the only point, as to the senate, which has been much discussed among us.

In some of the states in our national confederacy, elections for two or more years have been adopted, as a security for the independence and fidelity of senators. In others of them, a senator must have a large landed estate; in others, such an estate is a required qualification in electors; and in some, a landed estate is required, both in the elector and the senator.

The basis adopted in the constitution of this State is, that senators shall be apportioned, throughout the State, according to the amount of public taxes paid in districts of the State. That is, that the liability to be taxed, shall be accompanied by the right to be represented. We have not heard that this principle has been complained of by the people; nor do we believe it is justly exceptionable, in itself; on the contrary, the experience of forty years entitles it to the most entire respect and confidence. We have not thought it expedient, nor do we believe that you expected of us, to make any fundamental change in this department. We have done no more than to make the necessary provisions as to districts, and to fix the number of senators. We recommend that the number should be thirty-six; this number can be more conveniently distributed than any other throughout the State. A smaller number is not sufficient to perform the duty required of the senate; nor should the power of negativing the will of the house of representatives, be confided to a smaller number.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

We have found great difficulty in amending the representative system in a satisfactory manner. We have all agreed, that whether the representatives are few, or many, representation should be according to population, in this branch. It was the general opinion, that the number should be reduced; that town representation should be preserved; that payment should be made from the State treasury. Such mode of payment has been repeatedly voted in the house, and on one occasion it obtained the concurrence of the senate. There is reason to believe that it will become the established mode of payment. But if it be so, and the present system of representation continues, the expense must soon become an insupportable burthen. A house composed of one hundred or one hundred and fifty members, may be fully sufficient for all purposes of legislation; but so great a reduction could not be made without dividing the State into districts, and consequently giving up representation by towns.

We endeavored in the system which we submit to you-1. To reduce the number; 2. To preserve the privileges of town representation; 3. To provide for payment out of the State treasury; 4. To insure a general and constant attendance of the members throughout the session.

To accomplish these objects, we recommend that twelve hundred inhabitants should have one representative, and that twenty-four hun

dred be the mean increasing number for every additional representative.

But as nearly one half of the towns in the State contain on an average about eight hundred inhabitants, we propose that these towns should each choose a representative every other year, and that they should be divided, by the Legislature, into two classes for this purpose; one or the other of which classes will choose every year.

To show the application of this system; about seventy-four representatives will come every year, from the classed towns, which will be one representative for every 1632 inhabitants in all the classed towns; from those towns containing between twelve hundred and twenty-four hundred, will come one representative for every 1650 inhabitants; from those towns containing more than thirty-six hundred inhabitants will come one representative for every 2400 inhabitants. These calculations, (necessarily taken from the census. of the year 1810) are not precisely accurate; but they are sufficiently so to show the effect of the system.

It is apparent that towns having between twelve hundred and thirty-six hundred inhabitants, can send but one representative; and that there will be large fractions in some of these towns. Perfect equality is not attainable under any system. There are fewer inequalities in the proposed system, than in any which we have been able to form, if the four objects which we have mentioned are to be provided for; and we believe that the progress of population will constantly diminish those inequalities which may now exist.

We propose that in those years in which the valuation is settled, every town shall be represented."

By the proposed system the number of representatives will be about two hundred and sixty. We have thought it proper to offer to you further provisions, intended to prevent an increase, in the number of representatives, over two hundred and seventy-five, in any future time. This may easily be done, by empowering the Legislature to augment the ratio, after successive enumerations of the inhabitants. There was very little difference of opinion among us on the expediency of providing, that no town shall be hereafter incorporated with the right of sending a representative, unless it contain twenty-four hundred inhabitants.

If you are not willing to district the Commonwealth to elect members of the house; if you are not willing to continue the present mode of numerous representation, with the liability to the enormous expense which would accrue from paying out of the public treasury, some such system as we propose must be resorted to. We will not say that this is the best that could be; but we may justly say, that we have spared no exertion to form, and to present to you, the best which we could devise.

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL.

We recommend that the lieutenant governor should have the like qualifications as are required in the chief magistrate, for the obvious

reason, that the duties of the executive department may devolve on him.

During the last fifteen years the counsellors have been chosen by the Legislature, from the people at large, after an election from among those citizens, who were returned as senators and counsellors, followed by resignation. Experience has shown no inconvenience in this mode of election; and we have deemed it to be proper so to amend the constitution, as to establish this mode. This change, which we propose, is, in effect, nothing more than doing away the useless form of choosing from the senate. We did not prefer to elect counsellors by a general ticket, because we believe that there would be some difficulty in agreeing on candidates; and that the electors, throughout the State, would not have such knowledge of candidates, as would enable them to exercise the right of suffrage in a manner satisfactory to themselves. We did not prefer to choose counsellors in districts, because we were of opinion that it would not be agreeable to the citizens to be associated to exercise the right of suffrage, on this occasion, as they would not be so united on any other. And that it would be a useless labor and expense to form such districts, and an unnecessary burden on the people to meet and vote in them.

We conceive that a choice by the Legislature, is a choice by the people, through the agency of their public servants. That counsellors so chosen, and who enter on the duties assigned to them as soon as they are chosen, will be more independent of the chief magistrate, and more independent of those who desire executive favor, than if chosen in any other mode, though not less responsible to the people, because elected by the joint ballot of the two houses. We have all concurred in the opinion, that more than seven counsellors are not necessary.

THE JUDICIARY.

In the judicial department, we think two amendments are expedient.

An independent judiciary is a fundamental principle of a free government. We cannot so well express our sentiments on this important subject, as by referring to the twenty-ninth article of the declaration of rights.

It is there said, "It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent, as the lot of humanity will admit" and therefore, "that judges should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well."

The judges have not such tenure of office, unless the constitution be understood to mean, that they are not liable to removal, until they have had an opportunity to show that the alleged causes for removal are unfounded, or insufficient. The Legislature, in removing a judge, exercises not only a discretionary, but a judicial power. Judgment cannot justly be given, in any case affecting any interest, even of the humblest citizen, unless the cause has

been first stated, and it has been permitted to him to show, what he considers to be the truth of his case.

It cannot, then, be consistent with the plainest principles of justice, that the public functions of a citizen, and perhaps his reputation, may be taken from him, without any other notice from those who may exercise such power, than that they have exercised it, and that his relation to the public has ceased.

In whatever estimation we may hold the rights and interests of any individual who sustains a high judicial office, it is rather the public right and interest, which move us to propose the subjoined amendment.

The people can have no dearer interest in anything pertaining to government, than in the interpretation of the laws, and in the administration of justice, affecting life, liberty, property, and character. The constitution, with the explanatory amendment which we propose, secures to the people the unquestionable right of removing the unfit, the unworthy, and the corrupt; while it secures to them the no less valuable right of preserving to themselves, the able, the upright, and the independent magistrate.

We propose, therefore, so to amend the constitution as to require that no judicial officer shall be removed from office, until the alleged causes of removal are stated on the records of the Legislature; nor until the individual, thereby affected, shall have had an opportunity to be heard.

In the second article of the third chapter it is provided, that each branch of the Legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to require the opinion of the judges, on important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions. We think this provision ought not to be a part of the constitution; because, First, each department ought to act on its own responsibility. Second. Judges may be called on to give opinions on subjects, which may afterwards be drawn into judicial examination before them, by contending parties. Third. No opinion ought to be formed and expressed, by any judicial officer, affecting the interest of any citizen, but upon full hearing, according to law. Fourth. If the question proposed should be of a public nature, it will be likely to partake of a political character; and it highly concerns the people that judicial officers should not be involved in political or party dis

cussions.

We, therefore, recommend that this second article should be annulled.

SECRETARY AND TREASURER.

We recommend that the executive should be empowered to fill vacancies occurring in these departments, during the recess of the General Court, until a constitutional election is made.

MILITIA.

We propose that the office of commissary general should not be filled by legislative election; nor in any other manner, excepting

as the Legislature may by law provide, if such an officer should, hereafter, be necessary.

As minors are required by law to perform military duty, and have consequently a direct interest in the qualifications for office in those whom they are holden to obey, the want of discretion, which is legally affirmed of minors in other cases, is not applicable to this; and we have, therefore, proposed an amendment, which authorizes those minors, who are enrolled in the militia, to vote in the choice of officers.

To diminish expense in the militia service, and to secure able and faithful performance of duty therein, we think it expedient to empower the Legislature to provide, by law, for the removal of officers, in certain cases.

OATHS OF OFFICE.

How

We recommend that the oath of abjuration be abolished. ever proper this oath may have been, while this country was maintaining its conflict for independence with the mother country, the success of that conflict, and the lapse of time, have rendered that oath inapplicable to our condition.

We have agreed that the declaration of belief in the Christian religion ought not to be required in future; because we do not think the assuming of civil office a suitable occasion for so declaring; and because it is implied, that every man who is selected for office, in this community, must have such sentiments of religious duty as relate to his fitness for the place to which he is called.

DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE.

Some amendments are recommended in this division of the constitution, founded on one or other of these principles, viz.: First. To prevent the exercise, by the same individual, of those powers of government, which the constitution ordains to be kept separate. Secondly. To preserve that distinction between the National and State governments, which the principles, on which these governments are relatively founded, require.

NOTARIES PUBLIC.

No difference of opinion occurred, on the expediency of transferring the appointment of these officers from the legislative, to the executive department.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

We have thought it proper to inquire into the present state of this ancient and respectable institution, and have done this by the agency of a fully competent committee. We have made this inquiry, because this seminary has experienced the patronage of government from its earliest foundation; and was justly held to be worthy of appropriate constitutional provisions, by our predecessors. It appears that the powers conferred on Harvard University have always been exercised, and that the duties required of it have always been performed, with a sincere and ardent desire to promote