of Kansas, Mr. Douglas declared, February 29th, 1860, in reply to a speech of Mr. Seward:

"I repeat that their resistance [that of Mr. Seward and his associates] to carrying out in good faith the settlement of 1820, their defeat of the bill for extending it to the Pacific Ocean, was the sole cause of the agitation of 1850, and gave rise to the necessity of establishing the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the Territories. Hence, I am not willing to sit here and allow the Senator from New York, with all the weight of authority he has with the powerful party of which he is the head, to arraign me and the party to which I belong with the responsibility for that agitation which rests solely upon him and his associates." 1

In this allegation Mr. Douglas was clearly in the right. No matter by what unforeseen contingency it happened, that the line of 36° 30' could not be conveniently extended to the Pacific-and the only reason which could be offered, was the adoption of a constitution excluding slavery by the people of California, through the centre of which Territory the line would run—the repeal of the settlement of 1820 was accomplished by the failure to fulfil its conditions, which prohibited slavery north and permitted it south of that line. The question in regard to California was, it would seem, an impracticable one; but that Territory having been admitted to the Union, and provision made for the admission of New Mexico and Utah, both in contravention of the settlement of 1820, the Missouri Compromise was broken up altogether, in equity and in law. The national Whig Convention of 1852, as has been already shown, adopted this condition of things, "in principle and in substance," and the national Democratic Convention of the same year took the same ground, though not employing the same language. The line of 36° 30' having been abandoned, therefore, the territories of the United States were subject, in respect to slavery or any other matter affecting them, only to such legislation as Congress could constitutionally provide in such cases. Consequently, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, was but a reaffirmation of the congressional action of 1850, affirmed as it had already

From the "Congressional Globe."

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been by the Conventions of the two great parties, and by a popular vote of 2,969,079, against that of a minority amounting only to 157,296. And it may not be unreasonable to conjecture, that, if the framers of that act had contented themselves with providing only for the admission of territories, either with slavery or without, according to the will of the residents, leaving out any mention of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, in terms, it would have been impossible to create any very extensive agitation on the subject.

The popular mind may be stirred up by a direct proposition, which would excite no particular interest or feeling, if incidentally presented, though leading to precisely the same conclusions. It is not likely that ten out of a thousand of the people of the North ever examined this whole question, in its details. It was inevitable, therefore, that their views of it should be somewhat vague. But traditional memories which hung round the words "Missouri Compromise" impressed them, as with a sort of sacred significance. Though practically repealed, four years before, yet when the specific proposition to do what had been actually done already was set before them in plain terms, it gave great advantage to those who were only too well inclined to mislead and to excite the popular masses. Hence, then, came, in conjunction with other causes already referred to, the astonishing increase of the Freesoil vote, from less than 160,000, in 1852, to more than 1,300,000, in 1856; which grew in volume, so long as the fruitful theme of the Kansas troubles was kept in agitation, and which finally brought round the Republican triumph, with its results.

It is somewhat singular, that, in the course of the numerous debates which took place on the general subject, during so many years, it seems never to have occurred to those who discussed it, that the extension of slavery to a new territory, so far from being equivalent to an increase of the system, tended rather to its diminution. Since slaves could not be imported into the country, those who would follow their masters to fresh fields of labor must necessarily be taken

from the main body already in the slave States. The ratio of the increase of this class of population, in its normal condition, is an ascertained fact. Whether they would be as likely to increase according to the ordinary ratio, amid the severer labors of an unbroken region, as in the comparative ease and comfort of their accustomed abodes, especially if removed to a less genial climate, is a point about which a probably accurate judgment may be formed. At all events, it could be but the transfer of so many slaves, already existing in the country, from one place of residence to another. The political question, of the increase of slave States, would still remain. But it has been heretofore shown, that, while the limits of slavery in the South were definitely fixed, the North had already a very large preponderance of population; and that while the free States outnumbered the slave States at the period of the dispute, the character of the great Northwestern territory precluded the idea of forming out of it, at any future time, any other than those of the former class.

It may be remarked, in conclusion, upon this point, that however impolitic, in a popular sense, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, of 1854, may have been in some of its terms, it was, nevertheless, unavoidable, as a legislative measure, in its "principle and substance," whenever the organization of the Territory became necessary. The adoption of an opposite course would have been a violation of the Compromise measures of 1850, of the pledges of the Whig and Democratic Conventions, and a revolt against the vote of the immense popular majority in 1852. Consistency, principle, therefore, and the very existence of a party as a national organization, depended upon the submission of the question at issue to the determination of the people in the several territories, under suitable provisions for the rightful exercise of their popular functions. By flinching from this doctrine, the old Whig party, so long one of the main supporters of a constitutional republic, ran headlong into the wild sea of unconstitutional radicalism; and upon this issue, the Democratic party, no

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less distinguished of old for its devotion to the cause of the Union, became hopelessly divided; and, finally, with the assurance of victory if it had stood together, yielded the field to those whom both sections of the party were most anxious to defeat, for the cause of honestly republican principles under the Constitution.'

1 By referring to the final resolution, of the series which passed the Senate, January 12th, 1838 (Appendix IV.), by a vote of nearly four to one, it will be seen that the very principle of the Compromise of 1850 and of the KansasNebraska Act was then made a test question. The House took no action upon those resolutions; but at the first session of the twenty-fifth Congress, Mr. Atherton, of New Hampshire (December 11th, 1838), brought forward in the House a body of resolutions, covering the same general grounds as to Territories and other points included in those adopted by the Senate. These passed the House, on the following day, by large majorities; that one, which denied the right of Congress to interfere with slavery in the States, by the "indirect " of acting upon petitions for its abolition in the District and in Territories receiving the least support, the vote standing 126 yeas, to 73 nays. For sixteen years, therefore, and during the political discussions of four general elections, before the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the point involved in that act had stood settled by the action of the two Houses, without any general question by the people. It is obvious, therefore, that the agitation to which that act gave rise, and which led to such direful consequences, could have resulted only from such a combination of activelv-working agencies as those described in the text.

means

CHAPTER XI..

Availability as the Motive of Nomination a Mistake of the Democracy in 1856, as it was of the Whig Party in 1852.-Seditious Legislative Proceeding.-The Nomination of Fremont and Dayton the first Instance of Sectionalism, as to Candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency.-Party Success, on merely available Grounds, insecure.Southern Leaders seeking to inform themselves as to Northern Sentiment.-Visit of Mr. Davis to New England in 1858.-Mr. Toombs gives a Lecture in Boston.—Mr. Lincoln's Opinion of the State of Union Sentiment at the South, during the War.

THE object of this work has been to point out, in a somewhat general way, the movements of popular feeling and the course of action of the several parties, as tending towards certain results, not to examine the conduct of particular administrations of the General Government. It may, however, be properly enough suggested at this point, that the Democratic party, however actuated by considerations thought important to insure success, at a great public exigency, and, doubtless, also, by patriotic views of public duty, may have committed a political error in failing to renominate President Pierce in 1856. Without any reference to the subsequent turn of events, under the administration of his successor, President Buchanan, and allowing for the impossibility of foreseeing their progress and result, it was the evident fact that a great national question of absorbing interest, unexpectedly coming up early in the term of President Pierce, must be met and be brought to an issue, mainly by the intelligent action and popular strength of the Democratic party throughout the country. The embarrassments with which the administration of the latter was encumbered, in relation to the disturbances in Kansas, grew out of causes at work