of the territory; Guild v. First Nat. Bnk, 4 S. Dak. 582, 57 N. W. 504, majority sustaining law of 1881, providing for a different rate of interest in certain counties; Mackey v. Enzensperger, 11 Utah, 159, 39 Pac. 542, majority holding that, under territorial act of March 10, 1892, a verdict concurred in by less than twelve jurors would support a judgment.

Territories. The whole matter of selecting, impanelling, and summoning jurors is left to territorial legislature, p. 444.

Citing cases which apply the rule are: Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 154, 25 L. 246, that a Utah grand jury is sufficient when composed of the number prescribed by territorial statute; Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 310, 26 L. 483, sustaining a trial of a challenge to a juror for actual bias, as prescribed by territorial law of Utah; Thiede v. Utah Territory, 159 U. S. 515, 40 L. 241, 16 S. Ct. 64, holding a criminal defendant in Utah Territory not entitled to be furnished with a list of witnesses; United States v. Collins, 1 Woods, 515, 522, F. C. 14,837, holding the act of 1872 (17 Stat. 19) has no reference to the selection of jurors for United States courts; United States v. Antz, 4 Woods, 180, 16 Fed. 124, holding that, in the absence of a statutory provision, courts cannot dispense with a venire for the summoning of a grand jury; Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 197, 198, 200, 201, holding that, in the absence of special legislation, a jury in the territorial court, in a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, may be summoned under an open venire directed to the marshal; Territory v. Scott, 3 Dak. 410, 20 N. W. 412, affirming the power of the territorial legislature to fix and change the location of the seat of government; United States v. Hailey, 2 Idaho, 30, 3 Pac. 264, holding that, in cases in the Federal courts, the practice is in all cases regulated by the laws in force in the State or territory; Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 Mass. 78, holding that the provisions of general statutes, chapter 132, as to the drawing and selecting of jurors, are constitutional; United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah. 228. quashing indictment for polygamy found by grand jury of twenty-three, as not contemplated by the territorial statute; United States v. Miles, 2 Utah, 23, holding that, in the selection of jurors, the territorial statutes control when not in conflict with United States law, and triers were properly appointed; People v. Ritchie, 12 Utah, 195, 42 Pac. 213, holding that section 3400, subdivision 2, of 2 Compiled Laws 1888, as to impeachment of verdicts, was binding on the territorial courts; Nickels v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Ter. 387, in separate concurring opinion, saying that, in the territory, an admiralty case must come before the Supreme Court on appeal in the same manner as a suit in equity; France v. Connor, 3 Wyo. 463, 27 Pac. 575, holding that by the territorial laws, dower had been abolished in Wyoming, Cited in dissenting opinion in Reis v. Lawrence, 63 Cal. 139, majority not deciding, but assuming, invalidity of a decree of divorce made

Improved Order, etc., Assn., 94 Fed. 158, holding, in an action for infringing an elevator patent, that where a specific element is not claimed as a device by itself, it is in effect admitted as not the invention of the patentee.

Patents. If a machine will actually do more than inventor claims, and its structure and action would suggest to an ordinary skillful mechanic the double use, the adaptation is not a new invention or patentable, p. 456.

Citing cases which apply this principle are: Stow v. Chicago, 104 U. S. 550, 26 L. 817, as to a prior invention of wooden pave ment; Fond du Lac Co. v. May, 137 U. S. 406, 34 L. 718, 11 S. Ct. 102, denying validity of a patent for improvement in construction of prisons, being merely an adaptation of old mechanism; Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Norwich Nat. Bank, 19 Blatchf. 130, 6 Fed. 385, affirming a patent for a safe-locking device, where a new result was produced and there was invention in the combination; Leonard v. Lovell, 29 Fed. 315, holding a refrigerator patent void for want of novelty; Rapid Service Store R. Co. v. Taylor, 43 Fed. 253, sustaining a patent for a cash and parcel carrier, with a spring starter, as not anticipated by prior English patents for atmospheric railways nor by loom patents; Appleton Mfg. Co. v. Star Mfg. Co., 60 Fed. 415, 18 U. S. App. 492, holding a patent corn reducer and separator, patented as a process, vold for want of novelty; Galt v. Parlin, etc., Co., 60 Fed. 422, 18 U. S. App. 518, holding a patent for an improvement in wheelbarrows, void for want of novelty; Wright, etc., Co. v. Clinton, etc., Co., 67 Fed. 793, 33 U. S. App. 188, limiting a patent for improvement in weaving wire cloth to the new combination of prior means to the new purpose; Griswold v. Wagner, 68 Fed. 499, 37 U. S. App. 171, holding the transfer of hinging and journal devices found in coffee roasters to waffle irons, not patentable; Goshen Sweeper Co. v. Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co., 72 Fed. 75, 37 U. S. App. 555, disallowing an alleged improvement in carpet sweepers, consisting merely in duplicating part of the mechanism; Schreiber v. Grimm, 72 Fed. 675, 43 U. S. App. 10, holding patent for a cask support, void for want of invention; Stearns & Co. v. Russell, 85 Fed. 228, 54 U. S. App. 614, holding a machine for pill dipping, not patentable; Union Gas-Engine Co. v. Doak, 88 Fed. 90, holding that the mere change in a gas-igniting device, from a rotary to a reciprocating movement, was not a patentable novelty. Cited, arguendo, in Eachus v. Broomall, 115 U. S. 436, 29 L. 422, 6 S. Ct. 232.

Modified in Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S. 607, 39 L. 279, 15 S. Ct. 198, holding that if the relations be remote, and use of old device produce a new result, it may be patentable.

Patent. In action at law, for infringement, neither trial nor appellate court may decide that one patent covers or does not cover the invention of the other, p. 456.

Cited and principle applied in Taylor 7. Thomas, 22 Wall. 490, 22 L. 793, holding that "cotton notes," authorized by legislature of Mississippi, 1861, were void and not receivable for taxes after reorganization; Oliver v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 30 Ark. 131 denying power of legislature to repeal charter provisions, exempting the railroad's property from taxation; Grand Lodge of Masons v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 666, 11 So. 151, holding that the statute of 1855, exempting the Masonic Grand Lodge hall from taxation, is not a provision of the charter, and is repealed by the Constitution of 1879; State v. Hickman, 9 Mont. 379, 23 Pac. 743, 8 L. R. A. 405, holding that the constitutional provision, fixing the salary of the secretary of State, had the effect of a law, and no further legislation was required to authorize the State treasurer to pay the salary; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 282, 12 Am. Rep. 510, adjudging the Constitution of Virginia, article XI, section 1, and the homestead exemption act of 1870, invalid as to prior debts. Cited, arguendo, in Berry v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 203; dissenting opinion in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 760, 27 L. 465, 2 S. Ct. 169.

Contract.-Laws, which subsist at time and place of making of contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form part of it as if expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms, p. 653.

Cited and relied on in McCandless V. Richmond, etc.. R. Co., 38 S. C. 113, 16 S. E. 432, 18 L. R. A. 444, holding that where an amended charter was granted, subject to legislative power of amendment, a subsequent statute, rendering the company liable for damages by fire, caused by its engines, was constitutional; Graham v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 53 Wis. 490, 10 N. W. 616, holding that causes of action, which accrue by reason of the violation of an existing statute, are not affected by its repeal, whether they be in tort or contract.

Constitutional law. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which are guaranteed by the Constitution from invasion. A State may modify the remedy, but not so as to impair substantial rights; any legislation producing this result is void, hence State Constitution, closing courts against remedy on any debt, consideration for which was a slave, is void as to pre-existing contract, pp. 653, 654.

Citing cases which apply this principle are: Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 656, 20 L. 693, holding Arkansas Constitution of 1868, prohibiting the enforcement of contracts for purchase of sale of slaves, invalid as to prior transactions; Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 667, 669, 20 L. 759, 760, reprinted as note, 25 La. Ann. 349, 350, holding that when a State court affirmed the invalidity of a contract, based on a consideration in Confederate money, on a constitutional provision inhibiting its enforcement, the question must depend on the date ot

vendor; Minx v. Mitchell, 42 Kan. 694, 22 Pac. 711, rejecting questions to a defendant testifying in his own behalf as to other trades of land, unless so similar in character that same motive might be reasonably imputed; Cook v. Perry, 43 Mich. 627, 5 N. W. 1057, holding, in an action for false representations, evidence was admissible that defendant had made same representations to another person; Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N. J. Eq. 249, 7 Atl. 334, in action to charge managers of an institution with loss resulting from an illegal loan, holding that charges in the bill, of making other illegal loans, were not impertinent nor scandalous; Archer v. Long, 38 S. C. 279, 16 S. E. 1000, admitting an account-book, kept by one of the parties, on a charge of fraud, to show intention of the parties, Ludom v. Furniture & Carpet Co., 12 Utah, 179, 42 Pac. 209, where the issue was one of fraud in purchase of goods, charging that the defendant was insolvent, admitting interrogatories and answers as to changing the articles of association; Piedmont Bank v. Hatcher, 94 Va. 231, 26 S. E. 506, in suit to set aside a conveyance, as intended to subject the land to payment of certain notes, admitting evidence to show that the notes were procured by fraud; dissenting opinion in United States v. Budd, 144 U. 8. 170, 36 L. 389, 12 S. Ct. 580, arguendo.

Distinguished in West Florida Land Co. v. Studebaker, 37 Fla 36, 19 So. 179, holding that statements in newspaper advertisements were irrelevant in an action for fraud and deceit in sale of lands; McKay v. Russell, 3 Wash. 383, 28 Am. St. Rep. 47, 28 Pac. 909, rejecting evidence of a distinct and independent transaction, having no bearing on the case at issue.

13 Wall. 465-474, 20 L. 507, CAUJOLLE ▼. FERRIE.

Judgment.- Grant of letters of administration by proper court, directed by statute to grant them to “relatives of the deceased," is conclusive in another suit, upon question of grantee's legitimacy, that having been the question at issue at time of grant, pp. 471–474.

Cited and principle applied in Veach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 314, 33 L. 170, 9 S. Ct. 737, holding that the judgments of the Court of Ordinarily in Georgia, in matters relating to estates of decedents, are not open to collateral attack; Holmes v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 6 Sawy. 285,5 Fed. 534, holding that a grant of administration on an estate, vested in an administrator appointed by another court of competent jurisdiction, was void; S. C., 7 Sawy. 387, 9 Fed. 234, to same point and effect; Berney v. Drexel, 12 Fed. 394, holding that the decision of the surrogate as to the competency of a person to act as executor was conclusive against collateral attack; Comstock v. Herron, 55 Fed. 812, 6 U. S. App. 626, holding the judgment of the State Probate Court on matters within the scope of its authority, would have same effect in Federal courts as was given to it by the State laws; Howell v. Budd, 91 Cal. 349, 27 Pac. 748, holding

Constitutional law. Contracts in consideration of slaves, made when slavery was lawful, are vald, and unaffected by laws passed subsequent to the abolition of slavery, p. 654.

Cited and affirmed in Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 548, 21 L. 757, sustaining judgment on a note given for price of slaves, executed in 1861; Turner v. Edwards, 2 Woods, 435, F. C. 14,254, affirming right to plead statute of limitations in second suit on a note, made for purchase price of a slave before the Rebellion; United States v. Jefferson Co., 5 Dill. 321, 1 McCrary, 367, F. C. 15,472, holding that the clause in the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 did not repeal the statute of 1873, making it the duty of the County Court to levy a special tax to pay the bonds and interest issued under it; Anderson v. Mills, 28 Ark. 183, sustaining notes and mortgage given on contract for purchase of slaves; Cole v. La Chambre, 31 La. Ann. 45, holding that, when incurred, an obligation of a tutrix and cotutor to a ward, which included the price of slaves, was a valid obligation, and unaffected by a subsequent amendment of State Constitution; Hedgman v. Board, 26 Mich. 54, 12 Am. Rep. 299, holding that a child of fugitive slaves does not become a citizen of the United States, under act of 1802, by coming to reside in the United States; State v. Walsh, 31 Neb. 477, 478, 48 N. W. 265, holding that the provisions of law of 1875, in force when improvement bonds were issued, remained in force as to all improvement bonds after passage of the act and before adoption of the Constitution; Blease v. Pratt, 3 S. C. 514, holding that liberation of a slave cannot be set up as a defense to a bond for the purchase of such slave on the ground of failure of consideration; Lewis v. Woodfolk, 2 Baxt. 51, holding that a change in Louisiana Constitution, annulling existing contracts for sales of slaves, was unconstitutional, and would not be recognized in Tennessee. Cited obiter in Poutz v. Reggio, 25 La. Ann. 644, considering validity of mortgage given to secure price of slaves.

Miscellaneous.- Mentioned in dissenting opinion in Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 663, and Elliott Nat. Bank v. Western, etc., R. R. 2 Lea, 680, incidentally.

13 Wall. 654-664, 20 L. 689, OSBORN v. NICHOLSON.

Contract valid when and where it is made, is valid everywhere, p.

656.

Cited in Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Woods, 248 F. C. 8,541, denying power of State to cancel the charter of the Louisiana State Lottery Company before expiration of the term granted.

Constitutional law.- Constitution of Arkansas of 1868, annulling contracts for purchase or sale of slaves, and prohibiting their enforcement, is, as to all prior transactions, in conflict with contract clause of National Constitution, p. 656.