Mr. William M. Stewart, for appellee, presented the opinion of court below as his argument, from which is the following: From this examination of the documents, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that they are all false and were fabricated by Bolcoff, or some one at his instigation, to defraud the sisters of their property and secure the title to himself. By the false and fabricated documents, and the suppression or destruction of the grant to the sisters, a confirmation of the claim under the alleged grant to Bolcoff has been obtained, and the legal title secured to his children; when, in truth and fact, the real title was in the three sisters, and should have been adjudged to them. Under these circumstances, upon obvious principles of justice, the patentees and all persons holding under them, with notice of the claim of the sisters, should be decreed to surrender up the title. The right of the complainant to a decree of this character rests upon the established doctrine, that whenever property is acquired by fraud, or under such circumstances as to render it inequitable for the holder of the legal title to retain it, a court of chancery will convert him into a trustee of the true owner. 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 4; Hardy v. Harbin, U. S. C. C. for Cal., June term for 1865. This is not the case of the confirmation and patent upon an independent grant, having no relations to the proceedings of the sisters, but upon a grant alleged to have been given by agreement to Bolcoff, as a substitute for the one decreed to the sisters. The case proceeds upon the ground that the confirmees obtained by fraud or confirmation in their name, the rights granted to the sisters, and by reason of the confirmation have secured the possession of the legal title to the premises. It is the possession of this legal title which prevents the complainant from maintaining ejectment for the premises, and drives him into a court of chancery for relief. In this state, the statute of limitations, as we have had occasion to observe, differs essentially from the English statute, and from statutes of limitation in most of the other states. Those statutes, in terms, apply only to particular legal remedies; and courts of equity there are said to be bound by them only in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, and in other cases to act only by analogy to the statutes, and not in obedience to them. But in this state the statute applies as well to equitable as to legal remedies. It is directed to the subject-matter, and not the form of the proceeding, or the forum in which it is prosecuted. Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 486; Hardy v. Har bin, U. S. C. C. Cal. June term, 1865. to all cases in equity; but it is not necessary now to go so far. For even where it was not essential, by the old rules, to plead the statute or to refer to it in terms; yet, to claim any benefit from it, the pleador was required to state facts sufficient to bring the case within its operation, and then to insist that, by reason of those facts, the remedy of the complainant was barred. This has not been done by the defendants in this case; their claim, made in argument, only that the relief is barred, will not answer. 2 Madd. Ch. 309; Van Hook v. Whitlock, 7 Paige, 381. The presentation or non-presentation by the sisters of their claim under the grant of the board of Land Commissioners, has nothing to do with the equitable relations between them and third parties. The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently determined, to quote its own language, that the government had no interest in the contests between persons claiming ex post facto the grant. Castro v. Hendricks, 23 How. 442, 16 L. ed. 577. The supreme court of California, while holding that the legal title was vested in the confirmee, has, in repeated instances, declared that equities between him and third parties remained unaffected. See, Hardy v. Harbin, where this subject is considered at length. See, also, Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; and the recent decision in Salmon v. Symons, 30 Cal. 306. If, in this case, after the sisters had obtained their grant, Bolcoff had fabricated a deed from them of the property, and presented the claim in his own name and obtained a confirmation and patent, no question could be made against their right to demand the transfer to them of the legal title. He could not be heard to say that they would have lost the property by nonpresentation, and that, therefore, he should be left alone in his fraudulent acquisition. His mouth would be stopped by his fraud. Nor, indeed, could it be in truth affirmed by anyone, that the property would have ultimately been lost to the sisters, and that relief might not have been afforded them by appropriate legislation. As observed in the Hardy Case, the finder of personal property might, with equal propriety, justify its detention on the ground that the true owner would never have found it. Now, the case supposed is, in all its essential features, the case at bar; the only difference being the presentation of a fabricated grant from the governor, instead of a fabricated deed of the sisters, with a representation that the grant was issued to Bolcoff by agreement with the sisters, as a substitute for the one decreed to them, and in fact issued to them. It would be a reproach to the administration of justice, if a court of equity could afford no remedy to the injured parties. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: There would seem, therefore, to be as good reason for requiring parties claiming the bar of the statute to suits in equity in this state when the objection is not raised by demurrer, to plead such statute or insist upon it in the answer, as there is for a similar rule when the bar of the statute is invoked in actions at law. In some cases such is the rule now, as in suits Claims to lands in California by virtue of to have an account of rents and profits of land. | any right or title derived from the former gov See, Prince v. Heylin, 1 Atk. 493. ernment were required to be presented to the And were it necessary, we should not hesi-land commissioners, and authority was vested tate to hold that the rule in this state applies in the commissioners to decide upon the valid ity of such claims and to certify their decisions, with the reasons for the same, to the district attorney for the district. Applicants for such confirmations were required to present their claims to the commis452*] sioners when sitting as a *board, but the act of Congress made no provision for notice to any adverse claimant, and the proceedings before the commissioners were wholly ex parte unless opposed by the district attorney. Power to review such decisions was vested in the district court, on petition of the claimant in case of rejection, or of the district attorney in case of confirmation. 9 Stat. at L. 633. Specific regulations were enacted as to the form of such petitions, and the provision was that the district court should proceed to render judgment upon the pleadings and evidence in the case, and upon such further evidence as might be taken by the order of the said court, and that the court, on application of the party against whom judgment was rendered, should grant an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. On the 5th of May, 1852, a petition signed by the attorneys of Francisco Bolcoff and Juan Bolcoff was filed with the Land Commissioners, setting up title to the rancho El Refugio, as grantees of their father, José Bolcoff, and ask- | ing for a confirmation of their claim under the act of Congress passed to settle such private claims to lands in that state. They represented that the tract was granted to their father during Mexican rule by the governor of that department under the colonization laws ordained by the supreme government. Pursuant to the requirements of the act of Congress they filed with their petition their documentary evidences of title, consisting of the following documents: (1) A paper bearing date on the 7th of April, 1841, purporting to be a grant of the rancho El Refugio to José Bolcoff by Juan B. Alvarado, governor of the department at the date of the supposed grant. (2) The certificate of Governor Alvarado, dated the 28th of July, 1841, stating that the grant made on the 8th of April, 1839, in favor of José Bolcoff, was approved on the 22d of May, 1841, by the Departmental Assembly. (3) 453*] A document dated the 26th of July, 1842, purporting to be a record of juridical possession of the tract given to the supposed grantee by the proper Mexican authorities. (4) The diseño or sketch of the tract described in the petition addressed to the governor by the original donee. Proof of the handwriting of the persons whose names purport to be signed to the documents was introduced by the petitioners, and as no question was made as to the authenticity of the documents, they were received as genuine and treated as such in the hearing, and the commissioners entered a decree in favor of the petitioners, confirming the claim. Both parties concede that an appeal was taken on behalf of the United States to the district court, but it was never prosecuted to effect and was subsequently dismissed. Patents may be issued for all claims confirmed by the commissioners where no appeal was taken, the claimant complying with the conditions specified in the 13th section of the act providing for the adjudication of such claims; that is, he must present to the General Land Office an authentic certificate of such confirmation and a plat or survey of the land duly certified and approved by the surveyor-general. Such an application was accordingly made by the confirmees to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and he, on the 4th of February, 1860, issued a patent in due form to the persons in whose favor the decree was entered, and to whom the certificate of confirmation was granted. Title to the land is claimed by the appellants under that patent. Attention will now be called to the evidences of title under which the appellee claims in this case. On the 13th of February, 1839, three orphans, daughters of Joaquin Castro, a deceased Mexican citizen, to wit, Maria Candida, Maria Jacinta and Maria de los Angeles, presented their petition to Juan B. Alvarado, Governor of California, asking for a grant of the rancho El Refugio. Reference of the petition was made to the administrator of the adjoining mission, and he having reported, on the 16th of March, 1839, *that the land [*454 could be granted, as the land was not necessary to the mission, the governor, on the same day, made a provisional grant of the same to the petitioners and referred the espediente to the prefect of the district, as was the usual course in respect to such applications. Immediate attention was given to the subject by that officer, and on the twentieth of the same month he reported to the governor that the land was vacant, and recommended that the grant should be issued to the petitioners. Evidently the several documents constituting the complete espediente show a full compliance with all the requirements of the colonization laws, and it is quite clear that the case was so understood by the governor, as on the 8th of April, in the same year, he issued the concession in which the petitioners are declared to be the owners in fee of the land. Specific boundaries are given to the tract granted and the directions in the same document are that the espediente be reserved for the consideration of the Departmental Assembly and their due approval of the same. Due report of the proceedings was made to that tribunal, and the record shows that on the 22d of May, 1840, they formally approved of the grant. that Satisfactory proof was introduced Maria Candida intermarried with José Bolcoff, and that Maria de los Angeles intermarried with Joseph L. Majors. Prior to the marriage of Maria de los Angeles, the three sisters lived together as members of the family of José Bolcoff, the husband of the elder, and Maria Jacinta continued to reside in his family on the premises until 1850, when she became a nun and entered a convent. By the record it appears that Joseph L. Majors, on the 30th of April, 1852, presented a petition to the commissioners claiming title in right of his wife to one third of the rancho El Refugio, setting up the concession made by the governor, to his wife and her two sisters, and asked that the claim might be confirmed. In support of his claim he introduced the several documents referred to as tending to show that the concession to the three sisters was a valid grant of the rancho; but the commis- [*455 sioners, on the 30th of January, 1855, rejected the claim, evidently proceeding upon the ground that the documents introduced by the other claimants were genuine. and satisfactorily disproved. Beyond all doubt the entire espediente, except the titulo, was in the name of the three sisters, and the formal concession, which was also in their name, directed that the ultimate title should be issued to them and be recorded in the proper book; and discoveries made since the patent was issued show that the grant was entered in the Toma de Razon and in Jimeno's Index. Apart from that consideration the commissioners were, doubtless, much influenced by the testimony of the governor, who was examined as a witness by the successful claimants. He admitted that he granted the rancho in the first place to the three sisters, but he stated that he made the grant at the request of Maria Candida, the wife of José Bolcoff, and that he subsequently re-granted the land to her husband at her request and upon her representation that an arrangement to that effect beers, and it may be doubted whether they would tween her husband and the husband of her other married sister had been made. His statement was that he granted the new title to José Bolcoff because the parties agreed upon it, although he admitted that neither of the other two grantees ever came before him or made any such request. Subsequent investigations led to the discovery that the documents, or most of the documents, introduced in support of the claim of José Bolcoff, were forged and fraudulent, which induced the appellee, claim ing title under the three sisters, to commence the present suit. Confirmed as the claim of José Bolcoff was at the same time that the claim of the three sisters was rejected, they did not appeal nor would they have been benefited if they had, as the claim was confirmed to the other claim ants, and they were not parties in that litigation and could not appeal from the decree. Had all the facts and circumstances been known, the unsuccessful claimant might, perhaps, have presented a petition to the district judge and have procured an injunction restraining the confirmees of the claim "from suing out a patent for the same until title thereto" had been "finally decided," but it is a sufficient answer to any such suggestion that the patent was issued before the alleged forgeries were discovered. Remediless as the appeal was at law, he instituted the present suit in the circuit court. His theory is, as shown in the bill of complaint, 456*] that the grant was, in fact, made to *the three sisters, and that their names were erased and the name of the successful claimant inserted in the same, and that the commissioners were induced by false swearing, forgery and fraud, to confirm the claim to the grantees of the party guilty of all those offenses, as the means of his success and of the defeat of the claim of the three sisters, to whom the rancho really belonged. Much weight is due to those documents as evidences of title, even when they are not introduced in the particular case before the court. They were not produced before the commissionhave benefited the case of the three sisters if they had been, as their names are erased in the entry and the name of José Bolcoff written in their place, and as no suspicion of forgery or fraud existed at that time it may be doubted whether the production of the documents would have changed the result. Conjectures in that behalf, however, are of no avail, as it now appears that all or nearly all of the title papers introduced to support that title were [*457 forged and fraudulent, showing, to the entire satisfaction of the court, that the equity of the case was in the three sisters. Further argument upon that topic is unnecessary, as the proofs are persuasive, convincing and decisive. Detailed reference to them is given in the opinion delivered by the circuit court, and to that the parties can recur if they desire to examine the documents or the statements of the witnesses as exhibited in the depositions sent up in the record. Suppose that is so, still it is insisted by the appellants that the decree should be reversed because the decree of the commissioners, as they contend, was final and conclusive between the original claimants. Unquestionably, it is a general rule that when jurisdiction is delegated to a tribunal over a subject-matter, and its exercise is confided to their discretion, the decision of the matter, in the absence of fraud, is, in general, valid and conclusive. Even fraud will not in every case open the judgment or decree to review where the proceeding is not a direct one, but it is not important to enter much into that field of inquiry, as the 15th section of the act under which the commissioners were appointed provides that the final decrees rendered by the commissioners or by the district or Supreme Court of the United States, or any patent to be issued under the act, shall be conclusive between the United States and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons. 9 Stat. at L. 634. Nothing more is contemplated by the pro the lands which were owned by individuals from the public domain. U. S. v. Morillo, 1 Wall. 709, 17 L. ed. 627; Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 493, 18 L. ed. 93; U. S. v. Sanchez, Hoffm. L. Cas. 133: Martin v. U. S. Hoffm. L. Cas. 146; U. S. v. Ortega, Hoffm. L. Cas. 135. All such charges are denied in the answer, but they are fully proved by the documents exceedings under that act than the separation of hibited in the case and by such facts and circumstances as leave no doubt in the mind of the court that the charges are true. Even the governor admits, in his deposition taken in this case, that the espediente, including the concession, was prepared in the name of the three sisters, but he states that when the titulo was prepared the wife of José Bolcoff came before him, and that upon her representation that her sisters were to receive an interest in another rancho. the title papers were made out in the name of her husband. Such a theory is highly improbable, but the much better answer to it is that it is clearly Argument is not necessary to show that a patent in a suit at law is conclusive evidence of title against the United States and all others claiming under the United States by a junior title. Until the patent issues the fee is in the government, *but when it is- [*458 sues the legal title passes to the patentee. Persons claiming to hold the land against the patent cannot have relied in a suit at law, but courts of equity have full jurisdiction to relieve against fraud or mistake, and that power plainly extends to cases where one man has procured the patent which belonged to another at the time the patent was issued. Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436; Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 380. Where one party has acquired the legal right to property to which another has the better right, a court of equity will convert him into a trustee of the true owner, and compel him to convey the legal title. Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 419, 18 L. ed. 930. Objection was taken in the court below that some of the respondents were innocent purchasers, but that objection cannot have any weight at this time, as all the appellants before the court had notice of the title of the appellee, as clearly appears by the report of the master. None of those who purchased without notice are embraced in the decree. Laches and the statute of limitations are set up in argument, but such defenses cannot prevail where the relief sought is grounded on a charge of secret fraud, and it appears that the suit was commenced within a reasonable time after the evidence of the fraud was discovered. Decree affirmed. UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. GIDEON B. WRIGHT, et al. (See S. C. 11 Wall. 648-650.) Discretion in officer-court or jury cannot revise. The instruction by the judge who tried the case was erroneous, which referred to the jury a matter which, under the law, rested wholly in the discretion of the Postmaster-General. By the act of March 3, 1863, Congress constituted him the sole judge to determine, not only whether the exigencies in the case had arisen, but, if they had, the manner and extent of the allowance to postmasters under that act; and it is not competent for court or jury to revise his decision. usual business accrues thereat, the PostmasterGeneral is hereby required to make a special order, allowing proportionately reasonable compensation to the postmaster and for clerical services." It appeared in evidence at the trial, that the Postmaster-General had refused to allow the defendant, Wright, the claim for clerk hire, preferred by him under the provisions of this section, and the inquiry arose, whether the decision was final. The learned judge who tried the cause held that the action of the department was not conclusive on the subject, and instructed the jury to allow the postmaster a fair compensation for clerical assistance, if in their opinion, the state of things existed calling for the allowance. This instruction was clearly erroneous, for it referred to the jury a matter which, under the law, rested wholly in the discretion of the Postmaster-General. The act of March 3d, 1863, which embraces the section upon whose construction the disposition of the case depended, effected great changes in the administration of the Postoffice Department, but it did not take from the Postmaster-General the right to control and regulate the allowances to Postmasters and the expenses of their offices, which was conferred by the 9th section of the act of July 5, 1836. Indeed, it would seem that the general power granted by that section [*650 was sufficient to meet the exigencies provided for by the 5th section of the act of March 3, 1863, but be this as it may, the latter section did nothing more than to require the Postmaster-General, in case the business of a particular postoffice was considerably increased on account of the location of the national forces in its vicinity, to compensate the postmaster for the extra labor performed and the additional expenses incurred. The section did not go further and prescribe rules to govern the action of the PostmasterGeneral, nor did it seek to interfere with the judicial discretion of that officer. Congress constituted him the sole judge to determine not only whether the exigencies in the case had arisen but, if they had, the manner and extent of the allowance, and it is not competent for court or jury to revise his decision, nor is it provision in the law to that effect. It may be safely laid down as a general rule, says Story, confided to a public officer to be exercised by Judge, "that where a particular authority is him in his discretion, upon an examination of facts, of which he is made the appropriate judge, his decision upon these facts is, in the absence of any controlling provisions, absolutely conclusive as to the existence of those facts." Allen v. Blunt, 3 Story, 745. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of SETH H. MANN and Mary H. Mann, Appts., the court: This is a suit on the official bond of the postmaster at Gallatin, Tennessee, and a disposition of the case depends on the construction to be given to the 5th section of the act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L. p. 702, which declares that "whenever, by reason of the presence of a military or naval force near any postoffice, un v. THE ROCK ISLAND BANK. (See S. C. 11 Wall. 650-652.) Fraudulent purchase of real estate by cashier in his wife's name, with funds of bank. Where the cashier of a bank, purchased real estate, the title of which was taken to his wife, with money of the bank, the real estate will be decreed to be sold, at the suit of the bank, to pay to it the [No. 113.] money. A1 had some interest, by which $110,000 of the circulation of the Georgia Bank was to be used by the Rock Island Bank, and protected by it, and returned ultimately to the Georgia Bank; that, under pretext of a private and personal arrangement of his own, he received $20,000 of this money, which he put in circulation on his own account, and received the avails of it in real estate, the transaction being conducted in other people's names; that this money struck from the same plate, and having on it marks and figures used to distinguish the $90,000 actually received by the Rock Island Bank, was redeemed by it over its counter as the $90,000 was, while Mann got the benefit of its original Argued Mar. 28, 1871. Decided Apr. 17, 1871. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin. The bill in this case was filed in the district court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, by the appellee, to compel the subjection of certain real estate held in the name of Mary H. Mann, to the payment of a certain claim against Seth H. Mann, her husband. The case having been transferred to the circuit court, was there tried. A decree having been entered in favor of the complainant, the re-issue, and has never accounted for it to anyone. spondents took appeal to this court. The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. Wirt, Dexter, and Thomas Wilson, for appellants. No counsel appeared in this case for appellee. the court: In this case the Rock Island Bank charges by bill in chancery, that Seth H. Mann, who was then cashier of the bank, but had ceased to be so several years previous to the filing of the bill, had defrauded the bank of $20,000, and that the money itself, or the property in which it had been invested, had been converted into certain real estate, the legal title of which then stood in the name of Mary H. Mann, wife of Seth; and the bill prays for a decree against Mann, for the $20,000 with interest, and against him and his wife, and that the real estate may be subjected to the payment of the debt. The defendants answered, testimony was taken and a decree rendered that Mann was It seems pretty clear to us, that for many years prior to his connection with the Rock Island Bank, Mann had been hiding what little means he had in his wife's name; and that while the cashier of the bank, he used Mr. Osborne's name in the same manner, and when his son became of age, he was used for the same purpose. In this way, by a transfer from Osborne to his wife of shares in the Rock Island Bank, and by purchase with those shares of the Oakland Bank in her name, and by the voluntary conveyance by the son of fourteen acres of the land in question to the wife, and the conversion of the Oakland Bank stock, bonds, etc., into other real estate, and into improvements on it, the $20,000, of which Mann had defrauded the Rock Island Bank, became real estate held in the name of his wife. As the decree of the Circuit Court is based upon this view of the case, it is affirmed. liable for the money, and that the real estate SETH DEWING and Ephraim Graham, Plffs. should be sold to pay it. This decree was carried into effect by a sale of the property, and about four years afterwards, the defendants prayed an appeal to this court. No counsel appears for the Rock Island Bank. We have, therefore, been compelled to make a 652*] minute and careful analysis of the whole record. It turns in every point upon simple questions of fact. There is not a doubtful question of law involved in the entire record. That this court should be compelled to undergo the labor of finding the truth in such a mass of testimony, a duty much more appropriate to a master or to some other tribunal than this, and which in common-law cases is peculiarly the province of the jury, is itself a hindrance and obstruction to public justice by the delay which it interposes to the hearing of other cases. We do not feel that this burden should be further increased, and the time of this court, due to other parties and to more important interests, be consumed in writing and delivering opinions which, if they attempt to go into examination of the facts to justify the decision of the court, will be equally tedious and useless. In this case, a full and minute history of both branches of the controversy is given in the bill, and in the answers of the defendants. Much testimony is also taken by deposition. It appears to us that Seth Mann, as cashier and agent of the Rock Island Bank, made a contract with a bank of Georgia, in which he in Err., (See S. C. 11 Wall. 379, 380.) Judgment on contract payable in gold, should be entered for gold. livery of a specified weight of pure gold, in coined ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts. Suit was brought in the superior court for the county of Norfolk, commonwealth of Massachusetts, by the defendants in error, for money alleged to be due upon a contract of lease for the yearly rent of four ounces, two pennyweights, and twelve grains of pure gold in coined money. Judgment was given for the defendants, but subsequently, by order of the supreme judicial court of the commonwealth, NOTE. Obligations payable in gold and silver or in specie-see note, 19 L. ed. U. S. 141. Form of judgment on obligation to pay in coin -see note, 29 L. R. A. 593. 189 |