The third ground was Lord John Russell's announcement to Mr. Dallas that he was not unwilling to receive the so-called commissioners of the insurgents unofficially. On this point you already have instructions, to which nothing need now be added.

The fourth ground is the Queen's proclamation, exceptionable first for the circumstances under which it was issued, and secondly, for the matter of that important state paper.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton.

June 8, 1861. We appreciate highly the Emperor's assurance that he would mediate between the government and the insurgents, with a view to the maintenance and preservation of the Union, if such intervention were deemed desirable by us; and that generous offer imposes a new obligation upon us toward France, which we acknowledge with sincere pleasure.

If mediation were at all admissible in this grave case, that of his Majesty would not be declined. But the present paramount duty of the government is to save the integrity of the American Union. Absolute, self-sustaining independence is the first and most indispensable element of national existence. This is a republican nation ; all its domestic affairs must be conducted and even adjusted in constitutional republican forms and upon constitutional republican principles. This is an American nation, and its internal affairs must not only be conducted with reference to its peculiar continental position, but by and through American agencies alone. These are simple elementary principles of administration, no one of which can be departed from with safety in any emergency whatever; nor could it be departed from with the public consent, which rightfully regulates, through constitutionally constituted popular authorities, the entire business of the government.

I have set them forth in no invidious, uncharitable, or ungenerous spirit. I state them fairly and broadly, because I know the magnanimity of the Emperor of France, and I know that he can appreciate directness and candor in diplomacy. I know, moreover, that he is a friend of the United States, and desires that they may continue one great and independent nation forever. I know still further, that the principles I have thus stated will commend themselves to his own great wisdom. To invite or to accept mediation would be incompatible with these principles.

,

When all this has been said, you will then further say to Mr. Thouvenel, or to the Emperor, that if any mediation were at all admissible it would be his own that we should seek or accept. You may say, at the same time, that this government has no apprehension whatever of its being unable to conduct our domestic affairs through this crisis to a safe conclusion; that consummation is even not far distant, if foreign powers shall practise towards us the same. forbearance from intervention which we have habitually practised towards them in emergencies similar to our own; that intervention by them would only protract and aggravate the civil war in which we are unhappily engaged; that civil war is a scourge to which we are more sensitive than any other people, but that the preservation. of national unity, which is national existence, reconciles us to every form of difficulty and to the longest possible endurance of the trial in which we are engaged.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton.

June 17, 1861.- Every instruction which this government has given to its representatives abroad, since the recent change of administration took place, has expressed our profound anxiety lest the disloyal citizens who are engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Union should obtain aid and assistance from foreign nations, either in the form of a recognition of their pretended sovereignty, or in some other and more qualified or guarded manner. Every instruction has expressed our full belief that, without such aid or assistance, the insurrection would speedily come to an end, while any advantage that it could derive from such aid or assistance could serve no other purpose than to protract the existing struggle and aggravate the evils it is inflicting on our own country and on foreign and friendly nations. Every instruction bears evidence of an earnest solicitude to avoid even an appearance of menace or of want of comity towards foreign powers; but at the same time it has emphatically announced, as is now seen to have been necessary, our purpose not to allow any one of them to expect to remain in friendship with us if it should, with whatever motive, practically render such aid or assistance to the insurgents. We have intended not to leave it doubtful that a concession of sovereignty to the insurgents, though it should be indirect or unofficial, or though it should be qualified so as to concede only belligerent or other partial rights,

would be regarded as inconsistent with the relations due to us by friendly nations. Nor has it been left at all uncertain that we shall, in every event, insist that these United States must be considered and dealt with now, as heretofore, by such nations as exclusively sovereign for all purposes whatsoever within the territories over which the Constitution has been extended. On the other hand, we have not, at any time, been unmindful of the peculiar circumstances which might excite apprehensions on the part of commercial nations for the safety of their subjects and their property in the conflicts which might occur upon sea as well as on land between the forces of the United States and those of the insurgents.

The United States have never disclaimed the employment of letters of marque as a means of maritime war. The insurgents early announced their intention to commission privateers. We knew that friendly nations would be anxious for guarantees of safety from injury by that form of depredation upon the national commerce. We knew also that such nations would desire to be informed whether their flags should be regarded as protecting goods, not contraband of war, of disloyal citizens, found under them, and whether the goods, not contraband, of subjects of such nations would be safe from confiscation when found in vessels of disloyal citizens of the United States. This administration, free from some of the complications of those which had preceded it, promptly took up the negotiations relating to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, just at the point where they had been suspended by President Buchanan. We found it just and humane in itself so far as it goes, and that it had only failed to be accepted by the United States because foreign nations had refused to accept an additional principle proposed by this government, yet more just and humane than any which it does contain, namely, that the property of private citizens, not contraband, should be exempted from confiscation in maritime war. While still willing and desirous to have that further principle incorporated in the law of nations, we nevertheless instructed you, and all our representatives in foreign countries, to waive it, if necessary, and to stipulate, subject to the concurrence of the Senate of the United States, our adhesion to the declaration of the Congress of Paris as a whole and unmodified. This was done so early as the 25th day of April last, long before the date of the instructions which Mr. Mercier proposed to submit to us. We have ever since that time been

waiting for the responses of foreign powers to this high and liberal demonstration on our part. We have, however, received no decisive answers on the subject from those powers.

It was under these circumstances that on the fifteenth day of June instant, the minister from France and the minister from Great Britain, having previously requested an interview, were received by me. Each of them announced that he was charged by his government to read a despatch to me and to give me a copy if I should desire it. I answered that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the times, I could not consent to an official reading or delivery of these papers without first knowing their characters and objects. They confidentially and with entire frankness put the despatches into my hands for an informal preliminary examination. Having thus become possessed of their characters, I replied to those ministers that I could not allow them to be officially communicated to this government. They will doubtless mention this answer to their respective states. I give you now the reasons of this government for pursuing this course in regard to the despatch from France, that you may communicate them to the French government, if you shall find it necessary or expedient. Some time ago we learned through our legation at St. Petersburg that an understanding had been effected between the governments of Great Britain and France that they should take one and the same course on the subject of the political disturbances in this country, including the possible recognition of the insurgents. At a later period this understanding was distinctly avowed by Mr. Thouvenel to Mr. Sanford, who had been informally introduced by me to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Lord John Russell to Mr. Dallas, our late minister in London. The avowal in each case preceded the arrival of our newly appointed ministers in Europe, with their instructions for the discharge of their respective missions.

On receiving their avowals I immediately instructed yourself and Mr. Adams "that although we might have expected a different course on the part of these two great powers, yet, as the fact that an understanding existed between them did not certainly imply an unfriendly spirit, we should not complain of it, but that it must be understood by the French and British governments that we shall deal hereafter, as heretofore, in this case, as in all others, with each power separately, and that the agreement for concerted action be

tween them would not at all influence the course we should pursue." The concert thus avowed has been carried out. The ministers came to me together; the instructions they proposed to me differ in form, but are counterparts in effect.

Adhering to our previous decision, which before this time has doubtless been made known to the government of France, we do not make this concert, under the circumstances, a reason for declining to hear the instruction with which Mr. Mercier is charged. That paper does not expressly deny the sovereignty of the United States of America, but it does assume, inconsistently with that sovereignty, that the United States are not altogether and for all purposes one sovereign power, but that this nation consists of two parties, of which this government is one. France purposes to take cognizance of both parties as belligerents, and for some purposes to hold communication with each. The instruction would advise us indeed that we must not be surprised if France shall address herself to a government which she says is to be installed at Montgomery, for certain explanations. This intimation is conclusive in determining this government not to allow the instruction to be read to it.

The United States, rightly jealous, as we think, of their sovereignty, cannot suffer themselves to debate any abridgment of that sovereignty with France or with any other nation. Much less can it consent that France shall announce to it a conclusion of her own against that sovereignty, which conclusion France has adopted without any previous conference with the United States on the subject. This government insists that the United States are one whole undivided nation, especially so far as foreign nations are concerned, and that France is, by the law of nations and by treaties, not a neutral power between two imaginary parties here, but a friend of the United States.

In the spirit of this understanding of the case, we are not only not wishing to seek or to give offence to France, but, on the contrary, we desire to preserve peace and friendship with that great power, as with all other nations. We do not feel at liberty to think, and do not think, that France intended any want of consideration towards the United States in directing that the instruction in question should be read to us. Outside of that paper we have abundant evidence of the good feeling and good wishes of the Emperor, and even his anxious solicitude for the same consummation which is the supreme