mind as the ground of the obligation, and as the condition of the affirmation of the obligation to put forth executive acts to secure that end, although this fundamental reason is not in the immediate view of the mind, as the object of conscious attention at the time."

"We necessarily assume our own obligation to will good for its own sake."

"The good of universal being ought to be chosen and promoted, because of its intrinsic value."

"The intrinsic nature and value of the highest well being of God and of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation."*

"This inward witnessing of the absolute in his own worthiness, gives the ultimate estimate to nature which needs and can attain to nothing higher than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby in all his works he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which should be executed for his worthiness' sake, that God has created all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"+

"We next take the rational good, and in carrying it up to its highest attainment, we shall all along find that which has an intrinsic excellency, that no gratification of appetite may be allowed to buy. In the last space of the rational we shall find that supreme excellency which holds all else in subserv iency and is the absolute end of all ends."

"We apply the Inspiration of the spirit's own excellency. Whether absolute or finite spirit, there is to each an inner world of conscious prerogative,-revealed to itself completely, and to itself only,-except as the absolute comprehends the finite, and from which comes forth perpetually the impera

* Systematic Theology, by Rev. Charles G. Finney. English edition, pp. 42, 102, 132.

Rational Psychology, by Rev. Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., p. 591.

tive that every action be restrained by that which is due to its own dignity." "There is an awful sanctuary in every im mortal spirit, and man needs nothing more than to exclude all else, and stand alone before himself, to be made conscious of an authority he can neither dethrone nor delude. From its approbation comes self-respect; from its disapprobation comes self-contempt. A stern behest is ever upon him that he do nothing to degrade the real dignity of his spiritual being. He is a law to himself, and has both the judge and executioner within himself, and inseparable from him." "We may call this the imperative of the reason, the constraint of conscience, or the voice of God within him; but by whatever terms expressed, the real meaning will be that every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that, and that only, which is due to his spiritual excellency." "To be thus worthy of spiritual approbation is the end of all ends; and as worthy of happiness, this may now righteously be given and righteously taken; but not righteously paid as price nor claimed as wages. The good is to be worthy, not that he is to get something for it. The highest good-the summum bonum―is worthiness of spiritual approbation."*

"The highest good would be from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object."

"It must surely be difficult to satisfy those who cannot find an adequate end and good in their own highest blessedness, and in the highest blessedness of God and His Universe."

We ought to do what ought to be done, "because of the intrinsic excellency and worth of that end."

Speaking of Dr. Hickok, President Hopkins says, "From so able a thinker I differ with regret. But what is that in which a man's worthiness of spiritual approbation consists?" It is in his choice of an ultimate end. The character is according to that. Does, then, the highest good of man consist in his choosing as an ultimate end his own choice of an ultimate end? This cannot be, and yet would seem to follow from the definition."

*Moral Science, by Rev. Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., pp. 45, 47, 48, 49.

"No doubt worthiness is conditional, and in a moral being necessarily so, for blessedness. But the word, though it may be used absolutely, naturally carries with it an indication of something beyond itself. A worthiness of what? Of approbation? And why not of the blessedness there is in and through that worthiness and that approbation?"

"We do not love God because we are under obligation to, except as his worth and worthiness impose the obligation. We love him impartially because of his worth, and complacently because of his worthiness."*

We remark, in passing, that the last quotation, especially what we have italicized, agrees exactly with Dr. Hickok's position; and is directly opposed to the doctrine that "the intrinsic nature and value of blessedness" is the foundation of moral obligation. A new statement, of such a character as was indicated at the first, is required. As a help to this, the following bit of analysis may be valuable. In making it, the distinction properly observed between essence, as the foundation of God's being, and substance, as the foundation of finite persons, is observed. The logical order of elements in a person is, then, as follows: Essence or substance, constitution,. personality, spontaneous activity, conduct. A person is a certain constitution inhering in essence or substance; and possesses thereby capacity for both spontaneous activity and conduct. Considered from the point of his activity, the endowments of a person possessed in his constitution may be classified under three heads, viz.: pure reason, spiritual sensibility, originating will,--which is an ultimate cause. Pure reason gives simple a priori ideas; and these ideas in their lawful and necessary combinations, or ideals. This it does as capacity. As faculty, it examines conduct in the light of these ideas and ideals; and in accordance therewith gives judgment upon character. Spiritual sensibility is simple capacity in the person for pleasure or pain; and is always in accord with the decision of the pure reason. Originating will is simple faculty-the power to decide what conduct.

Moral Science, by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., pp. 53, 54, 57, 58, 175.

shall be, in view of motives, and is the final arbiter of the person's destiny. Reason, then, gives the law of conduct. Will gives the conduct. Then reason approves or disapproves, as the conduct accords with, or is contrary to, its law. And, finally, the sensibility is in a state of blessedness or misery, as the reason approves or disapproves. It follows, then, that obligation belongs wholly in the province of the reason. Worth is a quality of constitution, as inhering in a ground; and is in direct ratio to the completeness and approach to perfect harmony of the endowments thereby bestowed. Absolute worth is quality of God only, as constituted essence, possessing all possible endowments. Character is status of person; and is good, or bad, as conduct accords with the law of reason, or not. Worthiness is a quality of character; and is in direct ratio to the exactness with which conduct accords with the law of the reason, Absolute worthiness is a quality of God's character. Approbation is the smile of the reason upon that conduct which accords with its law; and is the highest possible attainment of the reason. Blessedness is that state of the spiritual sensibility which is agreeable to the person, because his conduct is in accord with the law of the

reason.

The way is now prepared for the definition of moral obligation. Moral obligation is the requirement resting upon a person to behave or conduct himself in accordance with the a priori laws of the pure reason. This differs from the views of Presidents Finney and Hopkins. Theirs may be stated thus: Moral obligation is the requirement resting upon a person to choose the highest blessedness of God and the universe, as the object of pursuit; or, as the ultimate end of effort. This is defective, because it is not ultimate. The analysis is not exhaustive. The questions may be asked, What is this blessedness? Why is it blessedness? Why is it the highest blessedness? The final answer will be, Because the Being who possesses all possible endowments, accords his conduct with those endowments. The constitution inhering in the essence forms that organization in accordance with which he is, and by which he is the possessor of these endowments; and be

comes, therefore, the ground and law of his conduct. Our definition being accurate and ultimate, we come next in order

to our

PROBLEM.

To find such a ground of moral obligation as shall be common to, and adequate for, and binding upon all moral beings. It must be ground for GOD, as much as for created beings. Probably no one would deny the fact of obligation as lying upon all created moral beings. But there are some, many, perhaps, who would hesitate to admit that its imperative lay with equal rigor upon the Deity. Yet it must, if he is a moral being. The very essence of the idea of moral being is obligation to obey law, with the power to violate it. If he is not a moral being, two other suppositions, and only two, are possible. He is inferior to moral beings. He is superior to them. The first is, to use the mildest term, absurd, and needs no notice. Of the other it is to be said, one can use the words, for no one can at all construct the thought,—only upon a very inadequate examination of the subject. The supposition is absolutely unthinkable by any intellect. The reason gives the positive and unqualified assertion, that no higher form of being than personality is possible. God, then, is a moral being; and obligation lies upon him to obey moral law, with a rigor commensurate with his absoluteness and infinity. The assertion that we enjoy, in common with God, the endowment of a moral nature, may at first sight shock some mind. But only thus can it be true, that we are "in his image." In this assertion is involved no degradation of God, and no undue elevation of man. Infinity and finiteness, as opposite qualities, the one of God, the other of man, must forever differentiate them, and these qualities in no way interfere with the fact of the common moral nature.

God is self-existent; and so has neither "beginning of years nor end of days." Other moral beings were created; and so began to be. Therefore, before time began, God was alone. He is unchangeable; and was then a moral being, under obligation, just as much as now. Therefore the foundation of