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of political opinion, adınits of some excuse; but the expla nations commonly made on this subject do not amount to thei. vindication. It is true that when Gen. Lee was in Frederick, he was forty-five miles from the city of Baltimore-a city surrounded by Federal bayonets, zealously guarded by an armed Federal police, and lying in the shadow of Fort McHenry and of two powerful fortifications located within the limits of the corporation. It is true that our army passed only through two of the remote counties of the State, namely Frederick and Washington, which, with Carroll and Alleghany, are well known to contain the most violent "Union" population in Maryland. It is true that the South could not have expected a welcome in these counties or a desperate mutiny for the Confederacy in Baltimore. But it was expected that Southern sympathizers in other parts of the State, who so glibly ran the blockade on adventures of trade, might as readily work their way to the Confederate army as to the Confederate markets; and it was not expected that the few recruits who timidly advanced to our lines would have been so easily dismayed by the rags of our soldiers and by the prospects of a service that premised equal measures of hardship and glory.

The army which rested again in Virginia had made a history that will flash down the tide of time a lustre of glory. It had done an amount of marching and fighting that appears almost incredible, even to those minds familiar with the records of great military exertions. Leaving the banks of James river, it proceeded directly to the line of the Rappahannock, and moving out from that river, it fought its way to the Potomac, crossed that stream, and moved on to Fredericktown and Hagerstown, had a heavy engagement at the mountain gaps below, fought the greatest pitched battle of the war at Sharpsburg, and then recrossed the Potomac back into Virginia. During all this time, covering the full space of a month, the troops rested but four days. Of the men who performed these wonders, one-fifth of them were barefoot, one-half of them in rags, and the whole of them half famished.

The remarkable campaign which we have briefly sketched extending from the banks of the James river to those of the Potomac, impressed the world with wonder and admiration, excited an outburst of applause among living nations, which

anticipated the verdict of posterity, and set the whole of Europe ringing with praises of the heroism and fighting quali ties of the Southern armies. The South was already obtain ing some portion of the moral rewards of this war, in the esti mation in which she was held by the great martial nations of the world. She had purchased the rank with a bloody price. She had extorted homage from the most intelligent and influential organs of public opinion in the Old World, from men well versed in the history of ancient and modern times, and from those great critics of contemporary history, which are least accustomed to the language of extravagant compliment.

The following tribute from the London Times-the great organ of historic precedent and educated opinion in the Old World-was echoed by the other journals of Europe:

"The people of the Confederate States have made themselves famous. If the renown of brilliant courage, stern devotion to a cause, and military achievements almost without a parallel, can compensate men for the toil and privations of the hour, then the countrymen of Lee and Jackson may be consoled amid their sufferings. From all parts of Europe, from their enemies as well as their friends, from those who condemn their acts as well as those who sympathize with them, comes the tribute of admiration. When the history of this war is written, the admiration will doubtless become deeper and stronger, for the veil which has covered the South will be drawn away and disclose a picture of patriotism, of unanimous self-sacrifice, of wise and firm administration, which we can now only see indistinctly. The details of extraordinary national effort which has led to the repulse and almost to the destruction of an invading force of more than half a million men, will then become known to the world, and whatever may be the fate of the new nationality, or its subsequent claims to the respect of mankind, it will assuredly begin its career with a reputation for genius and valor which the most famous nations may envy."

It is at first appearance strange, that while such was the public opinion in England of our virtues and abilities, that that government should have continued so unjust and obstinate with respect to our claims for recognition. But the explanation is easy. The demonstrations of the conflict which awakened such generous admiration of us in the breasts of a majority of the

English people were to the government the subjects only of jealous and interested views. We had trusted too much to manifestations of public opinion in England; we had lost sight of the distinction between the people and government of that country, and had forgotten that the latter had, since the beginning of this war, been cold and reserved, had never given us any thing to hope from its sympathies or its principles, and had limited its action on the American question to the unfeeling and exacting measures of selfishness.

The bloody and unhappy revelation which the war has made of enormous military resources has naturally given to Europe, and especially to England, an extraordinary interest in its continuation. It is probable that she would not have hesitated to recognize the South, unless firmly persuaded of our ability and resolution to carry on the war, and unless she had another object to gain besides that of a permanent division in the nationality and power of her old rival. That object was the exhaustion of both North and South. England proposed to effect the continuation of the war, as far as possible, to the mutual ruin of the two nations engaged in it, by standing aside and trusting that after vast expenditures of blood and waste of resources the separation of the Union would be quite as surely accomplished by the self-devotion of the South, as by the less profitable mode of foreign intervention.

In this unchristian and inhuman calculation, England had rightly estimated the resolution and spirit of the South. We were prepared to win our independence with the great prices of blood and suffering that she had named. But we understood what lurked behind the mask of British conscience, and we treasured the lesson for the future.

OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE WAR.

It is not amiss in this connection to make a summary in ref erence to the relations between the Confederacy and the neutral powers of Europe during the progress of the war to the present period of our narrative.

The confederation of the Southern States in 1861 was the third political union that had been formed between the States of North America. The first act of secession dates as far back

as 1789, when eleven of the States, becoming dissatisfied with the old articles of confederation made in 1778, seceded and formed a second union. When in 1861 eleven of the States again seceded and united themselves under the style of the Confederate States of North America, they exercised a right which required no justification, and which in a former instance had not been contested by any party at home, or made the subject of discussion with any third power.

On every attempt for the opening of formal diplomatic intercourse with the European powers, the commissioners of the Confederate States had met with the objection that these powers could not assume to judge between the conflicting representations of the two parties as to the true nature of their previous mutual relations; and that they were constrained by international usage and the considerations of propriety to recognize the self-evident fact of the existence of a war, and to maintain a strict neutrality during its progress.

On this neutrality, two remarks are to be made :

First. It was founded upon the grave error that the separate sovereignty and independence of the States had been merged into one common sovereignty; an error easily induced by the delegation of power granted by these States to the Federal gov ernment to represent them in foreign intercourse, but one that should have been as easily dispelled by appeals to reason and historical fact.

Secondly. The practical operation of this falsely assumed and falsely named "neutrality" was an actual decision against the rights of the South, and had been but little short of active hostilities against her.

By the governments of England and France, the doctrines announced in the treaty of Paris were ignored, and the monstrous Yankee blockade, by some forty or fifty vessels, of a coast line nearly three thousand miles in extent, came to be acknowledged and respected. When this recognition of the blockade was made, it is very certain that the whole Yankee navy, if employed on that service and nothing else, could not furnish vessels enough to pass signals from point to point along the coast. At the time this paper blockade was declared and acknowledged, the Navy Register shows that the Federal Government had in commission but forty vessels, all told

These

were scattered over the world: some of them were in the China seas, some in the Pacific, some in the Mediterranean, some in our own part of the world, and some in another. The actua. force employed in the blockading service did not give one vessel for every fifty miles of coast. In addition to these considerations, it had been shown by unquestionable evidence, furnished in part by the officials of the European powers themselves, that the few Southern ports really guarded by naval forces of the Yankees had been invested so inefficiently that hundreds of entries had been effected into them since the declaration of the blockade.

During nearly two years of struggle had this boasted "neutrality" of the European powers operated as active hostility against us, for they had helped the enemy to prevent us, with a force which was altogether inadequate, from obtaining sup. plies of prime necessity.

Nor was this all. We had no commerce; but in that the enemy was rich. We had no navy; in that he was strong. Therefore, when England and her allies declared that neither the armed cruisers nor the prizes of either of the belligerents should have hospitality and protection in neutral ports, the prohibition, directed against both belligerents, was in reality effective against the Confederate States alone, for they alone could find a hostile commerce on the ocean.

Thus it was that, in the progress of the war, the neutral nations of Europe had pursued a policy which, nominally impartial, had been practically most favorable to our enemies and most detrimental to us.

The temper which this injustice produced in the South was fortunate. The South was conscious of powers of resistance of which the world was incredulous; and the first feverish expectations of recognition by the European powers were replaced by a proud self-reliance and a calm confidence, which , were forming our national character, while contributing at the same time to the immediate successes of our arms.

The recognition by France and England of Lincoln's paper blockade, had by no means proved an unmitigated evil to us. It had forced us into many branches of industry, into which, but for that blockade, we should have never entered. We had excellent powder-mills of our own, and fine armories which

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