sion as to this defense must be the same, as the court is unhesitatingly of the opinion from the proofs that the supposed inventor did not construct the circular apron, and attach the same to the square platform, and use the two in conjunction until after the complainants' invention was perfected and reduced to practice as an operative machine. Evidence was also introduced by the respond ents respecting the invention of Nelson Platt, but extended discussion upon that topic is unnecessary, as it is hardly contended by the respondents that the machine contains a quadrant shaped platform with, and immediately behind, the cutting apparatus, and in such relation to the main frame as that described in the specification of the complainants' patent. They appear to shrink from that proposition, which is the only one involved in this defense, and seek shelter under another, of a very different character, which is that the difference between the two is so very slight that it required no invention to pass from the former to the latter, which is a matter appertaining to another head of the defense that has previously been fully considered and the point distinctly overruled. witnesses examined by the complainants testify Properly understood, that machine does not contain a combination of the quadrant shaped platform with the cutting apparatus in any 554*] practical sense. On the contrary, it *has a square platform combined with the cutting ap- None of these defenses, however, were susparatus, and the quadrant shaped platform is tained in the court below, but the circuit combined with the square platform; nor does it judges were of the opinion that the proofs contain any quadrant shaped platform to re- failed to show that the respondents had inceive the grain as it falls, but the ingredients of fringed the letters patent of the complainants. the invention, as well as the combination, are Actual inventors of a combination of two or different from those in the complainants' ma- more ingredients in a machine, secured by letchine, and the mode of operation is also differ-ters patent in due form, are entitled, even ent, which is all that need be said in response to that defense. Substantially the same defenses were also set up to the other re-issued letters patent, to the extent that those patents were put in issue in the pleadings, but it will not be necessary to restate the objections to their originality nor to present any response to the same, as to do so would only be to repeat what has been said in respect to the one more particularly assailed in argument. Attempt is also made to show that the original letters patent described in the bill of complaint are also invalid, because the patentees are not the original and first inventors of the improvements therein secured. Whether they were or were not the original and first inventors of the improvement in the first claim is a matter of no importance in this case, as the pleadings do not put that claim in issue. They only put in issue the second claim, which embodies the described method of hanging the reel so as to dispense with any post or reel bearer next to the standing grain, to prevent the grain from getting caught between the divider and the reel supporter, and the only evidence introduced of prior invention is what is contained in an article published in London, in the Mechanics' Magazine. Expert witnesses were examined in respect to it by both sides. One examined by the respondents testified that he did not understand that it had any real support on the grain side of the machine, which in that respect is like the machine of the complainants; but three expert though the ingredients are old, if the combination produces a new and useful result, to treat every one as an infringer who makes and uses or vends the machine to others to be used without their authority or license. Pitts v. Whitman, 2 Story, 619; Ames v. Howard, 1 Sumn. 487. They cannot suppress subsequent improvements which are substantially different, whether the new improvements consist in a new combination of the same ingredients or of the substitution of some newly discovered ingredient, or of some old one performing some new function not known at the date of the let [*556 ters patent, as a proper substitute for the ingredient withdrawn from the combination constituting their invention. Mere formal alterations in a combination in letters patent, however, are no defense to the charge of infringement, and the withdrawal of one ingredient from the same and the substitution of another which was well known at the date of the patent as a proper substitute for the one withdrawn, is a mere formal alteration of the combination if the ingredient substituted performs, substantially, the same function as the one withdrawn. Patentees, therefore, are entitled in all cases to invoke to some extent the doctrine of equivalents, but they are never entitled to do so in any case to suppress all other substantial improvements, and the rule which disallows such pretensions, if properly understood and limited, is as applicable to the inventor of a device, or 1870. SEYMOUR V. OSBORNE. Briefly de even of an entire machine, as to the inventor | been infringed by the respondents. of a mere combination, except that the inventor scribed it consists of a combination of the cutan in- ting apparatus of a harvester with a quadrant of the latter cannot treat anyone as fringer whose machine does not contain all of shaped platform *arranged in the rear [*558 the material ingredients of the prior combina- thereof, and with a sweep rake operated by tion, as in that state of the case the subsequent mechanism in such a manner that its teeth are invention is regarded as substantially different caused to sweep over the platform in curves from the former one, unless the latter machine when acting on the grain and to discharge the employs as a substitute for the ingredient left stalks crosswise in the direction of the swath out, to perform the same function, some other and out of the way of the team on the return of ingredient which was well known as a proper the machine. substitute for the same when the former invention was patented. Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. 341; Johnson v. Root, 2 Cliff. 123. Bona fide inventors of a combination are as much entitled to suppress every other combination of the same ingredients to produce the same result, not substantially different from what they have invented and caused to be patented, as any other class of inventors. All alike have the right to suppress every colorable invasion of that which is secured to them by their letters patent, and it is a mistake to suppose that this court ever intended to lay down any different rule of decision. Guided by these rules, the remaining question for the determination of the court is whether the respondents 557*] *have infringed the several patents described in the bill of complaint. Two combinations are also contained in the re-issued patent 1683, but the respondents are not charged with infringing the second, so that it is only necessary in this connection to refer to the first and describe its operation. It consists of a combination of the cutting apparatus with a reel and with a quadrant shaped platform located in the rear of the cutting apparatus, operating as follows: the cutting apparatus severing the grain, the reel bearing the grain against the cutting apparatus and insuring its delivery upon the quadrant shaped platform in the rear thereof, and the quadrant shaped platform receiving the grain from the cutting apparatus and reel, and supporting it in such a manner that it can be moved from the cutting apparatus, heads foremost, swept round in a curve and discharged upon the ground crosswise to the direction of the swath and out of the track of the horses when the machine comes round to cut the next swath. Patent numbered 72 is also an arrangement of the quadrant shaped platform immediately behind the cutting apparatus of a reaping machine, so that the platform will receive the grain as it falls from the cutting apparatus, and will support it in such a manner that it may be swept around in a curvilinear path and discharged, heads foremost, upon the ground at the side of the platform out of the path of the horses when they return. Infringement is alleged by the complainants, and the burden is upon them to prove the allegation, as it imputes a wrongful act to the respondents. All controversy, as to the character of the machines made and sold by the respond ents, is closed by their admission set forth in the record. Exhibit six, it is conceded by the respondents, is an accurate representation of the machines which they made and sold, and the complainants accept the admission as correct. Absolute certainty, therefore, attends that inquiry, and there is very little, if any, more difficulty in ascertaining the construction of the patented machines made and furnished to the public by the complainants, so that the only substantial inquiry is, whether the machines made and sold by the respondents infringe the patented machines of the complainants, as the latter embody all the inventions of the complainants except the claims pointed out as not infringed, and the proofs satisfy the court that the exhibits are constructed in accordance without any projection of the reel shaft or bearing the mechanism described in the several letters patent. Properly construed the re-issued patent number 4 is the combination of a quadrant shaped platform located behind the cutting apparatus of the harvester so as to receive the grain as it falls after it is cut, with an automatic sweep rake so constructed as to sweep over the platform in circular curves, and to move forward and backward, or towards and from the cutting apparatus, so as to seize upon the grain as it falls, after being cut, sweeping it over the platform in circular curves and delivering it upon the ground behind the machine with its stalks at right angles, or nearly so, with the line of progression of the machine, and to return by a forward movement towards the cutting apparatus to the original position when the first operation commenced. Number 1682 is divided into two parts, the first of which may be used without the second, and it is not charged that the second part has Reference will only be made to the second part.of the original patent embraced in the suit, as it is not charged that the respondents have infringed the other claim. Separated from the second claim the first consists in a mode of hanging the reel in a reaping machine so as to dispense with any post or reel bearer on the side next to the standing grain, with "therefor on that side of the machine, [*559 so that the reel overhangs the bearings on the one side and is without support on the other side. Prior to the act of Congress allowing several patents to be issued for distinct and separate parts of the thing patented, it is not probable that a bill of complaint joining five several patents in the same charge of infringement would have escaped objection from the respondent, but it will be noticed that all the claims appertain to the same general subject, and that it requires all of the inventions in question to constitute a complete self-raking harvester or reaping machine, and that they are all embodied in the machines which the complainants make and furnish to the public. Viewed in that light the court is of the opinion that the objection, if it had been made, could not have been sustained. 5 Stat. at L. 192. Where the invention or inventions are embodied in a machine, the question of infringe 43 ment is best determined by a comparison of the machine made by the respondent with the mechanism described in the complainant's patent or patents, where more than one is embraced in the same suit. Blanchard v. Putnam, 8 Wall. 426, 19 L. ed. 435. Comparisons of the kind have been carefully made by the court, aided by the evidence of the expert witnesses, as exhibited in the record, and the court is of the opinion that the several inventions of the complainants, excepting the claims pointed out as not infringed, are embodied in the machines made and sold by the respondents. Two of the expert witnesses testify to that effect without qualification, and the reasons which they assign for that conclusion are, in the opinion of the court, decisive of the question. Some attempt was made in the cross-examination of those witnesses to elicit an answer that the sweep rake employed by the respond ents operated differently from the correspond ing device of the complainants in the several reissued patents, but the attempt was wholly unsuccessful, and called forth explanations which confirm the conclusion that the two devices have substantially the same operation. 560*] *Special reference is made in the opinion of the district judge to the means employed by the respondents in supporting the reel as showing that the machines which they have made and sold do not infringe the second claim of the original patent. His view is that their machines do not infringe that claim because they do not employ but one reel post instead of two, as shown in the complainants' patent, but it is so obvious that the one post with the frame attached to the upper end is substantially the same thing that it is not deemed necessary to pursue the argument. For these reasons we are all of the opinion that the complainants are entitled to a decree that their several patents are valid, and for an account and for a perpetual injunction, except as to such, if any, as have expired. Decree reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity to the opinion of the court. ELIZABETH W. EDMONSON, James A. 0. ADAM BLOOMSHIRE et al. (See S. C. 11 Wall. 382-391.) Construction of clause in will. Where a testatrix made her last will and testament, in which she uses the phrase. "My certificates that are in the hands of my brother Ben:" held. that a certificate as to bounty lands, which had been surrendered to the register of the land office. and was never in the hands of the brother of the testatrix, was not included in such phrase. [No. 55.] Argued Jan. 10, 1871. Decided Jan. 23, 1871. Ohio. missing the bill, the complainants took an appeal to this court. A statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. John B. Baldwin and H. Stanbery for plaintiff in error. Messrs. J. W. Robinson and T. W. Lawrence for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Volunteer forces for the public service in the war of the Revolution were, in many instances, furnished by the States, and all such, as well as the regular forces, were paid for their services to a large extent in continental money, which so depreciated in a short time as to become almost valueless. Troops for that service were raised by the state of Virginia, known as the Virginia line on continental establishment, and they also. were paid for their services in that currency; and in order to afford relief for the loss which the troops sustained in that way, the legislature of the state, at the November session, 1781, passed an act directing the auditor of public accounts to settle and adjust the pay and accounts of the officers and soldiers of that line, so as to make their claims for pay and subsistence equal to specie, such adjustment to cover the period from the first day of January, 1777, to the last day of December, 1781; and the directions to the auditor were that he should issue printed certificates to the respective applicants for the balance found due to them in such adjustment, payable on or before the first day of January, 1785, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum. 10 Hen. Stat. (Va.) 462. Directions were also given to the auditor in the same act that he should in like manner settle and adjust the accounts *of all of- [*384 ficers and soldiers of the said line who have fallen or died in the service during that period, and the provision was that their representatives should be entitled to such certificates, and all other benefits and advantages therein granted to the officers and soldiers in the line at the date of the act. Ibid. 463. None of these matters are the subject of controversy, and it is also alleged and admitted that William Rickman, of Charles City, Virginia, was a deputy director-general in the Virginia line on continental establishment; that he served three years or more as such director, and that he thereby became entitled also to Virginia military bounty lands. On the 7th of August, 1778, William Rickman made and published his last will and testament, by which he gave and bequeathed to his wife, Elizabeth Rickman, all his estate both real and personal, in fee simple, and appointed his wife, together with Benjamin Harrison, her father and her brother, Benjamin Harrison, Jr., the executors of his warwar mache and pur United States for the Southern District of lished. Three years afterwards the testator The bill in this case was filed in the court below, by the appellants, to obtain title to certain lands. That court having entered a decree dis NOTE.-Interpretation of wills; intention of tes lied, leaving the said last will and testament unrevoked and in full force, and the same was subsequently duly proved and admitted to record. Application in behalf of Elizabeth Rickman, as the widow and executrix of her deceased tator to govern-see note to Pray v. Belt, 7 L. ed. husband, was afterwards made to the auditor U. S. 309. of public accounts to settle and adjust the pay | and subsistence accounts of the testator as an officer in the Virginia line on continental establishment, and on the 28th of February, 1784, the requested adjustment was made. By that adjustment the auditor of public accounts found that there was a balance due to the deceased, or to his legal representatives, of one thousand seven hundred and twenty-two pounds nineteen shillings and two pence, and the record shows that the evidence of the indebtedness of the state to the deceased for that amount was delivered to B. Harrison on the same day the adjustment was made. 385] *Prior to that adjustment, to wit, on the 29th of November, 1783, the House of Delegates of Virginia passed two resolutions which it becomes important to notice: 1. That the petition of Elizabeth Rickman praying that the auditor of public accounts should settle and adjust the pay and accounts of her late husband was reasonable, showing satisfactorily that the adjustment was largely influenced by the Legislature. 2. That Elizabeth Rickman, widow of William Rickman, be allowed such a portion of land as the rank and service of the deceased merit. Pursuant to the second resolution the governor of the state, Benjamin Harrison, on the 12th of January, 1784, executed a certificate that Elizabeth Rickman, widow and executrix of William Rickman, director-general, is entitled to the proportion of land allowed a colonel in the continental line who has served three years, and on the following day a warrant for six thousand six hundred and sixty-six and two thirds acres was issued to her, signed by the register of the state land office. Five years later she intermarried with John Edmondson, and they afterwards, during the succeeding year, united in executing a deed of trust or post-nuptial agreement to her brother, Carter B. Harrison, of all her estate, real and personal, or to which she was entitled under the will of her former husband, for her separate use and advartage, her heirs, executors and administrators, the husband stipulating therein that she might dispose of the same by her last will and testament as she should see fit to do. On the 3d of May, 1790, Elizabeth Edmondson made her last will and testament, which was olographic, and on the first day of January, 1791, she died, leaving her will in full force, and on the twentieth of the same month the will was proved and admitted to record in the county where she resided at her decease. Absolute title to the lands embraced in the warrant signed by the land register is claimed by the complainants, upon the ground that the same were devised in fee simple by Elizabeth 386] *Edmondson to her husband, John Edmondson, by her last will and testament; but the respondents deny that her will, when properly construed, contains any such devise; and insist that the will, if it made any disposition of those lands, only devised to the husband a life estate in the same; and that the fee simple title to the same, inasmuch as the testatrix died without issue, descended to her brothers and sis ters, under whom they claim, as alleged in the answer. Unless the course of descent was broken by the will of the testatrix, it is clear that her brothers and sisters became the owners of the lands embraced in that warrant, as it is conceded that she died without issue. Afterwards, in the year 1795, the said John Edmondson married again, and the record shows that he had three children by the second wife, one of whom died before the father without issue, leaving John and Elizabeth, the latter having since intermarried with Littleton Waddell, the other complainant and appellant in the case before the court. Before his decease, John Edmondson, the father of the two appellants, John and Elizabeth, also made a will and devised all his property to his three children, one of whom, as before stated, died during the lifetime of the father. His will bears date on the 3d of October, 1802, and the pleadings show that he died on the first day of December following, leaving the two children before named as his principal devisees and sole heirs at law. They, together with the husband of Elizabeth, claim the lands in controversy upon the ground that the same were devised to the father of John and Elizabeth by the will of his first wife. Defenses of various kinds are set up in the answer, but in the view taken of the case it is not necessary to enter into those details, as the court is of the opinion that the decision of the case must turn upon the construction of the will of Elizabeth Edmondson, deceased, it being conceded that she held the title to the lands in controversy under the warrant granted to her for the same by the state. Proofs were introduced by both parties, but the circuit court was of the opinion that the complainants were not entitled to re- [*387 cover, and entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint. Whereupon the complainants appealed to this court, but the appeal was dismissed, it appearing on the face of the record that the transcript was not filed in this court during the term next succeeding the allowance of the appeal. Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 306, 19 L. ed. 91. Since that time a new appeal has been allowed to the complainants and they have removed the cause into this court, seeking to reverse the same decree from which the first appeal was taken. Pending the present appeal, a motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents, which was heard at the same time with the merits; but the questions involved in the motion will not be decided, as the court is of the opinion that the decree of the circuit court, dismissing the bill of complaint for the want of equity, is correct. Motions of the kind are usually determined before proceeding to examine the merits of the controversy, but the court deems it proper to adopt a different course on the present occasion for the following reasons, among others which might be mentioned: (1) Because differences of opinion exist in the court as to the proper disposition to be made of the motion, irrespective of the fact that the case has been twice heard upon the merits; (2) because the respondents, when the case was here before, went to final hearing without making any objections to the regularity of the appeal. Affirmative relief, it is true, could not be granted to the complainants without first disposing of some of the questions involved in the motion, but inasmuch as an affirmance of the decree of the circuit court will effect substantially the same result as a dismissal of the appeal, the court is not inclined to decide the preliminary questions. Letters of administration on the estate of Elizabeth Edmondson were granted to John Edmondson, the husband of the deceased, as no executor was named in the will. Several bequests to the husband were made by the testa388*] trix in the will which need not be noticed, as they furnish no aid in the solution of the question presented for decision. Those clauses relate to certain articles of personal property which she gave to her husband forever, and to certain slaves which she gave to him "to dispose of as he may think proper." Preceding the clause disposing of the articles of personal property the will contains the following devise: "I give to my dear husband, John Edmondson, all the land I possess, during his life," but the will contains no residuary clause of a general nature. Enough appears to show that the testatrix owned real estate, as she devised the house and land where she lived, at the death of her husband, to one of her brothers, and to another brother she gave, at the decease of her husband, a certain other tract described in the will as having been purchased by her first husband, but the will does not, in terms, make any ultimate disposition of the lands devised to her husband during his life except those two parcels, and the complainants do not controvert the proposition that the lands in question, if they were devised to the husband under that clause of the will, descended at his decease to the brothers and sisters of the testatrix, as contended by the respondents. They deny, however, that the lands in controversy or any portion of the same were devised to him by that clause. On the contrary, they rely upon another clause in the will as the foundation of their claim, which follows the bequests before mentioned to her husband, and certain other bequests of like kind to her brothers and sisters and other relatives, specifying in each of the several bequests the name of the legatee. Having devised all the land she possessed to her husband during his life, and made those bequests, the testatrix provides as follows: "My certificates that are in the hands of my brother Ben, 1 desire may be given to my husband, to dispose of as he may think proper." Founded on that clause in the will, the theory, of the complainants is, that the warrant signed by the land agent for the six thousand six hundred and sixty-six and two thirds acres of bounty lands was devised to their father, and that at 389*] the decease of the testatrix *he became the owner in fee simple of the lands surveyed and located under that warrant, and that they, as the devisees in his will and his sole heirs at law, are the lawful owners of the lands in controversy. Support to that theory is attempted to be drawn from the fact that the governor, before the warrant was signed, granted a certificate in which he certificed that the widow and executrix of the deceased claimant was entitled to the proportion of land allowed to a colonel of the continental line who had served three years, but the decisive answer to any such attempt is, that the certificate of the governor was, on the following day, deposited in the proper office as the legal foundation of the land-warrant, where it has ever since remained. Most of the introductory allegations of the bill of complaint are admitted by the respondents. They also admit that Elizabeth Rickman, before her marriage with John Edmondson, obtained the certificates for the balance due her first husband for pay and subsistence as director-general in the continental line, and also for the interest due on the same, and that she also obtained the warrant for the lands in controversy, but they utterly deny that the word "certificates," as used in the clause of the will under which the complainants claim, means or intends the warrant in question or the lands described in the pleadings. Persons having claims to bounty lands were required at that time, by the laws of that state, to exhibit their vouchers to the executive, and if found to be correct and the claim was allowed, it was the duty of the governor to issue a certificate to that effect to the register of the land office, and the register, upon the filing of that certificate, was required to grant the warrant. 11 Hen. Stat. 83; Swan's Land Laws, 118. More than six years before the testatrix made her last will and testament in which she uses the phrase "my certificates that are in the hands of my brother Ben," the certificate *as [*390 to the bounty lands had been surrendered to the register of the land office, and the land-warrant in question had been issued in its place, and there is no evidence that the land warrant or the certificate which preceded it was ever in the hands of any one of the brothers of the testatrix. Undoubtedly the certificate for the balance due for pay and the subsistence accounts arising from the depreciation of the currency in which the original claimant was paid and the certificates for the interest on the same did pass by that clause in the will to the husband of the testatrix, and the proofs are satisfactory that those certificates were in the hands of her brother Benjamin at the date of the will. Those certificates bear date on the 28th of February, 1784, and they were immediately delivered to the brother named in the will as having them in his hands, where they remained to the date of the will of the testatrix and to the time of her death. Certified copies of the certificate signed by the governor as the foundation for the land-warrant are exhibited in the record as given by the register of the land office, which shows that it could not have been in the hands of her brother at the date of the will, as it had been in the register's office more than six years before the will was executed. Suppose, however, that it appeared that the land-warrant had been in the possession of her brother, from its date to the time when the testatrix died, still it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hold that the signification of the word "certificates," as used in the will, is sufficiently comprehensive to include that instrument, as the word "certificate" seems to have an appropriate and direct reference to the instruments of evidence issued to the testatrix for the back pay and subsistence accounts of her former husband, as before explained. Attempt is made in argument to show that the words "certificate" and "warrant" are sometimes used in the statutes of the state as words of equivalent import, but the examples put do |