This declaration is known officially as the "declaration concerning the laws of naval war," while the conference is known as the London naval conference of 1909. The preliminary provision of the declaration states that the signatory powers are agreed that the rules contained in the chapters that followed correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law. The subjects treated were those of blockade in time of war, contraband of war, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to a neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance to search and compensation, finishing with a wish (vou) with regard to the international prize-court, which was adopted at the request of the United States in order to avoid what seemed to be a constitutional difficulty with respect to appeals to the prize-court from our Supreme Court. According to this wish, the delegates were to point out to their governments the advantage there will be in arriving at an agreement of a kind to dispel the difficulties of a constitutional nature which face some of them. It is a proposition for attaining the same end under another form; instead of annulling a decision appealed from, the prizecourt will award compensation. The result, however, remains the same; the individual affected will be able to obtain a new trial which will in the end do him justice. The method alone is different.

The declaration of London has been approved by the President of the United States and was ratified by the Senate April 24, 1912. Whether formally ratified or not by the signatory and other powers, it has the authoritative weight due to the unanimous vote of the representatives of the great maritime powers and to their declaration that it represents the actual principles of international law upon the subjects dealt with. It is highly satisfactory to know that so many questions of the conflicting schools of continental Europe and of England and America have been finally and formally agreed upon. The criticisms in regard to the conference and the declaration of

London have been more as to its omissions rather than as to its agreements and results.

36. Events since 1909 Bearing upon International Law.Events occurring since the London naval conference that have a direct and indirect bearing upon international law may be mentioned in closing this chapter upon the development of modern international law. They will be referred to more fully later under their various headings. The first, chronologically speaking, was the arbitration at The Hague between the United States and Great Britain as to the disputes arising from the interpretation of the treaty of 1818 on the subject of fishery rights on the coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, etc. (this took place in 1910 and involved a definition of territorial waters); the questions of intervention and mediation in certain Latin-American states; matters involved in the formation of the state of Panama and the use of the Panama Canal; the fate of the arbitration treaties of the United States; the progress of the codification of maritime international law, including the action of the Institute of International Law at Oxford in 1913; the Turkish-Italian and Balkan Wars of 1913 and the questions incident thereto, and especially the deliberations and actions of the great European powers. To this may be added the many questions involved in the great European war in progress in 1914.

TOPICS AND REFERENCES

1. The Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia

Walker, "Science of International Law," 72, 89, etc., 247. Wheaton's "History of the Law of Nations," 69. Bernard, "Lectures on Diplomacy," II, chap. VII.

2. The Successors of Grotius

A. D. White, "Seven Great Statesmen," 113, 161. Wheaton, "History of Law of Nations," 193, 200, 219-229, 309-322. Hershey, "Essentials," 59-63.

3. From the Peace of Westphalia until the Peace of UtrechtWheaton, "History of Law of Nations," 78, etc. Walker, "Science of International Law," 74. Oppenheim, 2d ed., 61, 62, 63.

4. From the Peace of Utrecht to the Outbreak of the French RevolutionWheaton, "History of the Law of Nations," 87, 106, 210. Hosack, "Rise and Growth of Law of Nations" (1882), chaps. VIII-X. Oppenheim, 2d ed., 64-65. Halleck, Baker's 4th ed., 21, 22.

5. From the French Revolution to the Congress of ViennaHenry Adams, "History of the United States," vol. IV, chap. IV. Wheaton, "History of Law of Nations," 372. Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon French Revolution," vol. II, chap. XVII. Manning, "Law of Nations," bk. V, chap. X.

6. From the Congress of Vienna to the Declaration of ParisFyffe, "History of Modern Europe," chap. I. Phillips, "Modern Europe," 4th ed. Hazen, "Europe since 1815."

7. Monroe Doctrine

Coolidge, "The U. S. as a World Power," chap. V. Moore's "Digest," chap. XX. Chadwick, "The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Spain," chap. X.

8. The Declaration of Paris

Higgins, "The Hague Peace Conferences, 1909," 1-4. Woolsey, 314. Oppenheim, 119.

9. Questions of International Law Arising During Our Civil WarThe Deerhound affair. The blockade. Continuous voyage. The Alabama claims. The treaty of Washington of 1871. 'Letters of Historicus-Blockade," 89-118. Woolsey, §§ 202-6. Westlake, chap. IX. Moore's "Digest," vol. II, 979; vol. V, 723; vol. VI, 999; vol. VII, 697, also Moore's "Arbitrations," vol. I, chaps. XIV, XV, and XVI. Walker, "Science of International Law," 458, 502. Bernard (English), "Neutrality of Great Britain During American Civil War." Cushing, "Treaty of Washington."

10. The Hague. Conferences

"Naval War College, 1908," 117, etc. Scott's "Hague Conferences." Higgins, "Hague Conferences."

11. Declaration of London

Bentwich, "The Declaration of London." Higgins, "Hague Conferences." "Naval War College, 1910." See appendix of this book, no. IV.

PART II

STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHAPTER IV

STATES: THE PRIMARY SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION

37. Sovereign States the Subjects of International Law. Sovereign states, or states fully independent and members of the family of nations, are primarily the subjects of international law. In the sense used here and ordinarily in this treatise, the term a sovereign state is synonymous with that of a nation. Nations that are less than civilized, part-sovereign states, communities, corporations, and individuals, though not regarded as principal persons or subjects, are, however, affected by the rules of international law and, according to circumstances, more or less governed by them.

38. Definition of a Sovereign State.-A sovereign state may be defined in general terms to be a fully independent and civilized community of persons, permanently located within a fixed country, organized under common laws into a body politic for mutual advantage, exercising the rights of government over all persons and things within its territory, and capable of entering into relations and intercourse with the other states of the world.1

39. Characteristics and Conditions of Sovereign States.— A sovereign state, to be in full standing as such, must have the following characteristics and conditions:

1 Moore's "Digest," vol. I, p. 12.

First. There must be a normal political community of persons with common laws, customs, and habits.

Second. There must be a fixed territory within which these persons permanently live.

Third. There must be a supreme government normally controlling all persons and things within its boundaries and capable of entering into and maintaining full relations with other states, with the power of making offensive and defensive war and also peace.

Fourth. The state must be fully independent of all other states but governing its intercourse with them according to the tenets of international law.

Fifth. The state must be recognized as a sovereign state and an equal in law by the other sovereign states of the world.

Sixth. It must possess a certain elevated standard of civilization.

As to other matters, Phillimore says: "It is a sound general principle, and one to be laid down at the threshold of the science of which we are treating, that international law has no concern with the form, character, or power of the constitution or government of a state; with the religion of its inhabitants; the extent of its domain; or the importance of its position, and influence in the commonwealth of nations.

Provided that the state possess a government capable of securing at home the observance of rightful relations with other states, the demands of international law are satisfied." 1

It may be mentioned here that the territory of a sovereign state includes its colonies, dependencies, and insular possessions, no matter how governed.

40.

Equality of Sovereign States in a Legal Sense.-Legally all sovereign states within the purview of international law are equal, that is, equal in their rights and in their obligations, equal in their sovereignty and in their independence. It does 1 Phillimore, "Int. Law," 3d ed., vol. I, p.

81.