distinct and ready apprehenfion of all the ill confe

quences of vice, and of all the good effects of virtue. For, as foon as, by this extended power of affociation, we perceive vice, with all that accompanies and follows it, as one undivided thing, and the virtues, with all their train, as one undivided thing likewife, the fuperiority of the latter, upon the whole, is fo great, that no man could hesitate a moment which to prefer. It is only by partial views of things that we are impofed upon, are bewildered, and confounded in our choice. When, in confequence of acting for fome time with this clear and steady view of things, virtuous conduc is become habitual, the pains and difficulties of a virtuous courfe abfolutely vanish, and are abforbed in the fenfe of the infinitely greater good we hereby insure to ourselves. In this cafe, even the pleafures of vice would be fhunned with abhorrence, because we could never feparate from them the idea of the infinitely greater pains, with which they are clofely connected.

In matters to which we are much accustomed, this comprehenfion of mind, and coalefcence of ideas, is remarkably ready and complete. A perfon who has been much converfant in bufinefs and accounts, and who every day meets with gains or loffes, is affected juft as the balance of the profits would have affected him, if he had never heard of the particulars. A perfon who is lefs converfant

in

in these things would feel his mind as it were, vibrate between both, and would longer perceive their separate effects.

The power of habit, in promoting a perfect coalefcence of affociated ideas, is moft remarkable in cafes where the external fenfes are concerned. The moon, when near the horizon, feems to be confiderably larger than it does when it is near the meridian; but this can be owing to nothing but the effect of habit, in confequence of having frequently compared its apparent magnitude with thofe of the intermediate objects: for its picture upon the retina is well known to be of the fame dimenfions, and therefore a child, or a perfon wholly without experience, could not imagine any difference in them. Nay, it is evident, from the laws of optics, that originally all objects appear to be in the fame plane, and that it is from experience, or habit, that we first get the idea of diftance, or of any dimenfion befides length and breadth.

Again, it is probable, that all objects appear double to every perfon, till, by experience, we find the mistake, and then learn to conceive of impreffions, made upon two correfponding points of the retina, as referring but to one object. However, fo abfolutely fixed is our judgment, (for fuch only it evidently is originally) that the moon is larger near the horizon, and that the appearance of two objects is, in reality, no more than that of one, that

we are now even puzzled to account for the fact. Perhaps like obfervations might be made concerning our other fenfes.

All thefe cafes are remarkable inftances of the power of affociation, and demonftrate a poffibility, not only that an idea, but even a fenfation may cease to appear to be what it originally was; yea, that it may be fo intimately connected with, and abfolutely loft in affociated ideas only, as to be no longer capable of being resolved back again into its former fate.

Another thing worthy of our notice in thefe facts is, that this amazing effect is accomplished in a limited time, even pretty early in life; for no perfon can remember the time when objects appeared to him otherwife than they do now.

Do not thefe plain, but striking facts, teach us to conceive, how poffible it is, that any ideas whatever may be fo entirely coalefced by affociation, that the components parts of the whole image fhall abfolutely difappear, and never more be feen in the fame light in which they were originally viewed. Thus, all ideas of pain may, at length, perfectly unite with thofe of the pleafures which hey have accompanied, or to which they have been fubfervient; and when once the general affociation, founded on the connection of good and evil, pleafure and pain, obferved through all nature, is firmly established

eftablished (like the fixing of the corresponding points in the retina) not even the most fudden appearance of evil will be able to affect the mind with the idea of any thing but what is right and defirable upon the whole, any more than two images, one in each eye, though ever fo unexpectedly impreffed, are not able, even for a moment, or by furprise, to give us the idea of two objects; though this was always the cafe in our infancy, and would be fo ftill without affociation of ideas. If ever our minds should arrive at the perfect ftate here hinted at, all the works of God, and all the events of divine providence, will conftantly appear to us as they do to the divine being himself, i. e. perfectly and infinitely good, without the leaft perceivable mixture of evil.

In what time it is even poffible to effect all this, cannot, with the least certainty, be fo much as conjectured for though we cannot remember objects appearing to us in any other manner than they now do; yet as these affociations of visible ideas must have been impreffed every time we opened our eyes, from the time that we began to take notice of things; we muft conclude, that this operation cannot but require a very long and fteady application of mind. Temporary pains and evils of all kinds, must be very clearly and fatisfactorily feen to be, in all cafes, productive of happiness in the iffue, under the government of an infinitely good God; and