SOUTHERN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

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fered a memorial from a Pennsylvania fellow-citizen, "one of the people called Quakers," in relation to the African slave trade, and looking to an improved treatment of slaves in the United States. Upon some objection taken to his action, Mr. Ames, defending the general right of every citize to petition Congress, stated that he had no idea of supportin the prayer of the petition; but had made up his mind long since that it was inexpedient to interfere with the subject. In this case, by order of the House, the petition was returned to its author.

It was evidently the earnest desire of the Southern members from the first moment, to keep this subject out of Congress. Whatever seemed like tampering with their settled rights under the Constitution, was manifestly unjust, and would naturally provoke resentment. Naturally enough, too, they would regard in this light any of those side issues, occasionally introduced, which might have a tendency to affect unfavorably their domestic institutions. Their jealousy on this point was likely to become much more active, when they found, after the lapse of a few years, that slavery had be come strictly confined to their own portion of the country; and that, in consequence of it, they occupied a somewhat anomalous position in the eyes of the civilized world. Doubtless, all men similarly situated would resist every seeming encroachment upon their own position; and none the less so, if they perceived themselves subjected to moral imputations for the exercise of a right to which the whole country had assented, and which it had solemnly pledged itself to uphold.

So little, however, had slavery become a political question, and so certain is it that the Southern States had not at an early period become banded together in support of the system, that after the years 1820-'21, during which that great struggle which resulted in what is called the Missouri Compromise was most active and came to its conclusion, the States of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee were earnestly engaged in practical movements for the gradual emancipa

tion of their slaves. This movement continued until it was arrested by the aggressions of the abolitionists upon their voluntary action. This action was prompted by economical, rather than moral reasons. The abolitionists, however, refused to accept an impending fact, and insisted upon convicting as criminals those who were so well disposed to bring about the very result at which they themselves professed to aim. The consequences were such as might have been reasonably expected. Promised emancipation refused to submit itself to hateful abolition. Those three border States placed themselves at once upon the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, and, resenting as an insult the interference of the Northern intruders, abandoned the scheme which a calm view of considerations, tending to their own future welfare, had induced them to form.

CHAPTER II.

Sectionalism.-The Right of Petition.-The District of Columbia.-The Missouri Compromise.-State of Political Parties.-The Tariff Question.-" Aggression."—Mr. Jefferson, on the Missouri Question.-Admission of States before 1820.-Territories Organized in Conformity with the Wishes of the Inhabitants.-State of Sentiment at the North-Southern Youths in Northern Colleges.-Northern School-books-Exaggerated Descriptions of Slavery at the South.

THE lamentable spirit of sectionalism, leading, finally, to such disastrous consequences, at first distinctly revealed itself in the presentation of successive petitions to Congress for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. These memorials continued to pour into both Houses from the North, session after session, for a series of years, and gave rise to a great deal of heart-burning among the Southern members, until the matter culminated in a scene of unparalleled excitement in the Representative Hall, in the year 1837. The comparatively slight consideration which at first they received, in either branch of Congress, was given almost entirely to the question of receiving them at all. Sometimes. they had been sent back to the petitioners; or the committees to which, on other occasions, they were referred, had asked to be discharged from further attention to them; or else a brief report or resolution had been adopted, expressive of an entirely adverse view to that of the prayer. Precluded by absolute constitutional limitations, which were supported by the general sense and sentiment of the people, from attacking slavery in the States, the uneasy spirits who assumed to be legislators for the nation, at home, devoted themselves assiduously to the manufacture of petitions, in reference to the internal policy of the seat of government. It probably never

occurred to them that those upon the spot, in the discharge of their legislative duties, might be better qualified to judge about such a point than the men, and often the women and children, of remote country towns.

But the absence of knowledge and experience is not al ways a check to presumption. It is said that "the hand which could not build a hovel may destroy a temple;" and if the structure reared by our great forefathers were fated to topple over, nothing was so likely as this continual picking from below to be the primary cause of its destruction. The question of the treatment due to those petitions, and that which involved the powers of Congress touching the topic urged upon it by them, were both matters of no little nicety. The right of petition, under every well-administered government, should be theoretically unlimited, and yet practically subject to all reasonable control in special cases. Such a case is that, in which the public authorities are as well informed upon the subject, and are presumably as well disposed to do all which can reasonably be done, in the premises, as their constituents. The extreme value of the right of petition exists under governments in which the source of power is liable to be kept ignorant of the wrongs of the subject. In a republic, the popular voice is paramount, and the remedy for every wrong is in the public hands, at the stated seasons appointed for the expression of the popular will. It seems almost a solecism for the sovereign people to complain that their servants deprive them of the right of petition."

1 Frederick II. of Prussia, for instance, received such petitions into his own hands.

' In the Legislature of Massachusetts, some twenty years ago, a gentleman happened to be on a standing committee to which had been referred a petition for the dissolution of the Union. A time and place of hearing were appointed, whereupon this member of the committee declined to attend in his place. The worthy chairman remonstrated against such contumacy, urging the sacred right of petition, and the duty of hearing what might be said upon every subject proposed. This gentleman requested to be informed, in reply, if the chairman would grant a sitting in case, for example, of a petition for a rail.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

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As to the authority of Congress over the District, it was legally exclusive. It often happens, however, that certain moral considerations, going to show intention, give the actual color to law. The public, for example, may acquire a right of way over a parcel of land, which the owner has neglected to seclude to his special use, for a certain number of years. The public title would be the more free from any question, if the mansion of the proprietor were close at hand, so that, being conveniently situated, he seemed purposely to avoid seizing upon any opportunity of objection. In the year 1790, Congress formally accepted the cession, previously made by Virginia and Maryland, of the tract, ten miles square, constituting the District. It included the city of Alexandria, and slavery existed there, and in other parts of the territory. No provision was made in regard to slavery on this tract intended for the peculiar uses of the Government, and for its seat; nor was any memorial received by Congress for the emanci pation of the slaves in the District, until more than forty years after Virginia and Maryland had relinquished title to it. It must be admitted that, being exclusively under the legislative control of Congress, the power existed to abolish slavery within the District. The right to do so, whether legal or equitable, may be thought much more questionable. Power, employed by a representative body, except under the specific requirements of law, is always presumed to be equit ably exerted. In this instance, there was the original ac ceptance of the territory with slavery existing upon it, and long acquiescence in the claims of the inhabitants, without any question raised in regard to it. New interests connected with the domestic system had grown up there, extending into every one of the slave States. By implication, certainly, here were long established rights, with which it would be injuri road to the moon. The head of the committee thought he would; whereupon the member suggested that such indulgence might be a waste of time, and that in the case in hand it was so clearly out of the power of the Legislature of Massachusetts to dissolve the Union, and contrary to its duty to countenance such a treasonable project, that he should stay away.