a positive knowledge of the existence of the war. (Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 4; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 119–121; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 9; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 3, ch. 1; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 8; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 55; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, §§ 51, ét seq.; Wildman, On Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 5-8; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 120; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 18, cap. 2, § 4; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 4; The Eliza Ann, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 247.)

§ 5. Declarations of war may be either absolute or conditional. Hostilities result at once from the former, and the two nations are regarded as belligerents from the date of the declaration. But the demand of the one power upon the other may be accompanied by a notification that hostilities will be commenced unless satisfaction upon some matter specified be obtained immediately, or within a certain limited time. In this case the war dates from the commencement of hostilities. Sometimes, however, it is very difficult, in such cases, to fix the exact point where belligerent rights begin, and when the duties of neutrals, and the obligations of subjects, incident to the new relations of the two states, have commenced. The rule given in the preceding paragraph applies also to cases of conditional declaration. (Grotius, de Jur. Bel ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 3, §7; Vattel, Droit des Gens, lib. 3, ch. 4, § 53; Emerigon, Traité des Assurances, ch. 12. sec. 25, § 4; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 4; The Success, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 133; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, liv. 3, ch. 1; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 120, 121; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 23.)

§ 6. If the enemy, says Vattel, on either declaration offers equitable conditions of peace, the war is to be suspended, for whenever justice is done all right of employing force is superseded. To these offers, however, are to be added good and sufficient securities, for we are under no obligations to suffer ourselves to be amused by empty proposals. Moreover, we have a right to demand security, not only for the principal objects for which hostilities were declared, but also for the expenses incurred in making preparations for the The nature of this security will depend upon the pecu

war.

liar circumstances of the case, or the confidence we are willing to repose in the word of the enemy. If the war was declared for the recovery of territory unjustly withheld from us, its immediate surrender would satisfy the main object of the declaration. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 4, § 54; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, liv. 3, ch. 1; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 9.)

§ 7. Although Vattel strenuonsly insists upon the ancient rule, that the declaration of war must, in general, be communicated to the state against which it is made, he makes the case of a war strictly defensive an exception. He who is attacked, he says, and wages only a defensive war, need not make a formal declaration, as the state of war is sufficiently determined by the declaration or conduct of the enemy. Nevertheless, the nation which is attacked seldom omits to make such declaration, either from a sense of its own dignity, or for the information of its own subjects and of neutral states. It. has already been shown that modern usage does not absolutely require a formal declaration in any case, ex debito justitiae inter gentes, although some public act, recognizing the existence of the war, may be required by public or municipal law, in order to determine the duties and relations of the subjects of the belligerents. Such recognition seems as necessary in defensive as in an offensive war. Thus, when Sweden, in 1812, had declared war against Great Britain, and the British government had neither issued a counter-declaration nor caused any official declaration to be made to its own subjects, Sir William Scott said it might be á question of nicety to determine how far the Swedish proclamation "would affect the rights of British subjects to carry on their accustomed intercourse with the ports of Sweden." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 4, § 57; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 55; The Success, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 133; Phillimore, on Int. Law, vol. 3, § 66; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 6; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 5-8; Heffter, Droit International, § 120; Bello, Derecho, Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 4; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 9; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, lib. 1, tit. 3, § 4.)

§ 8. A war duly declared, or officially recognized, is not merely a contest between the governments of the hostile

states in their political character or capacity; on the contrary, its first effect is to place every individual of the one state in legal hostility to every individual of which the other is composed, and these individuals retain the legal character of enemies, in whatever country they may be found. In the next place, all the property of the one state, and of each of its citizens, is deemed hostile with respect to the opposing belligerent. Very important consequences, as to the rights of persons and property, are deducible from these principles. We here allude only to the general doctrine of the effects of a declaration of war; the limitations and modifications of this doctrine, by usage and constitutional law, will be discussed in another place. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 13; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 5, § 70; The Hoop, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 198; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 122; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 55; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 67; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 3; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 8–10; Heffter, Droit International, § 122; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 4.)

§ 9. One of the immediate and important consequences of this principle, which has been fully confirmed by the usages of modern warfare, and by the decisions of the judicial tribunals of Europe and the United States, is, that a declaration, or recognition of war, effects an absolute interruption and interdiction of all commercial intercourse and dealings between the subjects of the two countries. The idea, says Kent, that any commercial intercourse, or pacific dealing, can lawfully subsist between the people of the powers at war, except under the clear and express sanction of the government, and without a special license, is utterly inconsistent with the duties growing out of a state of war. It is a well settled doctrine, in the English courts, and with the English jurists, that there cannot exist, at the same time, a war of arms and a peace of commerce. The war puts an end at once to all dealings and all communications with each other. This is equally the doctrine of all the authoritative writers on the law of nations, and of the maritime ordinances of all the great powers of Europe. It was frequently so decided by the congress of the United States, during the revolutionary war, and, again,

by the supreme court of the Unied States during the war of 1812. This doctrine renders null and void all contracts with the enemy during the war; it makes illegal the insurance of enemy's property, prohibits the drawing of bills of exchange, by an alien enemy on a subject of the adverse government, the purchase of bills on the enemy's country, or the remission and deposit of funds there, and the remission of money or bills to subjects of the enemy. All endeavors at trade with the enemy, by the intervention of third persons, or by partnerships, are equally forbidden, and no artifice can legalize any trade, communication, or contract of whatsoever character, without the express permission of the government. The subjects of the belligerent states cannot commence or carry on any correspondence or business together, and all commercial partnerships, existing between the subjects of the two parties prior to the war, are dissolved by the mere force and act of the war itself; though other contracts, existing prior to the war, are not extinguished, but the remedy is only sus pended, and this from the inability of an alien enemy to sue, or to sustain, in the language of the civilians, a persona standi in judicio. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 66, 68; Wheaton, On Captures, pp. 220-223; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 70; Bynkershoek, Quaest Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 3; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, §§ 13, 15; The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 22; The Pieter, 4 Rob., Rep. p. 49; The Franklin, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 127; The Joseph, 8 Cranch. Rep., pp. 451, 455; Chitty, Law of Nations, pp. 2, 3; Manning, Law of Nations, pp. 122, 123; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 8-10; Heffler, Droit International, §§ 122, 128; The Hoop, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 196; The Rapid, 8 Cranch. Rep., p. 155.)

§10. "This strict rule," says Kent, "has been carried so far in the British admiralty, as to prohibit a remittance of supplies even to a British colony during its temporary subjection to the enemy, and when the colony was under the necessity of supplies, and was only partially and imperfectly supplied by the enemy. The same interdiction of trade applies to ships of truce, or cartel ships, which are a species of neutral navigation, intended for the recovery of the liberty of prisoners of war. Such a special and limited intercourse is dictated by policy and humanity, and it is indispensible

that it be conducted with the most exact and exclusive attention to the original purpose, as being the only condition upon which the intercourse can be tolerated. All trade, therefore, by means of such vessels, is unlawful, without the express consent of both the governments concerned." A case occurred during the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain, and was decided by the American courts, showing the rigor of this rule of non-intercourse. A citizen of the United States had purchased a quantity of goods within British territory, a long time previous to the declaration of hostilities, and had deposited them on an island near the frontier; upon the declaration of war, his agents hired a vessel to proceed to the place of deposite and bring away the goods; but, on her return, she was captured, and, with her cargo, condemned as a prize of war. (Chitty, Law of Nations, pp. 6, 7; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 66; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 13; The Rapid, 8 Cranch. Rep., p. 155; Potts v. Bell, 8 Term Rep., p. 548; The Venus, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 355; The Carolina, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 336; The Bella Guiditta, cited, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 147.)

§ 11. The only exceptions to this strict and rigorous rule of international jurisprudence, are "contracts of necessity, founded on a state of war, and engendered by its violence." All ransom bills come under this exception, as, also, bills of exchange drawn by a prisoner in the enemy's country for his own subsistence. In the case of a bill of exchange drawn upon England, by a British prisoner in France, for his own subsistence, and endorsed to an alien enemy, the latter was allowed to enforce it on the return of peace. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 68; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, §15; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 21; Antoine v. Morehead, 6 Taunton Rep., p. 237.)

§ 12. "It is equally illegal," says Kent, "for an ally of one of the belligerents, and who carries on the war conjointly, to have any commerce with the enemy. A single belligerent may grant licenses to trade with the enemy, and dilute and weaken his own rights at pleasure, but it is otherwise when allied nations are pursuing a common cause. The community of interests, and object, and action, creates a