moral obligation must be in him. He is a person. The ground of moral obligation for a person must stand in the order of nature before the conduct of that person, that it may be the standard by which to judge of the character of that conduct. This ground for God must stand, then, in the order named. What can stand in the order of nature before God's conduct? But two hypotheses are possible. 1. There is nothing, i. e. no ground, for the conduct. 2. A constituted Essence is such ground. The former is not only inconceivable, but is seen to be absurd. The latter is, then, the truth. Let us clearly see this. Personality is form of being. Essence, or substance, organized by a constitution, i. e. by a set of elemental a priori laws, inhering therein, must be the somewhat, which fills that form. But though we see an order of nature, in which constitution follows Essence and substance, yet the one cannot be without the other. Personality is the form of God's being. Essence constituted must fill that form; and thus God is. Essence constituted, in the form of personality, is ground for God's spontaneous activity, and for his ability to behave. His spontaneous activity gives in the pure reason all possible ideas and ideals, as pure light; in the spiritual sensibility, pleasure in view of the possession of all possible endowments; and in the will, a tendency to act in accordance therewith; but it only gives what is in the order of nature before it. It brings nothing new into being; but only shows what already is. The object of our search cannot be, then, in spontaneous activity. Constituted Essence alone is left. Here, then, must be the ground of moral obligation. And here it is. Analysis and intuition here accord. What God is, standing in the order of nature before what God does, and as ground for the possibility of his doing, and as law of his conduct, must be, and is, the foundation of moral obligation.

The following reflections will help to place this in a clear and satisfactory light before the mind. Man is instinctively pleased with endowments, and necessarily accords to them a real value. Large and varied intellectual gifts, an elegant manner, and beauty of person, when appreciated, awaken in the believer spontaneous admiration; while yet no credit is

deemed to be due therefor, to the person possessing them. The value of such endowments is directly in proportion to their completeness, and thus perfectness or harmony. God, by possessing all possible endowments in perfect harmony, possesses absolute worth. Such worth is intrinsic value, and is a quality of God's nature. Without doubt the intrinsic value of the ultimate end must be the foundation of moral obligation. Therefore President Finney's dictum must be changed to read as follows:

The intrinsic nature and value of God's self, as the embodi ment or unity of all possible endowments, in perfect harmony, and so, as ground for, and law of God's conduct, is the foundation of moral obligation.

It can now be seen how "the highest good-the summum bonum-is worthiness of spiritual approbation." The person, by the eye of reason, and in the light of reason, sees the law, and his conduct in accordance therewith. Approbation spontaneously and inevitably follows; and the person immediately knows that this is the highest possible act of the reason. President Hopkins well says, "The highest good would be from the activity of the highest powers, in a right relation to their highest object." Mark "would be from." Reason is the highest intellectual power. Nothing can be paramount to a priori law; for this is the final reason why other things are right and good. Sensibility is not power. It is simple capacity. Originating will is the highest executive and determining power. Choice of the right ultimate end, or, in other words, determination to conduct in accordance with a priori law, is the highest act of will.. In a person, then, seeing by the eye, and in the light of reason, a priori laws, conducting himself in accordance therewith, and seeing his conduct so in accord, there becomes, spontaneously and inevitably, the highest good-spiritual approbation. Consequent upon this is a blessedness or well being. A person feels happy when he does what he knows,-intuits,is according to principle.

Presidents Finney and Hopkins are wrong, because they make a state of the sensibility, or at most a state of the whole person, the object of choice, and its intrinsic value the founda

tion of obligation. On this theory we make the following remarks:

I. Obligation can be experienced only in the intellect. It is simple intellectual affirmation of worth in the standard, and of obedience as due to the law, because of its intrinsic value. It cannot be in the spiritual sensibility, because this is only capacity for feeling; and the feeling is inevitably pleasure or pain, as the reason approves or disapproves.

II. Blessedness has no intrinsic value. It is a state, is purely relative, and only is, because "the highest powers are acting in a right relation to their highest object." It is not final, because it is based upon such action. That only is final which is the reason why such action is right. Nothing, that is not final, can have intrinsic value.

III. If, then, blessedness is end, it can only be as wages. On this ground one will accord his conduct with the law of the reason, because an agreeable state follows. But the truth is that the obligation would lie just as rigorously, if pain followed inevitably. Obligation utterly disregards all states. Its imperative is, that conduct shall be according to law, for the law's own sake, no matter if misery result. But misery will not, cannot result to him who obeys law for its intrinsic excellence. To him blessedness is a gift. Hence one cannot be worthy of blessedness. It cannot be earned. Approbation, the highest act of the reason, he can deserve; and having deserved, demand; and it cannot be withheld. Then bliss will inevitably follow; and that cannot be withheld.

The objection will arise, that man does not possess God's endowments, and therefore cannot obey. To this it is replied, Man, however infantile, is formed "in the image of God." He therefore possesses "the law written in his heart." And only to the extent that he sees the law, and sees the obligation, is he bound. Light and obligation measure each other. Hence every man is to himself the subordinate ground, as God is the final ground, of obligation. Except a man could annihilate himself, he could not rid himself of this, or of the consciousness of it.

ARTICLE V.-FREEDOM OF WILL:-EDWARDS AND WHEDON.*

In reviewing a controversial book, the critic must pass judgment on at least two books, instead of one. If that book be written on the Will, and since the time of Edwards, he may be sure that Edwards' "Careful and Strict Enquiry" will be one of the two books that demand his attention. We were not surprised therefore on taking up Dr. Whedon's treatise to find in the "Index of Authors mentioned," the following: "Edwards, Elder, passim." An examination of the work justifies the reference. The work is not indeed a mere review of Edwards, it is a thorough discussion of the whole subject; but as the author finds the champion of Calvinistic philosophy everywhere in his path, he everywhere assails him boldly, and as he confidently believes, successfully. His apparent confidence reminds us of the remark often made, that although Edwards has been answered many times, somehow he will not stay answered. Indeed the great number of answers is regarded by some as evidence of the soundness of Edwards' arguments; but how would such reasoning apply to Hume? Are the numerous answers to Hume, testimonies to the soundness of his arguments? Does not Error as well as Truth have its strongholds, which must be often assaulted before they are carried? For our own part, we did not take up Dr. Whedon's book with the feeling that its very existence was presumptive evidence against its worth.

"A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willeth." [Written at Stockbridge, Mass., 1753.]

"The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of human Responsibility and Divine Government, elucidated and maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading advocates. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter, 1864.

We do not propose to go over the whole ground of controversy between Edwards and Whedon, for that might require a book larger than both of theirs. We shall select a few points which seem to be fundamental, and endeavor to ascertain whether on those points Whedon has so answered Edwards that he will "stay answered." If we do no more than show that there is opportunity for another answer, we shall have accomplished something. Let us first compare the two authors in respect to their

§ 1. DEFINITIONS OF THE WILL.

Edwards says the Will is "That by which the mind chooses anything." P. 1, S. 1. We think this definition is liable to objec tion, but are surprised at the particular objection which Dr. Whedon raises. He claims that it is no definition at all, "no more than saying that the Will is the power to will." p. 15. He would have the word "choose" defined; but why does it need defining, except to gratify a metaphysical daintiness that is not satisfied with common sense? A word is really defined if an equivalent is given which is more familiar. Now choose is a more familiar word than will, when the latter is used otherwise than as an auxiliary. The word will, as an independent verb, is rarely used in common life, while the word choose is very commonly used. The point of Edwards' definition is, that the Will is the power of doing that which men commonly express by the word choose. The definition is a reference in logical form to the testimony of consciousness, without the vain attempt to analyze a primary operation of the mind. Our only objection to it is that the word choose is not so comprehensive in its meaning as the word will, for which it stands.

Let us now examine Whedon's substitute. "Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act." p. 15. If this language has its ordinary meaning, then, according to it, the Will is the power of the soul by which it fulfills its intention, is the conscious author of an intended act. In other words, it is the power by which the soul does as it pleases. Now it would be very strange if a "free