thereby to introduce my reader to the diligent study of them, and frequent meditation upon them, with more advantage.

I had intended to have prefixed to this part a particular examination of what has been advanced concerning the doctrines and evidences of religion by Dr. Beattie, and especially Dr. Ofwald, who represent common fenfe as fuperfeding almoft all reasoning about religion, natural or revealed, and who have advanced maxims which I cannot help thinking to be both ill-founded and dangerous. But finding, after I had made fome progrefs in this work, that it drew to a confiderable length, I thought it would be better to referve the remarks that I had made on those writers to fome other opportunity, when I might enter into a more particular examination of what Dr. Reid has advanced concerning this pretended new principle of common fense; and, in the mean time, to content myself with a few general remarks on the subject, and an extract or two from Dr. Ofwald, that my reader may form fome idea of the nature and spirit of the principles that I mean to oppose*.

I am truly forry to complain of the conduct of any of the fincere friends of revelation, as I be

Since this was written I have published, in a separate volume, An Examination of the writings of Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald.

lieve Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald to be; but it appears to me, that their writings must neceffarily give a great, and a very plaufible advantage to unbelievers; who, finding that it is not now pretended that religion in general, or chriftianity in particular, is founded on argument, will make no difficulty of rejecting them on the principles of common fenfe alfo, and will not be displeased to find that chriftian writers will argue the matter with them no longer.

This common fenfe, which is from henceforth to be confidered as the firit, and likewife the laft refort with respect to religion, and the evidences of it, these writers reprefent as being the fame power or faculty by which we judge that the whole is greater than a part, and by which we diftinguish all other felf-evident truths from palpable abfurdities. By the very concife procefs of an appeal to this principle, they fay, that any man may fully fatisfy himself concerning the truth of the being, the unity, the attributes, and the providence of God, and also of a future ftate of retribution, and even (as Dr. Ofwald has given out, and has promised to prove at large) of the evidences of christianity.

Upon this plan I might have faved myself the trouble of writing the preceding parts of this work, in which my object has been to prove the truth of the above-mentioned propofitions, contenting my

felf

felf with roundly afferting them; and, without replying to any of the objections of unbelievers, not hesitating to pronounce every man a fool (fee Dr. Ofwald's Appeal, p. 134.) who did not affent to them.

But, notwithstanding, I have given all the attention I could to the treatife of Dr. Ofwald, who has written moft fully on the fubject, I am by no means convinced that the propofitions above-mentioned are to be claffed among primary truths, or those to which every man muft neceffarily give his affent (when the terms of them have been properly explained) without the help of other intermediate propofitions. And as I have no natural right to fet up my private judgment as the ftandard of truth, in oppofition to that of the reft of mankind, I do not fee but that an unbeliever is as much at liberty to affert the falfhood, as I am to affert the truth of fuch propofitions; and what would be gained by our reciprocally calling one another fools and blockheads?

The fource of this umbrage that has been taken, at reasoning about religion, appears to me to have been a mistake concerning the nature of it, and an expectation of a kind, or degree of evidence, that the nature of the cafe will not admit of; and which, indeed, is by no means neceffary for the purpose to which it is applied; being different from, or fuperior to, that evidence which, in

J

other

other fimilar cafes, does actually produce conviction, and influence the conduct; which, however, is evidently all that can be neceffary in the bufinefs of religion.

If a lottery be proposed to me, in which I fee that there are a thoufand prizes to one blank, I do not demur about purchafing a ticket, becaufe it cannot be abfolutely demonftrated that I fhall be a gainer by it; a very high degree of probability having an effect upon the mind, that can hardly be distinguished from that of abfolute certainty.

If the Copernican hypothesis of the solar system be proposed to ine, I do not reject it, or even keep my mind in fufpenfe, because there is a poffibility of the Ptolemaic fyftem being true, and because the fun, immenfe as it is, and rapid as its motion muft be, may revolve round the earth.

This is ftill more evidently the cafe with refpect to the influence of teftimony upon the mind of man,

though it can never amount to more than a very high degree of probability. For we reafon and act upon the supposition of there having been fuch a man as Julius Cæfar, of his having been ftabbed in the fenate-house, and of there being fuch a city as Pekin in China, just as if we ourselves had been prefent at thofe fcenes, or places; though there is a poffibility of all the books we have read having been contrived to impose upon us and the

world,

world, and that all our acquaintance were in the fecret; and concurred to favour the deception.

Now all the evidence of religious truths is of thefe kinds, being either general conclufions, by induction from a number of particular appearances, or founded on historical evidence.

If any person, like Lord Bolingbroke, call in queftion the goodness of God, all that I can say to convince him of his mistake, is to fhew him that there are more marks of kind intention than of the contrary in the ftructure and government of the world; and, if he reply, that fome facts, fingly taken, are as evident marks of a malevolent intention, as others are of a good intention, and the particular instances to which he alludes be fuch as I cannot deny or explain, fo that my proof is not complete, I frankly acknowledge that I have no other, or better. But this is fufficient to fatisfy me, and, I prefume, it will be abundantly fatisfactory to all who are candid and impartial; and with perfons who are otherwise disposed, an appeal to their common sense will have no more effect.

In like manner, to prove the facts of the death and refurrection of Chrift, the early dates, and confequent authenticity of the gospel hiftories, or any other facts, from which the truth of what we call the gospel is inferred, it is fufficient, but it is neceffary, to fhew that the credibility of these facts

has