panied by the recognition of the obligations of good faith, a redress for wrongs, and good-will, comity, and courtesy in their intercourse. These may be termed the rights and obligations existing in the normal times of peace. In time of war other rights and obligations arise peculiar to that state of affairs, embracing the status of belligerents and of neutrals. Although these are strictly within the domain of international law, they may, I hope, be now considered as abnormal rights and duties as peace becomes more and more, fortunately for the world, the normal condition of mankind and among nations. 60. The Right of Independence and Legal Equality.-The right of independence carries with it naturally, if full and complete, the right of legal equality with other sovereign states. By independence is meant that condition, essential to a sovereign state, by which it controls its own affairs, external as well as internal, without interference from other states. This includes, as has been previously mentioned, the right to organize itself as it chooses and do within its boundaries whatever it may think wise to develop its existence, its strength, and its prosperity. It must be recognized, however, that there are times, even with sovereign states, when restrictions are imposed upon them by events and circumstances. These restrictions, however, are in the main temporary and are not permanently legal conditions of their life. The same can be said also of individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily accept certain restrictions for the common good. An example in this connection is that of two powerful nations, Great Britain and the United States of America, who were bound for many years by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty not to acquire territory in Central America. Other nations have entered into obligations by which they have restricted their spheres of influence and colonization in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Ocean. A declaration was made as late as 1908 by which the states bordering upon the Baltic and North Seas pledged themselves to re frain from disturbing the existing boundaries within a certain sphere named therein.1 There are occasions also where states are obliged to submit to certain restrictions due to peculiar conditions that are imposed by the victor at the end of a successful war, or sometimes without the actual use of force by a single great power, or by a combination of powers for what is considered the general good of all concerned. Pertinent cases of this kind can be found in the history of the Napoleonic wars when Prussia was restricted to a standing army of 40,000 men; another later case is that of Russia, which was forbidden to create military and naval arsenals or a fleet in the Black Sea. Both of these restrictions are now removed, and it is not uninteresting to note that both were evaded before their formal removal. In a more constant manner there has been and still exists a predominance assumed by the great powers of Europe over the affairs of that continent looking to the settlement of matters which might lead to war. This is generally known as the concert of European powers and has been of service to mankind by the prevention of actual warfare and by the settlement of vexed questions. The success of this combination of the great powers with the powers concerned in the late Balkan wars seems to have been less marked than in other times. The attitude of the United States toward certain powers in the West Indies and Central America has had a certain similarity. An occasional yielding on the part of these states and of the European nationalities concerning them does not deprive them of their rights of legal independence and equality under international law. This exercise of authorities in both cases falls short of what is known as armed or threatened intervention, which is a display or threat of force upon an unwilling state. This subject of intervention will now be taken up as a topic bearing directly upon both the independence and equality of states. 1 Supplement to A. J. I. L., vol. I, p. 425, and vol. II, p. 270. 61. Intervention. The two elements that enter into intervention are the exhibition of actual force, naked or veiled, on the part of the intervening country and the want of consent on the part of the other country affected. The only circumstance under which intervention can be considered a legal right or obligation is when it is exercised in accordance with a guarantee under a treaty or other mutual agreement; this exercise of a treaty right may be, of course, with or without the momentary consent or willingness of the other party to the treaty. There are other cases where there is moral justification for intervention by one or more nations. These are cases of intervention upon the ground of humanity; they cannot be called legally right, but they may be morally justifiable and even commendable. They come under what "Historicus" calls "a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law." A case in point was the intervention of the great powers of Europe in regard to the persecution and murder of Christians in Asia Minor in 1860. Interventions in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe were until recent times considered admissible and at times just. It can no longer be considered as justifiable—and in Europe, at least, is not practised—and, as Westlake remarks, "the natural growth of a nation in power, and even the menace of its armaments in a fair proportion to its population and wealth and to the interests which it has to defend, must be looked on without jealousy and without any attempt to check it by those nations which by an inferiority of character or situation are destined to a decline in relative power.' 2ܙܖ The growth by increase of territory is not quite the same question. It is a matter of legitimate interest to all of the states of Europe in their present crowded condition. The system, or concert, of European nations, certainly, in regard to 1 Historicus, "Letters on Some Questions of Int. Law." southeastern Europe, considers the matter within their scope, though events prove not always within their authority to regulate. As to its fading authority, Lawrence says that in the past "it distributed provinces and rounded off the boundaries of kingdoms without regard to the wishes of the populations and their affinities of race, religion, and sentiment. It repressed popular movements when they interfered with its calculations. Italian unity and German unity were achieved in spite of it; and it is bound to lose influence as the wishes of peoples become more and more a necessary element in the calculations of rulers."1 The question of intervention can then be called a matter of state policy rather than one of international law, except that, as a general rule, when practised it is a violation of the right of independence so far as this is an inherent right of a sovereign state. It may be of interest to briefly recount recent events in our own history which properly come under the head of intervention. The first, chronologically, was the effort upon the part of the United States to prevent the continuance of the interference by France with the political independence of Mexico. France by force of arms established the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico during our Civil War, when the attention of the country was engaged in the struggle for the preservation of the Union. In 1865, when the Civil War was over, our government informed the French Government that their treatment of Mexico was regarded as injurious and menacing to republican institutions, and an American army was massed on the Rio Grande under General Sheridan. As a result, Napoleon III withdrew his forces from Mexico and the empire of Maximilian came to an end. In 1898 the President of the United States in a special message declared that the intervention of the United States in the 1 Lawrence's "Principles," 4th ed., p. 132. affairs of Cuba, then in insurrection against Spain, would be justified on the grounds of humanity and of protection to our citizens and to our commerce as well as removing a constant menace to our peace. As a result, action by Congress followed which brought on the war with Spain. In June, 1900, on account of the Boxer movement, unprecedented disturbances arose in China directed largely against all foreign life and property. These disturbances grew until all of the foreign legations at Peking were besieged and attacked by forces acting under orders from the imperial officials. Foreigners elsewhere, especially missionaries, were tortured and murdered and other outrages were committed. An international expedition which included an American detachment was formed and raised the siege of the legations and took possession of Peking after overcoming the resistance of the Chinese troops, the imperial household having fled. This joint intervention was explained by Secretary Hay as being necessary to open communication with Peking to rescue our officials and with the purpose of affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property and to guard all legitimate American interests. In November, 1903, the United States intervened to prevent the suppression by Colombia of the local revolution of Panama by preventing the landing of Colombian forces on the Isthmus and the consequent bombardment of the town of Panama. Justification for this intervention was claimed to be found in our treaty rights, our national interests and safety, and in the interests of collective civilization. In 1906 the United States intervened in Cuba, in accordance with our treaty rights and guarantees, on account of the disorders arising upon the island before and after the resignation of President Palma. After the establishment of peace and good government in 1909 the United States evacuated the island and self-government was resumed. In closing this subject it may be well to repeat what many |