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had not verted

escaped. They had been stripped for fire-wood or coninto barracks and hospitals. Fences were demolished, and here and there a lordly mansion stood an unsightly ruin. The andalism of Hunter in Virginia drew upon him the censure of the few journals in the North which made any pretension to the decencies of humanity. At Lexington, he had burned the Virginia Military Institute with its valuable library, phile sophical and chemical apparatus, relics and geological specimens; sacked Washington College, and burned the house of ex-Governor Letcher, giving his wife only ten minutes to a few articles of clothing.

save

Such
enormities were monstrous enough; they shocked the
moral sentiment of the age; yet they did not affright the soul
of the South. The outrages practised upon helpless women,
more helpless old age, and hopeless poverty, assured the people
of the Confederacy of the character of their enemies, and the
designs of the war, and awakened resolution to oppose to the
last extremity the mob of murderers and lawless miscreants
who desecrated their soil and invaded their homes.

We
turn from the dominant and controlling events of the
campaign of 1864, in Virginia and Georgia, to other fields of
the war, which were within, or close upon the period which

our narrative so far has traversed.

were

There properly belonged to the campaign of the summer and early fall of 1864 three projects of the Confederate invasion of the territory held or disputed by the enemy. These Early's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, Morgan's invasion of Kentucky, and Price's invasion of Missouri. results were small; opportunities were badly used; in brief, the Confederate attempts of 1864 at invasion did not differ from the former weak experiments of the kind.

Their

EARLY'S INVASION OF MARYLAND, ETC.

The Confederates had planned a series of offensive operations on a small scale, the object of which was to interrupt the main campaigns in the East and West. This line of operations began with Early's invasion of Maryland. About the same time the enemy was startled by the news of an invasion

of Kentucky by a considerable body of Confederates, moving into that State through Pound Gap. But Early's movement was the superior one, and commands attention first.

After the engagement at Lynchburg, June 18, Hunter found no way of escape so convenient as through the Blue Ridge to Gauley. This left the way open for Early to move up the valley. He did so, accompanied by a cavalry force under Ransom, and reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, July 3, at a point just above Harper's Ferry, threatening Martinsburg. Sigel, holding the latter place, fell back towards Sharpsburg. The Confederates immediately occupied Martinsburg, where they captured valuable stores. The same day a fight occurred at Leetown, south of the railroad, in which General Mulligan, covering Sigel's retreat, was finally forced back to Sharpsburg, where he joined Sigel, and another engagement occurred. The Yankee forces being overpowered, fell back to Maryland Heights. Max Weber, evacuating Harper's Ferry, joined Sigel. In the mean time, General E. B. Tyler, protecting the railroad from Baltimore to the Monocacy, prepared for resisting the Confederates and to reinforce Sigel. General Lew Wallace joined him on the afternoon of the 3d.

On Saturday, July 9, the Confederates disappeared from Greencastle, Hagerstown, and from other points threatened; but this was only for the purpose of concentration. The Yankee forces had evacuated Frederick the previous night, and fallen back to Monocacy Bridge.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY BRIDGE.

The bridge is four miles from Frederick City. The river runs due north and south. The railroad and national road cross the river at very nearly the same point. As our troops advanced towards the river from Frederick it became apparent that some forces of the enemy, supposed at the time to be cavalry, were holding the east bank. A couple of our batteries opened on them from the front, while our cavalry were ordered to go up the stream and cross over the bridge. At the same time a considerable force of our infantry moved down the

stream, and crossing south of the bridge, formed in a piece of woods on the high ground. It was still believed that the enemy had nothing but cavalry on the ground, but our infantry being ordered forward, emerged into an open field and discovered the enemy's infantry drawn up in line of battle along the railroad at the further end of the field. The railroad being several feet lower than the field, the enemy had all the advantages of an intrenched position. Evans's brigade charged across this field under a heavy fire of musketry. When within fifty yards of the enemy's position, another body of the enemy emerged from the woods on our right and attacked the brigade in flank, and rendered its position critical; but other of our forces coming up, the enemy's flank movement was counteracted. A simultaneous charge was then made by our whole line, when the enemy broke and fled, leaving between a thousand and twelve hundred dead and wounded, and seven hundred prisoners in our hands. The enemy left the railroad and national pike and fled north in the direction of Gettysburg.

In this action, which lasted about two hours from the time of firing the first shot, we lost in killed and wounded between five and six hundred men and some valuable officers.

Our forces did not follow the enemy, but proceeded directly towards Washington and Baltimore, making rapid marches, but collecting cattle and horses along the route.

The Yankee capital was in imminent peril, and the whisper ran through the North that it was already lost or surely doomed. General Early might have taken it by assault. There were only a few regiments to man its defences, and the advance of the Confederates was waited hourly by a population thrown into pitiable consternation. But General Early did not seize the great opportunity of 1864. He passed the time in which he might have struck the decisive blow in weak hesitation; he reconnoitred the defences of Washington; he scattered his forces into expeditions to destroy telegraphs and intercept trains; but he could not make up his mind to attack the Yankee capital, and with that characteristic Confederate stupidity which never completed its victories, and was easily pleased with half-way successes, he was satisfied with the results of a raid, where, with more enterprise and persistence, he might have achieved the most decisive and brilliant success of

the war-marched into Washington, and made his name as illustrious as that of Stonewall Jackson.

About the middle of July the Confederates began to disappear across the Potomac fords, carrying with them many of the fruits of their expedition. It was reported by General Early that he brought south of the Potomac five thousand horses and twenty-five hundred beef cattle. Besides this, his cavalry and artillery were all supplied with new and valuable horses. He had also created a useful diversion, and compelled Grant to weaken his army materially before Petersburg. But it must be confessed that the results of his expedition fell below public expectation in the South, and that he was justly charged with not having made full use of his opportunities.

After crossing the Potomac, General Early had occasion to give another sharp lesson to the enemy. He turned back upon Crook, who was pursuing him with about 15,000 infantry and cavalry. The fight commenced between Bartonsville and Kernestown, about five miles from Winchester. Our forces ran the enemy to Bunker's Hill, twelve miles beyond Winchester, and thoroughly routed them. General Crook confessed to a loss of one thousand in killed and wounded. entire loss was sixty. After this General Early occupied Martinsburg, and a pause ensued in the campaign in the Valley; nothing of any importance occurring for some weeks, except the raid of a few hundred Confederate cavalry to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, who burned a considerable portion of the

town.

Our

MORGAN'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.

General John Morgan's expedition into Kentucky was, on the whole, a failure. In the early part of June, with some 2,500 men, he entered Kentucky by Pound Gap, and by swift movements got possession of Paris, Georgetown, Cynthia, Williamstown, Mount Sterling, and other towns. A passenger train on the Louisville and Lexington Railroad, near Smithfield, was attacked, and two passenger cars and a baggage car burned. Other trains were attacked, and railroad communication was for some days interrupted. On the 9th of June, General Burbridge, who followed Morgan from Pound Gap.

came up with him at Mount Sterling, and had an indecisive engagement. A portion of Morgan's command entered Lexington at two o'clock the next morning, burned the Kentucky Central Railroad depot, and left at ten o'clock, in the direction of Georgetown and Frankfort. Part of the town of Cynthia was also burned. Two Ohio regiments stationed there were captured. On the 12th June, General Burbridge fell upon Morgan's forces while at breakfast near Cynthia, and after an hour's hard fighting defeated him, killing three hundred, wounding nearly as many, and capturing nearly four hundred, besides recapturing nearly one hundred of the Ohio troops, and over one thousand horses.

PRICE'S INVASION OF MISSOURI.

It was late in September when offensive operations were essayed in the distant and obscure country west of the Mississippi. In that month, General Price moved into Missouri with a force estimated at from ten to twenty thousand men. A great excitement was produced, and it was thought that a raid was contemplated on St. Louis.

Price's main army moved against the village of Pilot Knob, 86 miles south of St. Louis, the terminus of the railroad, and the depot for supply of the lower outposts. Several desperate assaults were made on this strongly fortified position of the enemy. Under cover of the night, General Ewing, the Yankee in command, evacuated Pilot Knob, and effected a disastrous retreat to Rolla. In his official report he said: "The refugees, men, women, and children, white and black, who clung to the command, nearly sacrificed it by their panics. I had to throw out the available fighting force, infantry and cavalry, as advance and rear guards and flankers, leaving in the body of the column the affrighted non-combatants and two sections of artillery, not often brought into action on the retreat. Repeated and stubborn efforts were made to bring us to a stand, and could they have forced a halt of an hour they would have enveloped and taken us; but our halts, though frequent, were brief, and were only to unlimber the artillery, stagger the pursuers with a few rounds, and move on."

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