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Have they never contributed to those favorable opportunities for making such a treaty, by recalling powers for that purpose once given, by defeating efforts made to send them when they might have been useful?

200

[JANUARY, 1794.

to Great Britain; they now take off near three millions in her manufactures, and by the progress of their population, which is likely to exceed that of their manufactures, the probability is, that their Whatever may be the motive, the operation year; their importance to Great Britain, as a importance as a customer will increase, every may clearly be pronounced to be a phenomenon source of supply, is not less than as a customer in political history-a Government attempting to for her manufactures; the articles with which aid commerce by throwing it into confusion; by they furnish her, are those of prime necessity, obstructing the most precious channels in which consisting of the means of subsistence, and the it flows, under the pretence of making it flow more materials for ship-building and manufactures, while freely; by damming up the best outlet for the sur-the articles we derive from her, are mostly those plus commodities of the country, and the best inlet for the supplies, of which it stands in need; by disturbing, without temptation, a beneficial course of things, in an experiment precarious, if not desperate; by arresting the current of a prosperous and progressive navigation, to transfer it to other countries, and by making all this wild work in the blameable, but feeble attempt to build up the manufactures and trade of another country at the expense of the United States.

Let us take a closer view of the project. It has been proved that it does not rest on a basis of distributive justice, and observations have been made to evince its impolicy. But this demands a more critical examination.

Let it be premised, that it is a project calculated to disturb the existing course of three-fourths of our import trade, two-fifths of our export trade, and the means on which depend two-thirds, at least, of our revenues.

To be politic, therefore, it ought to unite these different ingredients:

First. An object of adequate utility to the country.

Second. A moral certainty, at least, of success. Third. An assurance that the advantage likely to be obtained is not overbalanced by the inconveniences likely to be incurred, and as an equivalent for the jeopardy to which advantages in our possession are exposed.

1st. The direct object professed to be aimed at, is a freer trade with Great Britain, and access to her West India Islands, in our own ships. A collateral one, the success of which seems most relied on, is to transfer a part of our too great trade with Great Britain to other nations, particularly France.

of convenience and luxury; her supplies to us are therefore less useful than ours to her; that it would be contrary to all good policy in Great Britain, to hazard the turning of a commerce so beneficial, into other channels; besides all this, Great Britain is immersed in debt, and in a state of decrepitude; derangement of our commerce with her, would endanger a shock to the whole fabric of her credit, and by affecting injuriously the interests of a great of employ a large number of her manufacturers, portion of her mercantile body, and by throwing out would raise a clamor against the Ministry too loud and too extensive to be resisted; and that they would consequently be compelled, by the weight of these considerations to yield to our wishes.

try to over-rate as to under-rate its importance. It is as great an error in the Councils of a counThe foregoing argument does this, and it does it in defiance of experience. Similar arguments scheme; the same consequences now foretold, were formerly used in favor of a non-importation but the prediction was not fulfilled. This it would were then predicted in the most sanguine manner; seem, ought to be a caution to us now, and ought promised from a measure of much less force, to warn us against relying upon the like effects, namely, an increase of duties.

course of the human passions, or on a just estimate If our calculations are made on the ordinary we shall not be sanguine in expecting that the of relative advantages for the contest proposed, victory will be readily yielded to us, or that it wilk, be easily obtained.

ples of which exclude us from the advantages we The Navigation Act of Great Britain, the princiwish to enjoy, is deemed by English politicians, as the palladium of her riches, greatness, and se

cession of years, after having repeatedly hazarded After having cherished it for such a long sucmuch for the maintenance of it, with so strong a conviction of its immense importance, is it at all probable that she would surrender it to us without a struggle that she would permit us to extort the abandonment of it from her without a serious trial. of strength?

The first is no doubt an object of real magni-curity. tude, worthy of every reasonable and promising exertion. The second, in the single light of obviating a too great dependence for supply on one nation, is not unworthy of attention, but, as before observed, it ought only to be aimed at by expedients neither embarrassing nor expensive; it is a very insufficient object to be pursued either at hazard or expense to the people of the United States. It has been already shown, that to pursue it, either by prohibitions or partial increase of duties, would be a costly undertaking to this

country.

2d. The second ingredient is, "a moral certainty of success." The argument used to prove the probability, nay, the certainty of success, is this: the United States are a most important customer

fixed by long experience of advantages, a sense of Prejudices riveted by time and habit, opinions interest, irritated pride, a spirit of resentment at undoubtedly prompt to resistance. It would be the attempt, all these strong circumstances would felt, that if a concession were made to us upon the strength of endeavors to extort it, the whole system must be renounced; it would be perceived

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Commerce of the United States.

that the way having been once successfully pointed out to other nations, would not fail to be followed, and that a surrender to one would be a surrender to all.

[H. OF R.

proportions of imports and exports, the proportion which our trade with Great Britain bears to the totality of her trade is about one-sixth.

The proportion of imports from the dominions of Great Britain into the United States, may be

Resistance, therefore, would certainly follow in one or other mode, a war of arms, or of commer-stated at three-fourths of our whole importation; cial regulations.

the proportion which our exports to the same dominions bears to our total exportation may be stated at two-fifths; taking the mean of those two, the proportion which our trade with Great Britain bears to our whole trade is something more than one-half.

If the first should be determined upon, it would not be difficult for Great Britain to persuade the other Powers with whom she is united, that they ought to make common cause with her. She would represent that our regulations were in fact only a covert method of taking part in the war by It follows, then, that while a commercial warembarrassing her, and that it was the interest of fare with Great Britain would disturb the course the cause in which they were combined, to frus-of about one-sixth of her trade, it would disturb trate our attempts. the course of more than one-half of ours.

If war could be foreseen as the certain consequence of the experiment proposed to be made, no arguments would be necessary to dissuade from it. Every body would be sensible that more was to be lost than gained, and that so great a hazard ought not to be run.

But we are assured that there is no danger of this consequence, that no nation would have a right to take umbrage at any regulations we should adopt with regard to our own trade, and that Great Britain would take care how she put to risk so much as she would hazard by a quarrel with us.

This much greater proportional derangement of our trade than of hers by a contest, is a mathematical demonstration that the contest would be unequal on our part; that we should put more to hazard than Great Britain would do; should be likely to suffer greater inconvenience than her, and consequently, (the resolution and perseverance of the two parties being supposed equal,) would be soonest induced to abandon the contest.

The inequality of the contest is evinced by these further considerations. The capital of Great Britain is greater in proportion to numbers than ours. A manufacturing, as well as an agricultural nation, the objects of her industry and the materials of her trade are as much diversified as can be well conceived, while ours are few and simple. The habits of her people admit of her bringing into action every source of revenue which she possesses, while those of ours embarrass the Government at every step, and would render substitutes for the existing ones extremely difficult. The Government of Great Britain has all the energy which can be derived either from the nature of a Go

All this is far more plausible than solid. Experience has proved to us that the Councils of that country are influenced by passion as well as our own. If we should seize the present moment to attack her in a point where she is peculiarly susceptible, she would be apt to regard it as a mark of determined hostility. This would naturally tend to kindle those sparks of enmity which are alleged to exist on her side. War is as often the result of resentment as of calculation. A direct and immediate war between us would not be surpris-vernment, or from long habits of obedience in the ing; but if this should not take place, mutual ill offices and irritations, which naturally grow out of such a state of things, would be apt quickly to lead to it. Insults and aggressions might become so multiplied and open as not to permit forbear-chant or a nation, is the faculty to endure partial ance on either side.

It would be a calculation with Great Britain whether she could best oppose us by retaliating regulations, or by arms.

people, while ours is in its infancy-neither confirmed by age nor habit, and with many circumstances to lessen its force. No one can but be sensible, that in proportion to the capital of a mer

derangements to the trade carried on by the one or the other; that in proportion to the diversity of objects which a merchant or a nation can bring to market, is the faculty to find new resources of As circumstances at the moment of deliberation trade, and to bear the temporary suspension of should point, according to the then view of proba-existing ones; that in proportion to the habitude bilities, would be the result. The decision may be in favor of war, under the idea that its distresses might induce us to enter into a commercial treaty upon her own terms; who can pronounce that this would not be the result, when it is considered that she is likely to be aided by so many other maritime powers now in her connexion?

Let us, however, take it for granted, that she would prefer the other course, that of retaliating regulations; how will the contest stand? The proportion of the whole exports of Great Britain, which comes to the United States, is about onefifth; the proportion of our exports, which goes to Great Britain, is about one-eighth of the whole amount of her imports. Taking the mean of these 3d CON.-8

of a nation to endure taxation, is the facility of a Government to find substitutes for revenues lost; that in proportion to the energy of a Government and the habits of obedience of a people, is the chance of perseverance on the part of such Government, in measures producing inconveniences to the community.

Great Britain then would have less to resist and more means of resistance than the United States; the United States more to resist and less means of resistance than Great Britain. Which party are the chances against in such a contest? Can any one say that the United States ought, in such a comparative situation, to count on success in an experiment like that proposed, with sufficient as

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surance to be justified in hazarding upon it so great a derangement of its affairs, as may result from the measure?

The main argument for the chance of success, is, that our supplies to Great Britain are more necessary to her than hers to us. But this is a position which our self-love gives more credit to than facts will altogether authorize. Well-informed men in other countries, (whose opportunities of information are at least as good as ours,) affirm, that Great Britain can obtain a supply of most of the articles she obtains from us, as cheap and of as good a quality elsewhere, with only two exceptions, namely, tobacco and grain, and the latter is only occasionally wanted; a considerable substitute for our tobacco, though not of equal quality, may be had elsewhere; and even admitting this position to be too strongly stated, yet there is no good reason to doubt that it is in a great degree true. The Colonies of the different European Powers on this Continent, some countries on the Mediterranean, and the Northern countries of Europe, are in situations adapted to becoming our competitors.

(JANUARY, 1794.

bility, that a system of commercial retaliation will be adopted by Great Britain, in which case we must inevitably sustain a defeat, if we cannot dispense both with her supplies and with her market for our supplies.

Will it be answered that her manufactures will find their way to us circuitously, and our supplies to her in like manner? If so, what are our regulations to produce but distress and loss to us? The manufactures of Great Britain will still be consumed, and our materials will still nourish those manufactures.

The manufactures we take from her being less bulky than the supplies we send her, the charges of a circuitous transportation would be less than those of a like transportation of our commodities. In all the cases, therefore, in which those charges fall upon her, they would be lighter than in the cases in which the latter charges fell upon us. Moreover, as the articles of Great Britain would meet less competition in our markets than ours in hers, the increased charges on her manufactures would much oftener fall upon us than those upon our materials would fall upon her. So that both ways we should sustain loss.

On the other hand, the manufactured articles which we do not make ourselves, (the greatest But, it may be asked, what are the regulations part of which are, in civilized countries, necessa- Great Britain could adopt to counteract ours? I ries,) are as important to us as our materials for answer, she could, (among other conceivable manufacture (the only articles for which her de- things,) prohibit or lay prohibitory duties on her mand is constant,) are to Great Britain. The po- commodities to this country, and on ours to her, sition is as true, that no other nation can supply in our bottoms; and she might, in addition, temus as well as that country, with several essential porarily grant the same privileges to Dutch or other articles which we want, as that no nation can sup-friendly bottoms which are now granted to those ply her equally well with certain articles which of the United States in the trade between us and she takes from us; and as to other articles of sub- herself; or she might go no further in this particusistence, it is certain that our demand for manu- lar than to permit the importation of our commofactured supplies is more constantly urgent than dities in some of those bottoms. This, it is true, her demand for those articles. Where, indeed, would be a departure from the system of her Nashall we find a substitute for the vast supply of vigation Act; but when the question was, whether manufactures which we get from that country? she should surrender it permanently to us by exNo gentleman will say that we can suddenly re- tortion, or temporarily to a Power more friendly place them by our manufactures, or that this, if to her, till the issue of the experiment could be practicable, could be done without a violent dis- decided, who can doubt what would be the course tortion of the natural course of our industry. A which interest and resentment would dictate? substitute of our own being out of the question, where else shall we find one?

But there are numerous other regulations which could be adopted, and which, equally with the France was the Power which could best have foregoing, would have the effect of transferring filled any chasm that might have been created. the trade between the two countries to the manBut this is no longer the case. It is undeniable agement of some third party; for, after all, it is that the money capitals of that country have been not improbable this will be the result of the conessentially destroyed; that manufacturing esta- test, that, instead of the United States and Great blishments, except those for war, have been essen-Britain carrying on jointly as they now do the tially deranged. The destruction to which Lyons appears to be doomed, is a severe blow to the manufactures of France; that city, second in importance, in all respects, was perhaps the first in manufacturing importance. It is more than probable that France, for years to come, will herself want a foreign supply of manufactured articles.

At a moment, then, when the manufactures of Great Britain have become more necessary than ever to us, can we expect to succeed in a contest which supposes that we can dispense with them? It may be said that the resolutions proposed do not suppose this; but they do suppose it, for they ought to proceed upon the possibility, nay, proba

trade between the two countries, it will be carried on either directly or circuitously by some third Power, more to our detriment than to that of Great Britain.

The manufactures of that country will get to us nearly in the same quantities they now do, with the disadvantage of additional charges. Such of our commodities as she cannot have of equal quality elsewhere, will get to her also. The rest will be supplanted by the like commodities of other nations, and we shall lose the best market we have for them. Those who advocate the system of contention, should tell us where a substitute will be found. The merchants, who know that it is now difficult

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[H. OF R.

rather than risk the advantages we possess, in trials of strength, that never fail to injure more or less both parties.

If we turn from our shipping to our agriculture, we shall find no reason to be dissatisfied.

enough to find markets for our surplus commodities-that France, in ordinary times, affords a very contracted one, and that the French West Indies are not likely, in settled times, to be as good customers as they have been for some time past, cannot desire to see the sphere abridged, and our The amount of our exports for the year ending landholders will quickly reprobate the plan. the 30th of September, 1792, as appears by the Thus, it appears, that the contest would be like-last return of exports to this House, exceeded the ly to issue against us, and to end in defeat and disgrace.

two preceding years by $589,601 16. It exceeded the mean of the two preceding years, by $1,597,What would be our situation if we should make 983 36. Our revenues are unquestionably more an attempt of the kind and fail in it? Our trade productive than was looked for. Those from imwould then truly be in the power and at the dis-ports have exceeded, in a year, $4.600,000. Of posal of Great Britain. the increase of our manufactures, we have no precise standard, but those who attend most to the subject entertain no doubt that they are pro

3d. The third ingredient stated, as necessary to justify the proposed attempt, is this: that the prospect of advantages should be at least an equiva-gressive. lent for those in possession, which would be put in jeopardy by the experiment.

It has been shown, that in fact there is no real prospect of advantage, but a considerable one of inconvenience and loss. This puts an end to comparison. But it may be added, that our situation is precisely such an one as to forbid experiments. It is so, from the stage at which we are, as a people, too little advanced, too little matured for hazardous experiments of any sort.

This certainly is not a state of things that invites to hazardous experiments. These are perhaps never justifiable, but when the affairs of a nation are in an unprosperous train.

We experience, indeed, some embarrassments from the effects of the European war, but these are temporary, and will cease with that war, which of itself offers us some indemnifications, I mean a freer trade to the West Indies.

I am greatly mistaken if the considerations, which have been suggested, do not conclusively prove the impolicy of the plan which is now recommended for our adoption. So strong and decided is my own conviction, that I cannot but pursuade myself, that of the Committee will lead to its rejection. A few miscellaneous observations will conclude what I have to offer on this very interesting subject.

This is not all; our general situation at this time is an eligible one; we are making as rapid a progress in most of the great branches of political prosperity as we can reasonably desire, and it would be imprudent to hazard such a situation, upon precarious speculations of greater advantage. The prosperity of a nation is not a plant to thrive in a hot-bed; moderation in this respect is the truest wisdom; it is so plain a path, that it requires First. It has been made an objection to the prea peculiar sublimation of ideas to deviate from it. sent footing on which our trade is with Great It is agreed on all hands, that all our great na-Britain, that it is regulated by annual proclamational interests, our population, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and our navigation, are in a thriving and progressive state, advancing faster than was to have been expected, and as fast as can| reasonably be desired.

Our navigation, in the short space of three years, ending the 31st of December, 1792, has increased in the ratio of nearly one fifth.

The proportions of our tonnage have been as follows: In 1790, 479,091 tons; in 1791, 501,790 tons; in 1792, 568,283 tons; showing an increase of 89,192 tons.

tion of the Executive, instead of a permanent law. This was at first laid down by the Secretary of State in terms so general as to include the West Indies; but he has since corrected the error, and told us that our trade with the British West Indies is regulated by a standing law. The fact itself, nevertheless, is of no real importance. The actual footing, on which we are placed, is the only material point; the mode of doing it is of little consequence. The annual proclamation of the British Executive is equivalent to the decree, revocable at pleasure, of any single Legislator, of the Monarch of Spain or Portugal, and it may be added, of the French Convention, which, though a numerous body, yet forming only one Assembly, without checks, is as liable to fluctuation as a single Legislator; and, in fact, its resolutions have been found as fickle and variable, as it was possible for the resolutions of any single person to be. The truth is, that the difference in the tonnage To prove this, if proof were required, it would be duty, and the addition of one-tenth upon the du- only necessary to refer to the frequent changes in ties on goods imported in foreign bottoms, is a the regulations they have made with regard to the powerful encouragement to our shipping, and as trade of this country-to-day one thing, to-morrow it has not been of a magnitude to excite retalia- another. Instability is more applicable to no potion, it is much more likely to promote the inter-litical institution than to a Legislature, consisting ests of our navigation, than violent measures, of a single popular Assembly. which would compel to retaliation; prudence ad- Second. The additional duties proposed, are obmonishes us to stop where we are, for the present, jectionable, because the existing duties are already,

The proportion of foreign tonnage during the same years, has been: in 1790, 258,919 tons; in 1791, 240,799 tons; in 1792,244,263 tons; showing a decrease of 14,656 tons. This proves that our present system is highly favorable to the increase of our navigation, and that we are gradually supplanting foreigners.

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generally speaking, high enough for the state of our mercantile capital and the safety of collection. They are near twenty per centum on an average, upon the value of the objects on which they are laid; higher than the duties of several countries, and high enough for our present condition. To augment the rates materially will be in the abstract to oppress trade; for we must have for our consumption the manufactures of the country on which they are proposed to be laid.

Third. To serve as a contrast to the conduct of Great Britain, we are told of the liberal overtures for a commercial treaty lately made by France.

(JANUARY, 1794.

But I answer further, that we ought with great caution to attempt any thing at a future day, till we have acquired a maturity which will enable us to act with greater effect, and to brave the consequences, even if they should amount to war, and till we have secured more adequate means of internal supply; to which point we should bend our efforts, as the only rational and safe expedient, in our present circumstances, for counteracting the effects of the spirit of monopoly, which more or less tinctures not the system of Great Britain merely, but that of all Europe. But this it seems is not the favorite course, it is not high seasoned enough for our political palate; we not only turn aside from it with neglect, but we object away the plainest provisions of the Constitution to disable ourselves from pursuing it.

It has been already remarked, that the conduct of France towards us since the commencement of the Revolution, is no basis of reasoning; it has undergone as many revolutions as their political Every year, for years to come, will make us a systems; their measures at one period, with re- more important customer to Great Britain, and a spect to our tobacco, were of a complexion pecu-more important furnisher of what she wants. If liarly hostile to us. The duty of twenty-five this does not lead to such a treaty of commerce livres per quintal on that article, carried in our as we desire, the period is not very distant when bottoms to France, and of only eighteen livres fif-we may insist with much better effect on what teen sous on the same article, carried in French bottoms, amounted to a complete prohibition to carry our tobacco in our own bottoms.

The duty of twenty-five livres per quintal on foreign fish is another important instance of severity of regulations, a duty admitted by the Secretary of State to be prohibitory.

If there have been regulations and propositions of a more favorable nature, they are to be ascribed to causes of the moment. During the continuance of the Revolution, it is of necessity that we have carte blanche in the French West Indies. We know that we are getting admission into the British and Spanish islands also.

we desire, without any thing like the same degree of hazard. This last observation is not meant to be confined to Great Britain, but to extend to any other Power, as far as the stipulations of treaty may permit.

Wisdom admonishes us to be patient “to make haste slowly." Our progress is and will be rapid enough, if we do not throw away our advantages. Why should we be more susceptible than all the world? Why should this young country throw down the gauntlet in favor of free trade against the world? There may be spirit in it, but there will certainly not be prudence.

But again it may be asked, shall we put nations, disposed to a more liberal system, upon the same footing with those differently disposed? Will not this tend to produce an unfriendly treatment from all?

And as the overtures for a permanent system, Mr. Genet's instructions, published by him, explain the object. Privileges of trade in the West India islands are to be the price of our becoming a party in the war. The declamations against the I answer, first, that I think it has been proved, liberticide maxims of the ancient Government, the nation against which we have been invited and in favor of free principles of commerce, re-principally to aim our artillery, treats us with at solve themselves into this. This is a bargain least as much liberality as other nations, I mean which I trust a majority of this House will not be in a commercial sense. willing to make. I am sure our constituents would not thank us for it.

I answer, secondly, that if there be nations, who are seriously disposed to establish with us But it may be asked, are we to sit with folded more free and beneficial principles of trade, the path arms and tamely submit to all oppressions, restric-is plain; let treaties be formed, fixing upon a solid tions, and exclusions to which our trade is subject; if not, what are we to do? I answer, nothing certainly at the present juncture. If the foundation of the question were more solid than I believe it to be, candidly and dispassionately considered, this is of all moments the most unfavorable for an experiment. Any movement of the kind would, as before observed, be construed into a political manœuvre and an attempt to embarrass one of the belligerent Powers, and would interest the feelings of all those united with her, producing consequently either war or additional trammels in every quarter upon our trade; besides the weighty argument, that the great source of subsidiary supply to which we might have heretofore looked has been obstructed.

basis the privileges which we are to enjoy, and the equivalent. I have no objection to granting greater privileges to one Power than to another, if it can be put on the stable foundation of contract, ascertaining the boon and the equivalent. But I think it folly to be granting voluntary boons at the expense of the United States without equivalent. The mode of treaty secures the ground; it is inoffensive to any third Power. Our reply to objections would in that case be, "here is the price to us clearly defined and fixed by treaty, for which we grant the greater advantages of which you complain: give us the price, and the like advantages are yours." But capriciously to grant greater privileges by law to one nation than to another, when, upon a fair comparison, we are not better