shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeus corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

Already the political pot was brewing, and Lincoln was to hear of this and other cases in the campaign of 1864. Something of what was said to his discredit in that campaign we shall read in the next chapter. For the present we turn to opposition of a wholly different type which was rising against Lincoln, and which caused him almost as much embarrassment as the hostility of the Copperheads.

The opposition of the radicals to Mr. Lincoln was on the whole a higher grade than that of the Copperheads. It came from earnest and in good part from conscientious men, who were impatient with the president because he had not seemed to show more initiative and firmness in his advocacy of anti-slavery measures. He had indeed, issued the Proclamation of Emancipation, and was proposing that it be followed by a Constitutional Amendment prohibiting slavery throughout the United States; but he had done this avowedly as a war measure. He had declared that his paramount object was to save the Union, and that if he could have done this without freeing the slaves, he would have done so.

It is not surprising that Lincoln was severely criticized by the extreme abolitionists. Even if there had been no war, they would have felt justified in expecting from the first Republican president a more radical attitude in disapproval of slavery

than they discovered in the early portion of Lincoln's administration; but when slavery brought forth its fruit in rebellion, and that which had been the curse of the Union became its destruction, they thought they had a right to expect that Lincoln would proceed with far more vigor than he did to carry out to its legitimate conclusion his and their hostility to slavery. Lincoln put a Democrat at the head of the army, and left John C. Frémont in comparative obscurity. Lincoln dismissed Cameron from his Cabinet, largely as was supposed because Cameron was more interested in abolition than Lincoln was. Lincoln nullified the orders of Hunter and of Frémont for the abolition of slavery in their respective military districts. The Emancipation Proclamation covered only that portion of the country that was in rebellion. Even after the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln permitted the officers of the army to return fugitive slaves to loyal citizens in the border states that had not seceded. It is little wonder that this displeased the rabid abolitionists. There was in Congress a group of men increasingly out of sympathy with Lincoln in these matters. Zachariah Chandler, of Michigan, Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, and Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, were of this number. The unquestioned leader of the House of Representatives was the uncompromising Thaddeus Stevens. Had Lincoln lived he surely would have had trouble with Stevens. Thomas Dixon made no attempt to disguise him in the character which he calls "Stoneman" in his novel The Crisis and his photoplay The Birth of a Nation. But this characterization can not be acknowledged to be a just one.

The outstanding leaders, however, in the opposition to Lincoln in the campaign that was soon to occur, were a member of his own Cabinet and two generals in the Union Army, one of whom Lincoln had elevated to the foremost place of power, and the other of whom had been the first standard bearer of the Lincoln party as a candidate for the presidency.

CHAPTER XX

THE ELECTION of 1864

BY THE middle of Lincoln's first term, Republican leaders had quite generally come to an agreement that some other candidate would need to be nominated if that party were to win the election of 1864. On December 15, 1863, the New York Herald published an editorial headed "Grant as the people's candidate." To his lasting honor, General Grant turned a deaf ear to all suggestions that he should leave the leadership of the army and enter the field of politics against President Lincoln. Frémont, however, had no such scruples, and Chase conducted his own campaign from his chair in the president's Cabinet. Lincoln expressed in the hearing of John Hay his opinion of the various men who were opposing him. Chase's performance, he said, was in bad taste, but he had determined to pay no attention to it. He was a good secretary, and if he could be elected president he hoped the country would never have a worse one.

When viewed from this distance the operations of Secretary Chase on his own behalf while a member of Lincoln's Cabinet, appear so reprehensible we can hardly wonder that some authorities have regarded him as an absolute traitor to his chief. This view of the case is too severe. Chase never came to realize that the president was a greater man than himself. He was burdened with a hopeless inability to appreciate Mr. Lincoln's true greatness. He had no such limitation concerning his own ability. He had been an outstanding leader in the anti-slavery cause when Mr. Lincoln was an unknown man. He regarded Lincoln's first election as a political accident, and he intended to

save the country from the misfortune of Lincoln's reelection, which, however, he did not regard as a possibility. He was entirely sincere in believing himself a much abler man than Lincoln. His most serious lack would seem to have been a sense of humor.

Chase put the conduct of his campaign into the hands of Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas. He could hardly have made a worse choice. Kansas itself was divided between its two senators, Pomeroy and Lane. Pomeroy issued a circular, and scattered it broadcast among the enemies of the administration. Many copies of it fell into the hands of Lincoln's friends who sent them to the White House with the expectation that Lincoln would immediately demand the resignation of Chase. Chase discovered the blunder involved in it, and wrote to Lincoln a letter denying all knowledge of it, and Lincoln acknowledged the letter in a courteous response in which he stated that copies of the circular had been sent him, but he had not read it and did not expect to do so.

The Pomeroy circular is of value at this date as showing how bitter, within Lincoln's own party, was the opposition to him. It said:

The movements recently made throughout the country to secure the renomination of President Lincoln render necessary counter-action on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union who differ from the policy of the Administration.

So long as no efforts were made to forestall the political action of the people, it was both wise and patriotic for all true friends of the Government to devote their influence to the suppression of the rebellion; but when it becomes evident that party and the machinery of official influence are being used to secure the perpetuation of the present Administration, those who conscientiously believe that the interests of the country and of freedom demand a change in favor of vigor and purity and nationality, have no choice but to appeal at once to the people before it is too late to secure a fair discussion of principles.

Those in behalf of whom this appeal is made have thought

fully surveyed the political field, and have arrived at the following conclusion: First, that even were the reelection of Mr. Lincoln desirable, it is practically impossible against the Union of influences which will oppose him. Second, that should he be reelected, his manifest tendency towards compromises and temporary expedients of policy will become stronger during a second term than it has been in the first, and the cause of human liberty, and the dignity of the nation, suffer proportionately, while the war may continue to languish during his whole Administration, till the public debt shall become a burden too great to be borne. Third, that the patronage of the Government through the necessities of the war has been so rapidly increased, and to such an enormous extent, and so loosely placed, as to render the application of the one-term principle absolutely essential to the certain safety of our republican institutions. Fourth, that we find united in Hon. Salmon P. Chase more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years than are combined in any other available candidate. His record is clear and unimpeachable, showing him to be a statesman of rare ability and an administrator of the highest order, while his private character furnishes the surest available guarantee of economy and purity in the management of public affairs. Fifth, that the discussion of the Presidential question, already commenced by the friends of Mr. Lincoln, has developed a popularity and strength in Mr. Chase unexpected even to his warmest admirers; and while we are aware that its strength is at present unorganized, and in no condition to manifest its real magnitude, we are satisfied that it only needs a systematic and faithful effort to develop it to an extent sufficient to overcome all opposing obstacles. For these reasons the friends of Mr. Chase have determined on measures which shall present his claims fairly and at once to the country. A central organization has been effected, which already has its connections in all the States, and the object of which is to enable his friends everywhere most effectually to promote his elevation to the Presidency. We wish the hearty cooperation of all those who are in favor of the speedy restoration of the Union on the basis of universal freedom, and who desire an administration of the Government during the first period of its new life which shall to the fullest extent develop the capacity of free institutions, enlarge the resources of the country, diminish the burdens of taxation, ele