de Lafayette, with more than two thousand choice troops, to take post near the lines.* As this corps formed a very valuable part of the army, the commander-in-chief recommended, in his instructions to General Lafayette, the utmost attention to its safety; and, particularly, to avoid any permanent station, as a long continuance in one position would facilitate the execution of measures which might be concerted against him. The marquis crossed the Schuylkill, and took post near Barren Hill church, eight or ten miles in front of the army. Immediate notice of his arrival was given to Sir William Howe, who reconnoitred his position, and formed a plan to surprise or cut him off. On the night of the 19th of May, General Grant, with five thousand select troops, took the road which leads up the Delaware, and consequently diverges from Barren Hill. After marching some distance, he inclined to the left, and passing White Marsh, where several roads unite, took one leading to Plymouth meeting-house, the position he was directed to occupy, something more than a mile in the rear of the marquis, between him and Valley Forge. He reached his point of destination rather before sunrise. Here the roads fork; the one leading to the camp of Lafayette, and the other to Matson's ford over the Schuylkill. In the course of the night, General Gray, with a strong detachment, had advanced up the Schuylkill on its south side, along the Ridge Road, and taken a post at a ford two or three miles in front of the right flank of Lafayette, while the residue of the army encamped on Chesnut Hill. Captain McClane, a vigilant partisan of great merit, was posted on the lines some distance in front of Barren Hill. In the course of the night, he fell in with two British grenadiers at Three Mile Run, who informed him of the movement made by Grant, and also that a large body of Germans was getting ready to march up the Schuylkill. Immediately conjecturing the object, McClane detached Captain Parr, with a company of riflemen across the country to Wanderer's hill, with orders to harass and retard the column advancing up the Schuylkill, and hastened in person to the camp of Lafayette. He arrived soon after daybreak, and communicated the intelligence he had received. It was not long afterwards confirmed by the fire of Parr on the Ridge Road, and by an inhabitant who had escaped from White Marsh as the British column passed that place. Thus surrounded with danger, Lafayette instantly put his troops * Marshall. in motion, and passed the Schuylkill at Matson's ford, which was rather nearer to Grant than himself, with the loss of only nine men. General Grant followed his rear, and appeared at the ford, just after the Americans had crossed it. Finding them advantageously posted, he did not choose to attack them; and the whole army returned to Philadelphia. This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. He resigned the command of the army to Sir Henry Clinton, and embarked for Great Britain.* For the following graphic detail of the events which immediately followed, we are indebted to an able contemporary.† "After the conclusion of the alliance between France and the United States, the vast fleet collected by the former, and the active part she proposed to take in the war, made it no longer safe for the British to remain in a port so easily blockaded as Philadelphia. Accordingly, orders were sent out by the ministry to evacuate the place. As soon as Washington learned this, and became satisfied that Sir Henry Clinton intended to reach New York by a march through the Jerseys, he consulted his general officers whether it would be advisable to attack the enemy during his retreat. With but two exceptions they opposed the measure. It was determined, however, to follow on the track of the foe, and seize every favourable opportunity for annoying him. "The British general's first intention was to reach New York by the way of Brunswick, but after ascending the Delaware as far as Bordentown, he learned that Washington had already occupied the high grounds which commanded that route. He was accordingly forced to abandon his original design, and, turning off toward Croswick, he proceeded through Allentown to Monmouth court-house, intending to reach South Amboy in this more circuitous way. At Monmouth court-house he rested for several days, having chosen a wooded hill, surrounded by swamps, and almost inaccessible, for his encampment. During this retreat Washington had moved along the more elevated ground to the northward, in nearly a parallel line to his enemy, thus retaining the power to give or withhold battle. No means of annoying Sir Henry, meantime, were neglected. A strong corps hung on his left flank, a regiment followed on his rear, and Colonel Morgan watched his right. Washington appears to have secretly wished for a battle during the whole march, and as the † C. J. Peterson, in Graham's Magazine. * Marshall. British approached the end of their journey he gradually drew his forces around them. He now again called a council of his officers, and proposed that battle should be given. But the measure was negatived a second time. It was, however, agreed that the corps on the left flank of the enemy should be strengthened, and that the main body of the army should move in close vicinity to it, so as to be at hand to support it in case of an emergency. Among those who opposed a battle were Generals Lee and Du Portail, and the venerable Baron Steuben. These officers considered the discipline of the Americans so inferior to that of the British, as to render defeat inevitable, in case the two armies should engage on equal terms; and the influence of their opinions brought over most of the junior officers to that side. Wayne, Cadwalader, Lafayette and Greene appear to have been the only ones who differed from the council; and the two first alone were openly in favour of a battle. When the council decided so much against his wishes, Washington resolved to act on his own responsibility. The British were already approaching Monmouth; twelve miles further on were the heights of Middletown; and if the enemy reached these latter, all hope of bringing him to an action, unless with his own consent, would be gone. The blow, if struck at all, must be given at once. "To bring on a battle, Washington resolved to strengthen still further the force on the enemy's left flank, now the advanced corps: and accordingly he detached Wayne to join it with a thousand men. This command, about four thousand strong, was thought of sufficient importance to be intrusted to one of the major-generals; and the post, of right, belonged to Lee. But having advised against the battle, and believing nothing serious was intended, he allowed Lafayette to take his place. Scarcely had he yielded, however, before he learned the importance of the post, and solicited Washington to restore it to him; otherwise,' to use his own phrase, both he and Lord Stirling (the seniors of Lafayette) would be disgraced.' To spare his feelings, Washington suggested a compromise. He sent Lee to join the marquis, with two additional brigades; but, in order that the feelings of Lafayette might not be wounded, he stipulated that if any scheme of attack had been formed for the day, Lee should not interfere with it. The intelligence of this change, and of the stipulation he had made, Washington communicated to Lafayette in a confidential letter, which shows the almost fatherly kindness the American chief entertained for the young marquis. No plan of attack, however, had been formed, and by the night of the 27th Lee was in full command of the advanced corps. "His army lay at Englishtown, not five miles distant from Monmouth, where the British were encamped. Washington, with the rear division, was but three miles behind; and almost his last duty, before he retired, was to send word for Lee to attack the enemy as soon as he should have begun the march. This was known at the outer posts, and during that short summer night, the sentry, as he walked his round, speculated on the fortunes of the coming day. "The morning had scarcely dawned before the British army began their march, Knyphausen, with the baggage, going first, while the flower of the army under Cornwallis, forming the rear division, followed some distance behind. On the first intelligence of the movement, Washington again sent orders for Lee to attack the enemy's rear, unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary.' He accordingly put his troops in motion, and directly after eight o'clock the glitter of his muskets flashed along the heights of Freehold, where Cornwallis, less than an hour before, had arrayed his men. As the Americans reached the brow of the hill they beheld the splendid grenadiers of the enemy moving, in compact masses, along the valley below; while far in the distance, toiling through the sandy plain, was visible the long line of baggage-wagons. A rapid glance decided Lee what to do. Pushing Wayne forward, to press on the covering party of the British rear, and thus engross their attention, he began a rapid march, by a by-road, to gain the front of this party, and so cut it off from the enemy. But he had advanced only a short distance when he learned that this detachment was in greater force than he had thought; and galloping forward in person to reconnoitre, he saw the whole rear division of the foe coming up to oppose him, their dense and glittering columns darkening the plain. "As Lee's opinion had been, on the general question, against a battle, so now, in this peculiar position, his judgment appears to have been opposed to the measure. He had a morass in his rear, and a disciplined enemy in front, while aid was as yet distant. He appears to have wanted confidence in his men; to have regarded victory as impossible; yet he took his measures to prepare for battle. Before, however, a shot had been fired, General Scott, who commanded a portion of the detachment, mistook an oblique movement of one of the American columns for a retreat, and, without waiting for orders, recrossed the morass in his rear. Lee did not recall him, but giving up the contest as hopeless on his present ground, followed Scott across the ravine, and so began that disastrous retreat which had wellnigh proved fatal to our army, and which led subsequently to his own disgrace. "On the propriety of this movement there has been some difference of opinion. But an examination of all the authorities leaves the impression on our mind, that Lee, though a brave man, wanted, in his then circumstances, that reliance on himself without which success is impossible, even in the ordinary affairs of life. He at first resolved to stand his ground, but afterward suffered himself to be decided against it, by the comparatively trifling circumstance of Scott's retreat. This was certainly weak. Had he possessed the heroic determination which Washington evinced later in the day, he would have met the enemy with a firm front, and recalling Scott, endeavoured to keep his position, at every hazard, until the rear division, which he knew was advancing, could come up. "His retreat to the heights was not effected without some skirmishing. Flushed with what they thought an easy victory, the British thundered hotly in pursuit, and Lee, still unable to find ground to suit him, continued retreating. Already he had left the heights of Freehold behind him in his flight, and, with the enemy close upon his rear, was approaching Englishtown, where he had lain the night before. arms. “Meanwhile the troops of our rear division, hearing the cannonade ahead, had cast aside their knapsacks and other impediments, and were hurrying to reinforce their brave companions in What was the surprise and indignation of their leader to meet the retreating troops! Washington first came up with the van, and to his astonished inquiry received for answer that a retreat had been ordered without striking a blow. Mortified and alarmed, he galloped forward until he met Lee, whom he addressed with a warmth of manner unusual to him, and in terms of strong disapprobation. The crisis was indeed calculated to disturb even the equanimity of Washington. Of Lee's intention to stand his ground on the first favourable opportunity, he was ignorant. That general had been guilty of gross neglect in not sending word to his chief of the retrograde movement. Washington, in consequence, saw only what appeared an unnecessary and disgraceful flight, hazarding the safety, probably the very existence, of his army. But in this emergency he retained his self-composure. Never was he greater than now. His fine person appeared to grow more commanding; his countenance, usually so calm, became animated with heroic resolution; and forming the regiments of Stewart and Rani |