ally in the views it expresses, and sanctions the Secretary's decision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford."

PEACEFUL SOLUTION DECLINED.

The case was thus a plain one, as between war and peace. There was one course open for peaceful negotiations recognized by the Constitution. To that, the Government of the United States was shut up; but into that, though invited, the secessionists would not enter. If a possibility existed of a peaceful separation, through "negotiation," it was in the way the Secretary of State mentioned, and which the President in his Inaugural Address suggested, through a National Convention of the people of all the States,-and there was no other way under the Constitution.

It is true, that the Constitution does not contemplate the disruption of the Union in any manner; does not provide for even considering the question of separation, or "secession;" it says nothing about it; and it may be that a National Convention, held under the provisions of the Constitution, would have no authority to entertain the question in any shape. It has been insisted, however, that, as the people in a National Convention made the Constitution, and the people of the several States ratified it, the people of the United States and of the several States have the power, through the same process, to undo the work of their hands, to take down the edifice they erected, and to dissolve the Union. If this be so, it is a peaceful mode of separation. But whether there be any Constitutional mode of separation or not, and if there be, this seems to be the only one inferrible from the instrument itself,this was the course to which the Administration in power was willing to resort, for the con

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sideration of all grievances between the Government and the complaining States; and it was a measure of peace. But the Southern leaders never took one step, or expressed any desire, for a National Convention, but always spurned every suggestion of the subject.

Nor did they propose any other measure for a peaceful solution of the vital issue between them and the Government; that issue which was regarded as underlying all other questions in debate. But they took the ground, openly and defiantly, that they were "out of the Union" by their own act; that they were separated already from the jurisdiction of the United States; that they had "seceded," and that was the end of controversy. Suppose they were in fact right,—that "secession" was their proper remedy,-but yet that they could not convince the opposite party, the Government of the United States, of the truth of their position. There were then two parties to the case. The Government did not and could not agree with them. How, then, do honest men, disposed to peace, act, when they cannot agree? Before resorting to extreme measures, they exhaust every possible effort for a peaceful settlement. Did the South do this? Who could be an umpire, for a peaceful solution, between them and the Government? Only the whole people, represented in a National Convention. Did they agree to this? They spurned it. Did they propose any other measure? None whatever. Nothing short of a direct, full, immediate, unconditional yielding to them of the whole case in controversy, as one of the parties, would satisfy them. Does this carry on its front the compelling conviction that they were for peace, and the Government was for war?

Were this simple question submitted to any disinterested body of twelve men, in any nation under heaven, they would give a verdict against the rebel pretension.

UNJUSTIFIABLE REASONS FOR REFUSAL.

It may possibly be said, in answer to this, that the assembling of a National Convention would have been useless; that the majority of the people were no doubt against "secession," and with the Government, and therefore the South would not have obtained "their rights" in that manner.

To this we reply, first, that such an opinion could not justify a refusal to make the trial. Those who, if any, entertained it, might have found themselves mistaken. Our own conviction is, that had the whole people, represented in a National Convention, been brought face to face with the alternative of some peaceful settlement or civil war, one of two things would have occurred: either, propositions of "compromise" would have been agreed upon, satisfactory to the vast majority of the South,-which the Southern leaders no doubt feared,-or, a proposition for an amicable separation would have passed. We do not say that a "compromise," if subsequently ratified, would have been well. It would only have postponed the evil day. Nor do we say it would have been wise to dissolve this one nation and make two. It might have saved us the present strife, and its untold horrors, but numerous and bitter wars would no doubt have followed. All we mean to say, is, that we believe the people, compelled to face this "rugged issue," would have chosen the peaceful side of the alternative, in one of these two modes.

But, secondly, even if the Southern people had failed in Convention, either to gain a satisfactory "compromise" or an acquiescence in their "secession," and had thereupon felt compelled to withdraw from the Convention and enact and carry out "secession" in the way they are now doing, they would, in that case,—if able to exhibit a clear record

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of unendurable wrongs,-have made a far better showing, and would have had a deeper sympathy from the civilized world, than is now possible; and more especially so, in the matter of showing a disposition for peace.

But as the facts now stand, it is the baldest of all possible pretensions, the most naked and monstrous proposition ever penned by sober and Christian men, to assert that they were all the while for peace, while the Government was all the while for war. The Government was driven into war, to save its authority, to recover its property, to maintain its honor, to preserve its existence; and the Administration, constitutionally put in power by the people, could do no less, under its oaths of office, than to guard and defend these interests to the last. But the conspirators against the Government could not be coaxed or goaded into any measure for peace; but to be "let alone," after they had stolen all they could grasp, and would subvert forever the authority of the Government throughout half the territory of its jurisdiction, was the least of their modest demands.

THE COMMISSIONERS DEFIANTLY COURT WAR.

If any further evidence be desired to show the determination of the South for war, we find it officially certified, by the Confederate Commissioners. In reply to Mr. Seward's "Memorandum" of March 15th, 1861, they address him a long and their final note, dated April 9th. They assert that the people of seven States "have rejected the authority of the United States and established a Government of their own." Mr. Seward had referred them to a National Convention as the only Constitutional method for negotiation. Notwithstanding this, they complain, that, while they had come "with the olive-branch of peace," the Government,-which the Secretary of State

had assured them had no authority in the premises,would not treat with them, nor "recognize the great fact of a complete and successful revolution."

To show whether the leaves of this "olive-branch" were fresh or withered, observe what they further say:

The undersigned would omit the performance of an obvious duty, were they to fail to make known to the Government of the United States, that the people of the Confederate States have declared their independence with a full knowledge of all the responsibilities of that act, and with as firm a determination to maintain it by all the means with which nature has endowed them, as that which sustained their fathers when they threw off the authority of the British crown. * * * The President of the United States knows that Fort Sumter cannot be provisioned without the effusion of blood.

That is, if the United States shall deign to send provisions to its starving garrison, they will, if possible, prevent it by force. This is the kind of "peace" in the interest of which these gentlemen present the "olive-branch," and for which they stand ready to "negotiate" if the President will but receive them.

A DIPLOMATIC QUIBBLE.

There is one feature of this diplomatic note which exhibits true Southern chivalry. The Commissioners say to the Secretary of State, that they understand him to decline any interview:

Because, to do so, would be to recognize the independence and separate nationality of the Confederate States. This is the vein of thought that pervades the memorandum before us. The truth of history requires that it should distinctly appear upon the record, that the undersigned did not ask the Government of the United States to recognize the independence of the Confederate States. They only asked audience to adjust, in a spirit of amity and peace, the new relations springing from a manifest and accomplished revolution in the Government of the LATE Federal Union.