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of the State is, by the terms of the Constitution, equal or superior to the sovereignty of the National Government. But that idea no one could rationally or innocently entertain, in view of the express language of the Constitution. And no one ever did, or ever would, entertain it, except to carry some illegitimate purpose. For the Constitution, after conferring some of the chief features of sovereignty upon the National Government, as explicitly as possible withholds them from the States, in the following language, Art. I., Sec. 10: "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility."

"No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage; keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace; enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power; or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

Moreover, the supreme sovereignty of the United States, as related to the individual States, is thus plainly declared in Art. VI.:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

We say that, in view of these terms of the Constitution, the

"idea" that the Constitution gives paramount sovereignty to the States, and not to the National Government, is not a respectable or a sane idea, and does not excuse or palliate a war of rebellion by those who choose to entertain it. Indeed, they did not entertain it, except to suit their own purposes; i. e., when their ox of slavery or anti-tariff was in danger of being gored. Did Jefferson Davis and his allies hold to State Rights, or the supreme sovereignty of the States, when they passed the Fugitive Slave Law, and when they demanded that all the power of the United States Government should be employed, if necessary, to arrest and carry away into bondage from Massachusetts a man claimed as a fugitive slave? Did they hold to State sovereignty when they set up their cursing and howling about the Personal Liberty bills, which many of the States enacted for the protection of their own citizens against a misuse of the despotic features of the Fugitive Slave Law? No. State sovereignty was an idea which they adopted when it suited their purposes, and which they rejected practically whenever their purposes required. The claim that they were conscientious and honest in their rebellion, because they held the "idea" of paramount State Sovereignty, is entitled to no respect whatever. It is indeed an aggravation of their crime. For it is an evidence of criminal mental perversion.

But it is said, again, by those who would remit the punishment of treason upon Dayis and his allies, that they have been sufficiently punished already, by the failure of their rebellion. Now do those who urge this plea perceive and appreciate the fact that this amounts to a plea for nullifying altogether the laws against treason? It does. Providential retribution upon rebels by their failure is no part of legal punishment. All rebels expect to run their risk in that respect. The plea amounts to this: Strike out all laws against treason. They are of no use. For, if traitors succeed, they will not be punished according to law, of course. And if they do not succeed, they are sufficiently punished by the providential retribution involved in their failure. Are they who make this plea ready to set aside and abolish all laws and all legal penalties against treason, the highest of crimes? They might as

well, as to claim that the legal punishment of treason should be remitted because the traitors have suffered by the failure of their treason. If this is all that future traitors will have to fear, we shall have plenty of reckless men who will run their chance in the way of treason and rebellion. Really, is this the way to protect the nation against the immense evils and woes of treason and civil war? Is not the way rather to have laws against treason, and execute their penalty with certainty upon the leading traitors; so that their punishment shall flame out on the face of history as a terror to all future plotters of rebellion against a free government?

But it is said, again, if Jefferson Davis is hung for treason, as it is admitted he deserves to be, he will be made a martyr in the public opinion; and that would be a calamity greater than his pardon. We disbelieve it utterly. Undoubtedly there are fools enough to make a martyr of him, if he is set at liberty here, or if he is compelled to go abroad as an exile. That would be a public calamity, especially if some Southern constituency should send him back to Congress, again to air his imperious manners in the halls of the National Legislature. But if he is hung, he will be made a martyr such as public justice and public safety require, even an awful witness to the guilt and fit punishment of rebellion in a republic. That is the sort of martyr he should be.

Once more, it is said that if any of our traitors are executed, the friends of liberty and liberal government in Europe will be embarrassed by the example. That is, if they attempt revolution and fail, they will be more liable, on account of this example, to be capitally punished. This was substantially the plea of the excellent and eloquent delegate from France to the National Congregational Council at Boston.

To this we answer, in the first place, that rebellion and revolution ought not to be made cheap anywhere. The friends of liberty in Europe should never violate that canon of revolution which forbids any attempt at revolution without a rational prospect of success. And when they can make the attempt in consistency with that canon, they must be willing, out of love

to liberty, to encounter whatever risk remains of losing their necks.

And then, in the second place, we say, what is more to the immediate point, rebellion under a despotic government is a very different thing from rebellion under a free government. The former may be, often is, justifiable and laudable. The latter never is. And, more than this, rebellion in behalf of justice and liberty is a very different thing from rebellion in behalf of injustice and slavery. We commend to our French friend the familiar proverb that "circumstances alter cases."

ARTICLE VII.-NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND RELIGIOUS.

JOHN STUART MILL'S EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY.*-The American reprint of Mill's critique upon Hamilton's philosophical writings, and the principal questions discussed in them, outdoes the English original in respect of convenience and beauty. The dress is worthy of the importance of this contribution to metaphysical science.

We are no disciples of Mr. Mill. We dissent from almost every one of his distinctive doctrines. We are amazed at the superficialness of some of his principles, and totally reject, with a sufficient degree of warmth, almost every application which he makes of them to moral and theological philosophy. But for all this, we are none the less sensible of the great value of his metaphysical writings. He is always clear; he is generally logical, except in some few instances where the consequences of his premises would do too great violence to his candor and good sense. He is minute and painstaking, and possesses that rare talent of lucid exposition and development which is a prime essential to a successful metaphysical writer.

Sir William Hamilton, notwithstanding his immense erudition, his vigor of thought, and his general acuteness, is by no means an invulnerable antagonist to a sharp-eyed and dexterous assailant. Indeed we do not know the writer of such deserved preeminence who is at once so inconsistent himself, and so sharp a critic upon the inconsistencies of other writers, as is Hamilton. His doctrine of causation seems like a hasty thought, such as might occur to a very erudite historian of philosophy, if suddenly called to propound a theory of his own under the necessity of preparing a first course of lectures. His doctrine of the unconditioned can only be accounted for by his overweening admiration for Kant, and a failure in that readiness to revise and correct unadvised conjectures

* An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal questions discussed in his writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. In two volumes. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1865. 12mo. pp. 330 and 354.

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