§ 5. Thus the catholic powers concede the precedency to the Pope, as the visible head of the church; but Russia, and the protestant states of Europe, consider him only as a sovereign prince in Italy, and, as such, entitled to royal honors, but not to any precedency from his rank as sovereign pontiff. The Emperor of Germany, under the former constitution of the empire, was entitled to precedence over all other temporal princes, as the supposed successor of Charlemagne, and of the Cæsars, but the claim is considered to have been lost by the dissolution of the Germanic Constitution, and the new organization of the Austrian Empire. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 132; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 1, ch. 3, § 95; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, § 40; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Gunther, Europ. Volkerrecht, b. 1, p. 222; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 18, § 3.)

§ 6. The sovereign, or ruler of a state, is considered, in international law, as representing, in his person, its sovereign dignity. It matters not whether he is a monarch or a president, whether he is the de facto or the de jure head of a nation, (if he has been duly recognized as such,) custom has invested his person with certain international rights, as the representative of his state. He is therefore entitled to the precedence and honor due to the nation of which he is the ruler. But as sovereigns and rulers seldom meet in council, questions of this kind do not often arise between them individually. There, however, were no less than five such congresses between 1814 and 1821, viz: the congress of Vienna, 1815; of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818; of Troppau, 1820; of Verona, 1820; and of Laybach, 1821. As all matters of etiquette and precedency in such congresses are usually arranged before the meeting of the sovereigns, questions of precedence are not likely to arise in the congress itself. Difficulties of this kind, in former times, not unfrequently arose between public ministers who were considered as representing the sovereignty of their respective states, and who consequently claimed honors which others were unwilling to concede. This led to serious disputes, which were sometimes attended with fatal consequences. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 2, §§ 39, 101, 102; Heffler, Droit International, § 55; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1,

p. 38; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv, 1, ch. 3, § 40; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac, lib. 1, cap. 7, § 3; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 18, § 3; De Cussy, Precis des Evenements, passim.)

§7. We find numerous examples of these disputes in European diplomacy of past ages, some of a serious character, and others exceedingly ludicrous. Thus, at the public entry of the Swedish ambassador into London, a contest for precedence took place between the French and Spanish ambassadors, which was attended with loss of life on both sides, and probably would have led to war, if the king of Spain, who was interested in maintaining peace with France, had not made such concessions as to satisfy the pride of Louis XIV. Again, the ambassadors of two Italian princes met on the bridge at Prague, and as neither would give way, they stood for the greater part of the day, face to face, exposed to the jeers of the crowd collected by the strangeness of the spectacle. Such disputes, sometimes serious and sometimes ludicrous, have led to the adoption, at different times, of certain conventional rules of etiquette and precedence. These rules are binding only upon those who have agreed to them. They, however, serve as a basis for the adjustment of any disputes which arise between others who are not parties to these conventional agreements. (Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub. lib. 2, ch. 9; Wicquefort, l'Ambassadeur, etc., liv. 1, § 24; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, ch. 3; Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 458, et seq; Villefort, Priviléges Diplomatiques, passim.)

§ 8. The customary law of European nations has attributed to certain states what are called royal honors, which entitle the states, by whom they are possessed, to precedence over all others who do not enjoy the same rank, with the exclusive privilege of sending to other states public ministers of the first rank, together with other distinctive titles and ceremonies. Among the princes who enjoy these honors, differences have arisen with respect to relative rank and precedence; but these questions are now mostly settled by usage and treaty stipulations, and where not thus settled, they are regarded as of very little importance, or at least, of not sufficient consequence to lead to very serious national differences

or discussions. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, §2; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, § 38; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 129; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 91, 92; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 28, 53; Martens, Recueil. Supplem., tome 4, pp. 33-340; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, § 64; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, p. 355.)

§ 9. The title of emperor, from the historical associations connected with it, was formerly considered as the most eminent and honorable among all sovereign titles; but it is not now regarded by other crowned heads as conferring any prerogative or precedence over monarchical sovereigns of another name, ruling states of equal rank and dignity. The title of king is now considered as equal in every respect to that of emperor. In fine, the influence and importance of the sovereign, result rather from the rank and importance of the state, than from the name and nature of the title conferred upon its ruler. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 6; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §127; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., §95; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, § 40; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, §§ 65, 66.)

§ 10. Among monarchical sovereigns, those who enjoy royal honors, but are not crowned heads, concede the preference, on all occasions, to emperors and kings; and the princes who do not enjoy royal honors, yield the precedence to those who are entitled to them. This rule is based on the consent of the parties themselves, and does not extend to their intercourse with other states. That is, a state whose ruler does not wear a crown, may give precedence to one which does, but this concession does not preclude the same state from claiming equal rank with a third power which contests the right of precedence with the state to which it had yielded that honor. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, § 98; Polson, Law of Nations, §5; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 2, § 41; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, §§ 65, 66; Heffter, Droit International, § 53.)

§ 11. In all matters of ceremony and etiquette, the representatives of semi-sovereign or dependent monarchical states rank below the representatives of sovereign and independent

monarchical states, and, of course, and as a matter of necessity, below those of the state on which they are dependent, or whose protection or suzeraineté they claim or acknowledge. But where third parties are concerned, their relative rank must be determined by other considerations; and they may even take precedence of states completely sovereign, as was the case with the electors under the former constitution of the Germanic empire, in respect to other princes not entitled to royal honors. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 28, 41, 53; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Horne, on Diplomacy, sec. 1; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 5, §§ 2 et seq.; Martens, Manuel Diplomatique, ch. 1.)

§ 12. It will be observed that these regulations for determining the relative rank of states, or of their representatives, established in part by usage and custom, and in part by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, relate exclusively to monarchical sovereigns. An abortive attempt was made at the same congress, to classify the different states of Europe, with a view to determine their relative rank. A committee was appointed for this purpose in December, 1814; their report was discussed in February, 1815, and its adoption indefinitely postponed, doubts having arisen with respect to the proposed classification, and especially as to the rank assigned to republics. It therefore appears that republics have no definitive rank assigned to them by the rules of ceremonial etiquette in Europe, in the intercourse of their representatives with those of monarchical sovereigns. (Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 18, § 3; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3; Kluher, Acten des Weiner Congresses, tome 8, pp. 98-116; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Phillimore, on Int. Law, vol. 2, §§ 41, 43; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 133, 135.)

§ 13. It may be stated, as a general rule resulting from the natural equality of states as members of an universal community, and subject alike to the same general code of international jurisprudence, that all sovereign states, no matter what may be their form of government, are equal before the law, and no one can claim any superiority or precedence over another. Republics are, therefore, entitled to the same rank as monarchies, unless they themselves have yielded their natural right of equality and conceded the precedence

to others. Formerly, the Roman Republic considered all kings as very far beneath it; but when the monarchs of Europe found none but feeble republics to oppose, they disdained to admit them to an equality. Nevertheless, the powerful Republics of Venice and of the United Provinces assumed the honors of crowned heads. Cromwell would not allow the slightest mark of honor which had been paid to the representatives of the monarchy to be omitted toward those of the Republic of England. In the treaties between the French Republic and the other European Powers, it was expressly stipulated that the same ceremonials, as to rank and etiquette, which had been observed before the revolution of 1789, should be continued between them. The states of Europe observed the same rule toward the recent Republic of France. The United States of North America, the Germanic Confederation, and Switzerland (collectively, not in its individual cantons,) have been considered as entitled to the same rank as the monarchical states of Europe. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, § 38; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 3, § 3; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 2, § 41; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 38, 88; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 133; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, p. 367; Martens, Guide Diplomatique, tome 2, ch. 2; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 18, § 3.)

§14. Where the rank of different states is equal or undetermined, resort has sometimes been had to the usage of the alternat, as it is called, by which the rank and places of dif ferent powers is changed from time to time, either in a certain regular order, or one determined by lot. Thus, in drawing up public treaties and conventions, it is the usage. of certain powers to alternate, both in the preamble and the signatures, so that each power occupies, in the copy intended to be delivered to it, the first place. Another expedient, sometimes resorted to in order to avoid controversies respecting the order of signatures to treaties and other public acts, is that of signing, in the alphabetical order of the names of the respective states which are parties to these acts, the French alphabet being adopted for that purpose. Thus, at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the plenipotentiaries signed in the following order: Austria, Denmark, Espagne (Spain,)