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The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together; enabling the enemy to use to a great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined; first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

Whether Grant was a truly great general or not is a question which may be discussed by those who care to discuss it. For the purpose of this biography of Lincoln it is sufficient to record that from the day of Grant's appointment the president experienced a sense of relief. Grant's plan of campaign was simple. He made no claim to being a brilliant strategist. He determined to employ all the armies east and west, to one common closing in upon the armed forces of the Confederacy, and forcing them into closer and closer quarters until they should be compelled to give up the struggle.* Grant knew this plan would involve heavy losses to the Union forces. They must cperate upon a longer front and on the offensive. Any success

*General Grant's plan was not unlike the "Anaconda" which General Scott recommended to McClellan, and that general cavalierly rejected.

they won would commonly be with loss heavier than that which they were able to inflict. To gain a given end, they must expect to lose men, and must reckon that they could afford to lose more men than the Confederates, but they could not afford to let the war go on as a series of disconnected skirmishes.

Lincoln had enough military wisdom to understand and approve this plan. He said that he made no pretense of being either a military leader or a financier; but he was enough of both to know that when a nation got into war it must push the war with some vigor or the nation would be demoralized and bankrupt.

General Grant set to work upon this plan. He fought bloody battles and sustained heavy losses. The losses did not daunt him. He announced his intention to fight it out on that line if it took all summer. It took all summer and all winter and part of the spring, but Grant fought it out on that line just as Lincoln believed that he would do.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DRAFT RIOTS

ABRAHAM LINCOLN believed with good reason in the loyalty of the people of East Tennessee, and maintained that by permitting the Confederate Armies to operate in that region, the Union was in danger of losing a most valuable stake. In Knoxville, Parson Brownlow had edited the Knoxville Whig, to which title he later added the name "and Rebel Ventilator." Brownlow had been driven out. The mountain region of Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia had furnished large numbers of men for the Union Army, but Lincoln felt that his generals did not value highly enough the adherence of the people of that region to the Union. Burnside after his defeat at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862, was sent west. Lincoln desired that he should move through East Tennessee and unite with Rosecrans at Chattanooga. Burnside reached Knoxville, and there encountered Longstreet, and for a considerable time got no farther. Lincoln, eagerly waiting for news from him, came almost to welcome bad news. On November 24, 1863, there were tidings of firing at Knoxville. It was the first word from Knoxville for several days. John Hay's diary quotes Lincoln as saying that any news that showed Burnside was not overwhelmed was cheering:

"Like Sally Carter, when she heard one of her children squall, would say, 'There goes one of my young ones! Not dead yet, bless the Lord!'"

Rosecrans too, delayed his campaign at Chattanooga until he was out-generaled by Bragg and in danger of losing his whole army.

This was before Grant had been made commander-in-chief and Lincoln himself was virtually assuming the responsibility of that position. He removed Rosecrans after his defeat at Chickamauga, and placed Thomas in his stead. He sent Sherman from the west and Hooker from the east with reenforcements, and he appointed Grant to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which included the three departments of the Ohio, Cumberland and the Tennessee. Grant disliked Rosecrans, and greatly liked Thomas. Sherman, also, Grant trusted fully. As for Hooker, Grant believed in him as a general capable of a brilliant dash, but not capable of managing a sustained campaign. He says in his Memoirs concerning him, that Hooker was brilliant but unreliable, and given to the habit of gathering about him a group of younger officers and fighting a spectacular battle of his own, regardless of the particular thing he was set to do. Grant took command at Chattanooga in the autumn of 1863. He found Rosecrans still there, and generously ready to communicate his plans. "They were good plans," said General Grant, "I only wondered why he had not carried them out." Grant, however, did not carry out the plans of Rosecrans. Chattanooga was so well surrounded by the Confederates fortified on high elevations, that nothing but a determined and courageous battle would save it. On November 24 and 25, 1863, that battle occurred. General Hooker, who had almost lost his soubriquet of "Fighting Joe" at Chancellorsville, regained it at Chattanooga. Phil Sheridan, also, led in a brilliant and successful charge. The Union flag was planted on the summit of Lookout Mountain. The charge upon Missionary Ridge succeeded beyond the hope of the commanding general. The soldiers had been ordered to take the rifle pits at the foot of the mountain, and then halt and re-form; but in the ardor of their success they moved on up the slope, captured the cannon at the top, and turned them upon the retreating foe.

This victory, when it occurred, did much to establish confi dence in the ultimate success of the Union cause; but success was

[graphic]

Courtesy of F. H. Meserve, owner of the Brady negatives.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Photograph by Brady, February 9, 1864

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