attempt at retaliation. "Retaliation," he said, "is certainly just, and sometimes necessary, even where attended with the severest penalties; but, when the evils which may and must result from it exceed those intended to be redressed, prudence and policy require that it should be avoided.

"From the best information I have been able to obtain, General Lee's usage has not been so disgraceful and dishonourable as to authorize the treatment decreed to those gentlemen, were it not prohibited by many other important considerations. His confinement, I believe, has been more rigorous than has been generally experienced by the rest of our officers, or those of the enemy, who have been in our possession; but, if the reports received on that head be true, he has been provided with a decent apartment, and with most things necessary to render him comfortable. This is not the case with one of the officers comprehended in the resolves, if his letter, of which a copy is transmitted, deserves your credit. Here retaliation seems to have been prematurely begun; or, to speak with more propriety, severities have been and are exercised towards Colonel Campbell, not justified by any that General Lee has yet received.

"In point of policy, under the present situation of our affairs, this doctrine cannot be supported. The balance of prisoners is greatly against us; and a general regard to the happiness of the whole should mark our conduct. Can we imagine, that our enemies will not mete the punishments, the same indignities, the same cruelties, to those belonging to us in their possession, that we impose on theirs in our power? Why should we suppose them to possess more humanity than we have ourselves? Or why should an ineffectual attempt to relieve the distresses of one brave, unfortunate man, involve many more in the same calamities? However disagreeable the fact may be, the enemy at this time have in their power, and subject to their call, near three hundred officers belonging to the army of the United States. In this number there are some of high rank; and most of them are men of bravery and merit. The quota of theirs in our hands bears no proportion, being not more than fifty at most. Under these circumstances we should certainly do no act to draw upon the gentlemen belonging to us, and who have already suffered a long captivity, greater punishments than they have experienced and now experience. If we should, what will their feelings be, and those of their numerous and extensive connexions? Suppose the treatment prescribed for the Hessians should be pursued, will it not establish what the

enemy have been aiming to effect by every artifice and the grossest misrepresentations; I mean, an opinion of our enmity towards them, and of the cruel conduct they experience when they fall into our hands-a prejudice which we on our part have heretofore thought it politic to suppress, and to root out by every act of lenity and kindness? It certainly will. The Hessians would hear of the punishment with all the circumstances of heightened exaggeration, would feel the injury without investigating the cause, or reasoning upon the justice or necessity of it. The mischiefs which may, and must inevitably flow from the execution of the resolves, appear to be endless and innumerable."

While the American general was thus advocating the cause of humanity, the soldiers who were captured at Fort Washington were confined during the winter in New York, ill-lodged and badly fed. The provisions which they received were deficient in quantity, and of the worst quality. Many of them died of cold and hunger, and diseases contracted by being confined in close and unhealthy situations. Thus ungenerously treated, and driven almost to desperation, large bounties and tempting offers were held out to others to induce them to enlist in the British service, but they generally remained faithful to their country and their engagements under all their privations and sufferings. In the spring, General Howe sent some of them out for exchange, but they were so emaciated and sickly, so totally unfit for service in the field or camp, that General Washington refused to release an equal number of healthy British and Hessian prisoners, and such had been the good treatment received by them, that but few sick could be found. General Howe said that the refusal of the American general to exchange prisoners was a violation of the rule mutually agreed on between them; and though he could not deny the facts, he contended that the prisoners were treated as well as his circumstances would permit, and so far from being barbarously used, they were provided with every thing which was necessary, and which their situation as prisoners of war allowed. Commissioners had been appointed on each side to settle the matter, but they could not agree. General Washington replied:

"You must be sensible, that our engagement, as well as all others of the kind, though in the letter it expresses only an equality of rank and number, as the rule of exchange; yet necessarily implies a regard to the general principles of mutual compensation and advantage. This is inherent in its nature, is the voice of reason, and no stipulation as to the condition in which prisoners

should be returned, was requisite. Humanity dictated that their treatment should be such as their health and comfort demanded; and, where her laws have been duly respected, their condition has been generally good. Nor is this the language of humanity alone; justice declares the same. The object of every cartel, or similar agreement, is the benefit of the prisoners themselves, and that of the contending powers. On this footing, it equally exacts, that they should be well treated, as well as that they should be exchanged. The reverse is, therefore, an evident infraction, and ought to subject the party, on whom it is chargeable, to all the damage and ill consequences resulting from it. Nor can it be expected, that those unfitted for future service by acts of severity, in direct violation of a compact, are proper subjects for an exchange. In such case, to return others not in the same predicament, would be to give without receiving an equivalent; and would afford the greatest encouragement to cruelty and inhumanity. The argument, drawn from the mere circumstance of the prisoners having been received, is of no validity. Though, from their wretched situation, they could not, at that time, be deemed proper for an exchange, yet our humanity required that they should be permitted to return among us.

"It may, perhaps, be fairly doubted, whether an apprehension of their death, or that of a great part of them, did not contribute somewhat to their being sent out when they were.

"Such an event, whilst they remained with you, would have been truly interesting; because it would have destroyed every shadow of claim for a return of the prisoners in our hands, and therefore, policy, concurring with humanity, dictated that the measure should be adopted. Happy had it been, if the expedient had been thought of before these ill-fated men were reduced to such extremity. It is confessed, however, on all sides, that, after their delivery, they still continued your prisoners, and would be so till regularly exchanged.

"I acknowledge, that I should, and I have been always willing, notwithstanding this concession, to account for every man who was in a proper condition and fit to be exchanged at the time he came out, so far as the proportion of prisoners with us would extend. With what propriety, or upon what foundation of justice can more be demanded? This has been proposed, or, what is the same, was most clearly implied in the first article or objection made by Lieutenant-colonel Harrison, and illiberally rejected since, as inconsistent with any degree of reason or common sense.' Painful

as it is, I am compelled to consider it as a fact not to be questioned, that the usage of our prisoners whilst in your possession, of the privates at least, was such as could not be justified. This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out; their appearance sanctioned the assertion; and melancholy experience, in the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible certainty."

These difficulties continuing, interrupted the free exchange of prisoners until near the middle of the month of July, when an office fell into the hands of the Americans, of sufficient rank to induce General Howe to exchange General Lee for him. This removing one ground of the controversy between the two commanders, and the British general being induced to pay more attention to the condition of his prisoners, the causes of complaint were in some measure removed, though not wholly eradicated, until the final conclusion of the war.

As the spring opened, General Howe remained in some uncertainty with respect to reinforcements expected from Europe. Arriving, as they did, later, and in smaller numbers than had been anticipated, he was compelled, though he could number four times as many men fit for duty as Washington, to remain for some time in comparative inactivity; and, when the season for action could no longer be safely postponed, he was obliged to curtail the plans which he had formed the preceding autumn.

In order somewhat to remove the appearance of entire idleness, he determined to attempt the destruction of the stores collected by the Americans at Peekskill, Danbury, and other points to the eastward. Colonel Bird, with five hundred men, was detached against Peekskill on the 23d of March, under convoy of a frigate, two ships, and two brigs, and some smaller armed vessels. The place was garrisoned by two hundred and fifty men, under General McDougall, who receiving timely notice of the approach of the enemy, and accurate information with respect to their numbers, he exerted himself to remove the stores to places of greater safety; but before he had removed them all, the enemy landed with four pieces of artillery, and he retreated to the hills beyond the town, giving directions for destroying such stores as could not be removed. At the same time, he sent an express to Lieutenant-colonel Willett, ordering him to leave a subaltern's command at Fort Constitution, and march. with the remainder of his small force to his assistance. The British kept possession of the town until the next day, when they sent out a detachment to take possession of a piece of high ground flanked

by a wood between the town and the position taken by General McDougall. There, in the afternoon, they were attacked by Colonel Willett's detachment, and a smart skirmish ensued, which ended in the retreat of the British party to the main body. In the evening, favoured by the light of the moon, but galled by the fire of the Americans, the whole party embarked, and returned down the river. Nine of the enemy were killed or wounded in the skirmish with Willett, and four were killed at the creek, while attempting to set fire to the boats. The Americans had one man mortally wounded by a cannon-ball. The loss of provisions and stores destroyed by order of General McDougall, was considerable, and in this way the British partly succeeded in their design.

Another expedition was projected soon after against Danbury, in Connecticut, where a considerable amount of military stores had been collected. Though this place was within twenty miles of the Sound, so much dependence was placed on the neighbouring militia, and the help which they would be able to obtain from detachments passing through the town from the eastward, that no regular guard was stationed there for the protection of the stores. There were actually but fifty regulars, and one hundred militia, under Colonel Huntington, in the place, when the British made their appearance on the afternoon of the 26th of April. They numbered two thousand men, and were commanded by Governor Tryon, who had recently been appointed major-general of the provincials in the British service. Being unable to make any effectual resistance, Colonel Huntington carried off part of the stores, and retired from the town. General Tryon landed his army of tories at Campo, between Fairfield and Norwalk. Being unexpected, he proceeded without opposition to Danbury, which, with the stores contained in it, they set on fire and destroyed. In the mean time the alarm had spread. General Silliman, an officer of the Connecticut militia, saw the landing, called together as many men as he could, and the same evening sent forward a small party, who came upon the enemy and had a smart skirmish with their advanced guard. The next morning, he marched in pursuit with all the men he could. muster. Near Reading, he was joined by Generals Arnold and Wooster, who increased his numbers to six hundred men. They proceeded that night through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury, where, hearing that the town was destroyed, they rested their weary followers till daybreak. Then, hearing that the British were retreating towards the coast, they divided their forces, and Wooster, with two hundred men, took a route by