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Results of the Manassas Battle in the North.-General Scott. --McClellan, "the Young Napoleon."--Energy of the Federal Government.--The Bank Loan.-Events in the West.-The Missouri CAMPAIGN.--Governor Jackson's Proclamation.-Sterling Price.-- The Affair of Booneville.--Organization of the Missouri forces.—The BATTLE OF CARTHAGE.-General McCulloch.-The BATTLE OF VAK HILL.--Death of General Lyon.-The Confederate Troops leave Missouri.-Operations in Northern Missouri.General Harris.--General Price's march towards the Missouri.--The Affair at Drywood Creck.–The BATTLE OF LEXINGTON.— The Jayhawkers.--The Victory of " the Five Hundred."--General Price's Achievements.--Ilis Retreat and the necessity for it.-Operations of General Jeff. Thompson in Southeastern Missouri.--The Affair of Fredericktown.--General Price's passage of the Osage River.--Secession of Missouri from the Federal Union.-Fremont superseded. --The Federal forces in Missouri demoralized.--General Price at Springfield.---Review of his Campaign.-SKETCH 08 GENERAL PRICE.--Coldness of the Government towards him.
Tue Northern mind demanded a distinguished victim for its humiliating defeat at Manassas. The people and government of the North had alike flattered themselves with the expectation of possessing Riclımond by midsummer; their forces were said to be invincible, and their ears were not open to any report or suggestion of a possible disaster. On the night of the 21st of July, the inhabitants of the Northern cities had slept upon the assurances of victory. It would be idle to attempt a description of their disappointment and consternation on the succeeding day.
The Northern newspapers were forced to the acknowledgment of a disaster at once humiliating and terrible. They assigned various causes for it. Among these were the non-arrival of General Patterson and the incompetence of their general officers. The favorite explanation of the disaster was, however, the premature advance of the army under General Scott's direction; although the fact was, that the advance movement had been undertaken from the pressure of popular clamor in the North.
The clamor was now for new commanders. It came from the army and the people indiscriminately. The commanderin-chief, General Scott, was said to be impaired in his faculties by age, and it was urged that he should be made to yield the
command to a younger and more efficient spirit. The railing accusations against General Scott were made by Northern journals that had, before the issue of Manassas, declared hiin to be the “Greatest Captain of the Age," and without a rival among modern military chieftains. It was thought no alleviar tion of the matter that he was not advised, as his friends represented, of the strength of "the rebels." It was his business to have known it, and to have calculated the result.
General Scott cringed at the lash of popular indignation with a humiliation painful to behold. He was not great in misfortune. In a scene with President Lincoln, the incidents of which were related in the Federal House of Representatives by General Richardson, of Illinois, le declared that he had acted “the coward,” in yielding to popular clamor for an advance movement, and sought in this wretched and infamous confession the mercy of demagogues who insulted his fallen fortunes.
The call for a “ younger general" to take command of the Federal forces was promptly responded to by the appointment of General G. B. McClellan to the command of the Army of the Potomac. The understanding on both sides of the line was, that General Scott was virtually superseded by the Federal government, so far as the responsibility of active service was concerned, though he retained his nominal position and pay as lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of the Army of the United States. The unfortunate commander experienced the deep humiliation and disgrace of being adjudged incompetent by the North, whose cause he had unnaturally espoused, and whose armies he had sent into the field as invaders of the land of his birth. The retribution was righteous. No penalties of fortune were too severe for a general who had led or directed an army to trample upon the graves of his sires and to despoil the homes of his kindred and country.
General McClellan had been lifted into an immense popularity by his successes in Northwestern Virginia, in the affair of Rich Mountain and the pursuit of General Garnett, which Northern exaggeration had transformed into great victories. For weeks he had been the object of a “sensation." His namo was displayed in New York, on placards, on banners, and in newspaper headings, with the phrase, “ McClellan--two victo
ries in one day.” The newspapers gave him the title of "the Young Napoleon,” and in the South the title was derisively perpetuated. He was only thirty-five years of age-small in stature, with black hair and moustaches, and a remarkablo military precision of manner. He was a pupil of West Point, and had been one of the American Military Commission to the Crimea. When appointed major-general of volunteers by Governor Dennison, of Ohio, he had resigned from the army, and was superintendent of the Ohio and Mississippi railroad, a dilapidated concern. There is no reason to suppose that the man who was appointed to the responsible and onerous cominand of the Army of the Potomac was any thing more than the creature of a feeble popular applause.
A leading Southern newspaper had declared, on the announcement of the complete and brilliant victory at Manassas, “the independence of the Confederacy is secured.” There could not have been a greater mistake. The active and elastic spirit of the North was soon at work to repair its fortunes ; and time and opportunity were given it by the South, not only to recover lost resources, but to invent new. The governinent at Washington displayed an energy which, perhaps, is the most Jemarkable phenomenon in the whole history of the war: it multiplied its armies; it reassured the confidence of the people; it recovered itself from financial straits which were almost thought to be hopeless, and while the politicians of the South were declaring that the Federal treasury was bankrupt, it negotiated a loan of one hundred and fifty millions of dollars from the banks of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, at a rate but a fraction above that of legal interest in the State of New York.
While the North was thus recovering its resources on the frontiers of Virginia and preparing for an extension of the campaign, events were transpiring in the West which were giving extraordinary lessons of example and encouragement to the Southern States bordering on the Atlantic and Gulf. These events were taking place in Missouri. The campaign in that State was one of the most brilliant episodes of the war one of the most remarkable in history, and one of the most fruitful in the lessons of the almost miraculous achievements of a people stirred by the enthusiasm of revolution. To
the direction of these events we must now divert our narrative.
THE MISSOURI CAMPAIGN.
The riots in St. Louis, to which reference has already been made, were the inaugurating scenes of the revolution in Missouri. The Federal government had commenced its programme of subjugation with a high hand. On the 10th of May, a brigade of Missouri militia, encamped under the law of the State for organizing and drilling the militia, at Camp Jackson, on the western outskirts of St. Louis, had been forced to surrender unconditionally on the demand of Captain (afterwards General) Lyon of the Federal Army. In the riots excited by the Dutch soldiery in St. Louis, numbers of citizens had been murdered in cold blood; a reign of terror was established ; and the most severe measures were taken by tho Federal authority to keep in subjection the excitement and rage of the people. St. Louis was environed by a line of military posts; all the arms and ammunition in the city were seized, and the houses of citizens searched for concealed muni: tions of war. The idea of any successful resistance of Missouri to the Federal power was derided. “Let her stir,” said the Lincolnites, “ and the lion's paw will crush out her paltry existence."
The several weeks that elapsed between the fall of Fort Sumter and the early part of June were occupied by the Secessionists in Missouri with efforts to gain time by negotiation and with preparations for the contest. At length, finding further delay impossible, Governor Jackson issued his proclamation, calling for fifty thousand volunteers. At the time of issuing this proclamation, on the 13th of June, 1861, the governor was advised of the purpose of the Federal authorities to send an effective force from St. Louis to Jefferson City, the capital of the State. He determined, therefore, to move at once with the State records to Booneville, situated on the south bank of the Missouri, eighty miles above Jefferson City. Before his departure from the latter place, he had conferred upon Sterling Price the position of major-general of the army of Missouri, and had also appointed nine brigadier-generals. These
were Generals Parsons, M. L. Clark, John B. Clark, Slack, Harris, Stein, Rains, McBride, and Jeff. Thompson.
There was at the time of the issuance of this proclamation no military organization of any description in the State. Per haps, there had not been a militia muster in Missouri for twelve or fifteen years, there being no law to require it. The State was without arms or ammunition. Such was her condition, when, with a noble and desperate gallantry that might have put to bluslı forever the stále and common excuse of “helplessness” for a cringing submission to tyranny, the State of Missouri determined alone and unaided to confront and resist the whole power of the North, and to fight it to the issue of liberty or death.
Orders were issued by General Price, at Jefferson City, to the several brigadiers just appointed, to organize their forces as rapidly as possible, and send them forward to Booneville and Lexington.
On the 20th June, General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair, with seven thousand Federal troops, well drilled and well armed, came up the river by vessels, and debarked about five miles below Booneville. To oppose them there the Missourians had but about eight hundred men, armed with ordinary rifles and shot-guns, without a piece of artillery, and with but little ammunition. Lyon's command had eight pieces of cannon and the best improved small-arms. The Missourians were commanded by Colonel Marmaduke, a graduate of West Point. Under the impression that the forces against him were inconsiderable, he determined to give them battle; but, upon ascertaining their actual strength, after he had formed his line, he told his men they could not reasonably hope to defend the position, and ordered them to retreat. This order they refused to obey. They declared that they would not leave the ground without exchanging shots with the enemy. The men remained on the field, commanded by their captains and by Lieutenantcolonel Horace Brand. A fight epsued of an hour and a half or more; the result of which was the killing and wounding of upwards of one hundred of the enemy, and a loss of three Missourians killed and twenty-five or thirty wounded, several of whom afterwards died. “The barefoot rebel militia," as they were sneeringly denominated, exhibited a stubbornness on