Mr. Buchanan's History of his Administration.-His embarrassing Position.-Unanimous Vote of Approbation by the Legislature of Massachusetts.-Anxious Waiting for the Meeting of Congress.-A "John Brown" Incident in Boston.-Official Opinion upon "Coercion," of the Attorney-General of the United States.-Conciliatory Propositions in the Albany Journal, a leading Republican Paper in the Interest of Mr. Seward.— Upon Motion of Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, a Committee of One from each State (33) appointed, to consider and report upon "the present Perilous Condition of the Country."-Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, moves in the Senate for a Committee of Thirteen.— Proposition of Mr. Andrew Johnson in the Senate.-Speech of Mr. Wade, of Ohio.He does not "so much blame the People of the South."-Allusion to the Speech by Mr. Nicholson, of Tennessee, in the House.-Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, offers Resolutions.-Extracts from Speeches of Mr. Andrew Johnson.-Great Number of Memorials in favor of the Crittenden Resolutions.-Opinion of Mr. Pugh, Senator from Ohio, of the Popular Vote in their favor, had they been adopted by Congress.-The New York World (Rep.) on the Effect of "one Word that way" from Mr. Seward.Strong Statement of Boston Daily Advertiser (Rep.) as to Popular Aversion to a War. -Changes of Feeling.-The New York Tribune against a "Reactionary Spirit" for Union. -Resolution of Mr. Clark, Senator from New Hampshire, to defeat the Crittenden Propositions.-Mr. Seward disappoints Public Expectation by his Vote.-His Specch.-Its Effect.-The "Conservative " Republican Journals become quasi radical. -Statement of Mr. Wilson, Senator from Massachusetts.-Mr. Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts, on "the Barbarism of Slavery."-The "Irrepressible Conflict."-Interposition of Virginia.-The Appointment of Commissioners to the "Peace Conference." -Messrs. Shurz, Chandler, and Bingham.-Mr. Chase on this Subject.-The Spirit of the Radicals.-The Conference.-Its Propositions.

THE recent publication of the history of his administration, by ex-President Buchanan, renders it less necessary to examine the course of executive proceedings, during the remainder of his term of office. The situation was peculiarly embarrassing; for he could count upon little support either from the North or the South. The Executive was, as it were, between two fires; or, rather, the fire assailed it in so many different directions, that escape from the effects was out of the question, whatever course it might have seen fit to pursue. The Southern wing of the Democratic party hoped

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for non-interference, at least, with the progress of events, whatever that might prove to be. The supporters of Douglas and Bell, in the South, and the Democrats and conservatives, in general, at the North, trusted that war might be prevented by the use of conciliatory means. The radicals would have rejoiced at the inauguration of war, by the Democratic administration; but impatiently awaited the hour when their own influence might be felt in the direction of affairs. It was the obvious policy of the existing administration to shift the responsibility of war, if war should finally ensue, upon the party which had placed itself in open conflict with the South, by the sectional basis of its organization. It was its duty to thwart, if it could, the indulgence of any hostile. purposes, on either side, by prompt measures of repression, at the point where rebellion had begun; if, in the exercise of sound discretion, and in the possession, and by the use of suitable means, such measures should seem likely to promote the desirable end of peace, by the restoration of the authority of the United States in the insurgent quarter. Had the active disposition to rebellion been confined to South Carolina alone, as in the days of President Jackson, the problem would have been of very easy solution. But this disposition in the South was well known to be much more widely extended. On the other hand, the general cry of the country was for peace. To take active steps was only too likely to precipitate war. In -fact, the very question which lingered along through the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's administration, did not find its solution until nearly six weeks after the inauguration of his successor.' Even then, matters were brought to a final issue, only by an ingenious course of proceedings, to be referred to in their appropriate place.

1 On the 18th of January, 1861, the Senate of the Massachusetts Legislature passed a series of resolves, by a unanimous vote, of which the following is one. The House soon afterwards concurred:

Resolved, That the Legislature of Massachusetts, now, as always, convinced of the inestimable value of the Union, and the necessity of preserving its bless. ings to ourselves and our posterity, regard with unmingled satisfaction the de

But the causes of war being now fairly on foot, the problem before the nation was—whether their progress ought to be and could be honorably stayed. Of course, all eyes were turned towards Congress, at its meeting on the 3d of December, 1860, and the strongest hope was entertained, somewhat vaguely, it is true, by moderate men of all parties in the North, that the complications in which the country was involved would be unravelled by an honest comparison of views and the exercise of a prudent and moderate spirit. It is certain that the people, in general, were very far from wishing for war.

An incident which took place in Boston, on the very day that Congress met, tends to throw a good deal of light upon this particular point. The "John Brown" sympathizers had called a public meeting, at a noted place of assembly in that city, in order to show due reverence to the memory of that person, on the anniversary of his execution, in due course of law, for the highest crime known to the laws of every civilized country. At the appointed hour, it appeared that many of the more respectable citizens of Boston were present in the hall, who largely outnumbered the sympathizers. The meeting was finally organized, after some verbal conflict, under the officers chosen by the former part of the audience, and though there was some resistance on the part of the "John Brown" men and women, which called for the intervention of a considerable police force, the meeting was eventually dispersed, and the "sympathy" was expended in some more private way.

Although there was much ridicule thrown, especially by the Republican chiefs, upon the attitude of South Carolina, as yet standing alone in the position assumed by her, yet

termination evinced, in the recent firm and patriotic special message of the President of the United States [Mr. Buchanan] to amply and faithfully discharge his constitutional duty of enforcing the laws and preserving the integ rity of the Union, and we proffer to him, through the Governor of the Commonwealth, such aid in men and money as he may require to maintain the authority of the General Government.

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thoughtful men could not but beware, that her example must soon be followed by other States; and that the situation was both novel and embarrassing, in regard to the powers of the Constitution, at such an emergency. The Attorney-General had already officially advised the President (November 20, 1860) that he had no authority, under the provisions of that instrument, to "make war upon a State or States," the power having been conferred on Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the United States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" and Congress having made no provision for any such contingency as this, the United States could only defend itself when assailed.' It seemed evident, however, that it could strengthen its means of defence, at any and every point liable to be attacked; and it was understood that Mr. Cass withdrew from the Cabinet afterwards, because of disagreement with the President, solely in regard to failure of action in this particular.

On the day preceding the set time for the meeting of Congress (December 2d), the Albany Evening Journal, edited by Mr. Weed, well known to be the confidential intimate of Mr. Seward, stated the following propositions:

I. There is imminent danger of a dissolution of the Union.

II. This danger originated in the ambition and cupidity of men who desire a Southern despotism, and in the fanatic zeal of Northern abolitionists, whe seek the emancipation of slaves, regardless of consequences.

III. The danger can only be averted by such moderation and forbearance as will draw out, combine, and strengthen the Union sentiment of the whole country.

It was held among leading Republicans in Congress, as well as others, that there was no constitutional power to "coerce a State." Thus, Mr. Trumbull, Senator from Illinois, and reckoned, at the time, the special expositor of Mr. Lincoln's views, so declared in the Senate.

It was this opinion of the matter which kept affairs in an uncertain condition so long; that is, for forty days after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, until the Confederacy was induced to begin, at Charleston, so as to put the United States on its defence. Congress, it is to be remembered, adjourned without taking any order for coercion; showing, of course, the prevalent opinion on the constitutional question.-See Carpenter's "Logic of History," p. 50.

Thereupon, the Journal recommended "a convention of the people, consisting of delegates appointed by the States." It was natural enough, it proceeded to urge, that there should be though there seems to be no reason for it—some wear and tear of the machinery of the Government, after the use of seventy years; and it conceived that this could be set right by such a popular conference as it recommended. It was evident enough, from this announcement, that the "conservative Republicans," including, of course, Mr. Seward, who, it was well understood, was to be Secretary of State under the coming administration, were seriously alarmed at the condition of affairs—which could never have existed but for their countenance-and were anxious to devise some rational means to avert the threatened calamities. Unhappily, as has been alleged at another point of this discussion, the active influences of the party were not with this "wing" of the organization. The radicals really controlled the party press. Accordingly, on the 17th of December, Mr. Weed's paper stated, that "with two or three exceptions, the suggestions of the Evening Journal, having an adjustment of the controversy which threatens to divide the Union for their object, have elicited from the Republican press responses in the spirit of- No MORE COMPROMISES-NO BACKING DOWN."

It seems, therefore, upon this indisputable authority, and by actual experiment, that the general sentiment of the party as gathered from its press, was averse to an adjustment; and, in view of this spirit, the events of the future might be readily inferred.

Soon after the reception of the usual message of the President (December 8th), Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, moved, in the House, that so much of that document as related "to the present perilous condition of the country be referred to a special committee of one from each State, with leave to report at any time." After other motions had been made, and the occurrence of some debate, Mr. Boteler's order was adopted, by a vote of 145 to 38. This committee was soon