The president explained to the Cabinet his reasons for having asked them to sign their names as witnesses of this sealed paper: "You will remember that this was written at a time, six days before the Chicago nominating convention when as yet we had no adversary, and seemed to have no friends. I then solemnly resolved on the course of action indicated above. I resolved in case of the election of General McClellan, being certain that he would be the candidate, that I would see him and talk matters over with him. I would say, 'General, the election has demonstrated that you are stronger, have more influence with the American people than I. Now let us get together, you with your influence, and I with all the executive power of the government, and try to save the country. You raise as many troops as you possibly can for this final trial, and I will devote all my energy to assisting and pushing the war.''

Stanton said: "And the general would answer you, 'Yes, yes,' and the next day when you saw him again and pressed these views upon him he would say 'Yes, yes,' and so on forever; and would have done nothing at all."

"At least," added Lincoln, "I should have done my duty, and have stood clear before my own conscience."

It may be questioned whether history contains any parallel for Lincoln's magnanimity in this incident. Only a man with the highest and finest nobility of soul could have done what, under those circumstances, Lincoln did regarding a man who had so disappointed and abused him, and on behalf of a country that seemed about to repudiate him.

In another act equally magnanimous Lincoln had already risen above all partisan relations with Governor Seymour, of New York. According to Thurlow Weed, shortly after Seymour's election as governor in the fall of 1862, Lincoln authorized Weed to go to Seymour and say to him that Seymour, as the Democratic governor of New York, could, if he desired, bring his whole party into line in an effort to save the Union; and that if he would do so, Lincoln would do everything in his power to pave

the way for Seymour to become president in 1864. Even if Weed's memory of this incident led him somewhat to exaggerate the affair, and Lincoln's offer to Seymour was somewhat less definite and specific, still there can be no doubt that Lincoln held toward Seymour essentially the attitude which Weed describes. In this matter we have Lincoln's own very gracious letter to Seymour, and Seymour's exceedingly distant and very guarded reply. Lincoln wrote to Seymour addressing him as "the head of the greatest State in the nation," and asking for a frank understanding with him as to their substantial agreement concerning their joint duty in "maintaining the nation's life and integrity." Seymour declined to commit himself in this matter, but said that he was confident that his opinions were shared by fully one-half of the population of the northern states, and he said:

I intend to show to those charged with the administration of public affairs a due deference and respect, and to yield them a just and generous support in all measures they may adopt within the scope of their constitutional powers. For the preservation of this Union I am ready to make any sacrifice of interest, party or prejudice.

one.

The first of these two sentences was the really significant Governor Seymour did very little if anything, to show his deep interest in the preservation of the Union, and he did very much to show that he was no friend of Lincoln.

The president's message to Congress in December, 1864, took occasion to comment upon the election in its relation to his own war policy, and he viewed it with frank satisfaction. Moreover, he reflected that the nation's losses, heavy as they had been, had not really weakened it to a point below its effective strength when the war began. He said:

While it is melancholy to reflect that the war had filled so many graves, and carried mourning to so many hearts, it is some relief to know that compared with the surviving, the fallen have

been so few. While corps, and divisions, and brigades, and regiments have formed, and fought, and dwindled, and gone out of existence, a great majority of the men who composed them are still living. The same is true of the naval service. The election returns prove this. So many voters could not else be found. The States regularly holding elections, both now and four years ago cast 3,982,011 votes now, against 3,870,222 cast then; showing an aggregate now of 3,982,011. To this is to be added 33,762 cast now in the new States of Kansas and Nevada, which States did not vote in 1860; thus swelling the aggregate to 4,015,773, and the net increase during the three years and a half of war, to 145,551. . . To this again should be added the number of all soldiers in the field from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Jersey, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, and California, who by the laws of those States could not vote away from their homes, and which number cannot be less than 90,000. Nor yet is this all. The number in organized Territories is triple now what it was four years ago, while thousands, white and black, join us as the national arms press back the insurgent lines. So much is shown, affirmatively and negatively by the election. It is not material to inquire how the increase has been produced, or to show that it would have been greater but for the war, which is probably true. The important fact remains demonstrated that we have more men now than we had when the war began; that we are not exhausted, nor in process of exhaustion; that we are gaining strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely. This as to men. Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever.

Lincoln took occasion in this same message to consider the importunity of those who were insisting that he should hold a conference with Jefferson Davis in an effort the more speedily to win the war. The election had given him new assurance that the nation was prepared to stand by and see the war through to a successful finish. This, he believed, was the plain duty of the nation. The victory at the polls was also virtually a victory upon the battle-field:

On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader

could result in any good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union-precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations to this effect are explicit and oft repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten. Either way it would be the victory and defeat following war.

CHAPTER XXI

THE SECOND INAUGURAL

LINCOLN entered upon his second administration with a number of changes certain in his group of intimate associates. Hannibal Hamlin, vice-president in his first administration, gave place to Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee. Mr. Hamlin would have welcomed a renomination and reelection. Lincoln carefully concealed from Hamlin his own preference in the matter. It appears to be quite certain, however, that Lincoln favored Johnson. The reason was not that Hamlin was either personally or politically repugnant to Lincoln; but that important changes had occurred since 1860. In that year a former Democratic vice-president from New England had been desirable; in 1864 it seemed to Lincoln more important that the vice-president should represent the loyal South. It can not be said that the country profited by changing Hamlin for Johnson.

There were changes in the Cabinet. Montgomery Blair was unpopular with a large faction of the Republican Party, and he wearied Lincoln with his own suspicion against other prominent men. A little more than a month before the election, Mr. Lincoln asked for Blair's resignation, which Blair promptly tendered in a spirit much to his credit.* Lincoln appointed as his successor Governor William Dennison, of Ohio.

Mr. Bates, the Attorney General, also found himself wearied with his administrative cares, and out of sympathy with the fac

*Blair considered the request for his resignation "a peace-offering to General Frémont and his friends, dictated by Seward at the request of Thurlow Weed."